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In the context of the globalization of human capital, this thesis examines the 
role of CEOs with international experience, known as returnee CEOs. The first essay 
argues that that CEOs’ international expertise is acquired at the opportunity cost of 
local social capital, such as political and business ties, which is more critical than 
expertise in transition economies with weak legal institutions. Based on the sample 
of 2847 CEOs appointments in China, I find that returnee CEOs are associated with 
inferior performance, lower market reactions to appointment announcements and an 
adverse regulatory environment. The negative relation disappears when social capital 
is acquired, regional legal institutions are strong or returnees’ international expertise 
is in demand. Exploiting an exogenous increase in the supply of returnee talent as a 
result of new provincial policies, I find the results consistent. The second essay 
examines the returnee CEOs in newly public entrepreneurial firms that are in 
transition period. I propose that returnee CEOs possess the tacit knowledge of 
foreign advanced legal institutions, which can help entrepreneurial firms overcome 
the formalization challenges they face in getting listed. The results based on 355 
newly public Chinese entrepreneurial firms indicate that returnee CEOs, especially 
those who have returned from countries with advanced legal institutions are 
associated with superior post-IPO performance. In addition, foreign venture capitals 
(VCs) are found to strengthen the positive impact of returnee CEOs, especially when 
both VCs and CEOs are from countries with advanced institutions. In the third essay, 
I examine returnee CEOs’ managerial decision of listing location. Based on the 
sample of IPOs of Chinese entrepreneurial firms, I find that returnee CEOs are more 
likely to undertake foreign IPOs, especially for entrepreneurial firms operating in 
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high-tech industries, until the credibility crisis of US-listed Chinese firms was 
triggered by Muddy Water Research in 2011. Overall, this thesis provides original 
evidence on the impact of international experience of CEOs and makes important 
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In the context of the globalization of human capital, this thesis aims to 
examine the role of CEOs with international experience, known as returnee CEOs, in 
Chinese capital markets. This thesis makes three main contributions to the finance 
and entrepreneurship literature. 
First, this thesis contributes to the growing literature on the impact of CEOs’ 
experience or characteristics on firm decisions and financial outcomes (Benmelech 
and Frydman, 2015; Custódio and Metzger, 2013, 2014; El-Khatib et al., 2015; 
Kaplan et al., 2012; Malmendier and Tate, 2009; Mironov, 2015; Bernile et al., 2017). 
In particular, this thesis complements and extends the seminal work of Bertrand and 
Schoar (2003), which documents that managers’ person-specific impact can explain a 
large amount of the unexplained variation in corporate practices, after controlling for 
firm-level characteristics and industry effects. Quantifying the personal traits of 
CEOs with international experience, this thesis adds a new dimension to studies of 
CEO managerial effects and reveals how the international experience of CEOs 
shapes corporate performance and decisions. 
Second, this thesis also makes timely contributions to the research on brain 
gain in capital markets by revealing how it has impacted legal institutions. Giannetti 
et al. (2015) argue that directors with foreign experience facilitate the adoption of 
strong management practices and internationalization that could improve firm 
productivity and profitability. Masulis et al. (2012) find the advisory capability of 
foreign directors on cross-border acquisitions to be enhanced by their knowledge of 
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 The references of Chapter 1 are combined with Chapter 2. 
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foreign markets. In terms of CEO international experience, the literature shows that 
CEO international experience plays a role in international interdependence (Roth, 
1995) and operating firm performance (Carpenter et al., 2001; Certo et al., 2000). 
Chinese returnee entrepreneurs tend to have accumulated explicit knowledge about 
technology and foreign markets through their overseas experience, which can bring 
about advantages in terms of high-tech firm innovation, high-tech industry 
development, and exportation and entrepreneurial decisions (Liu et al., 2010; 
Filatotchev et al., 2009; Filatotchev et al., 2011; Kenney et al., 2013; Lin et al., 2016). 
I examine the role of returnee CEOs in firm performance, post-IPO performance and 
foreign IPO choice with considering the weak institutions, and provide evidence that 
fit of CEO characteristics and institutional environment is vital, and then explain the 
benefits of brain gain depend on both macro and micro institutions.  
Finally, this thesis adds to the literature on the relationship between cross-
border institution differences and financial markets in entrepreneurship studies. The 
literature largely focuses on the impact of institutional differences on the 
implementation of corporate strategies (Estrin et al., 2009; Meyer et al., 2009; Moore 
et al., 2012). Glynn and Abzug (2002) further point out that the host country’s 
institution can influence the behavior of foreign countries after entering the host 
country. Kwok and Tadesse (2006) provide evidence that multinational companies 
could shape the legal institutions of host countries. To the best of my knowledge, this 
thesis is the first to provide evidence that cross-border differences in the legal 
institutions of host countries and home countries play an important role in home 
countries through international human capital movement. 
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 The thesis consists of seven independent chapters, in addition to the 
introduction chapter, which study the role of returnee CEOs in China. The Chapter 1 
introduce the whole thesis. 
 In Chapter 2, “The Role of Returnees in Business: A Review”, I review the 
literature about returnees in China, and note that returnees have played an important 
role in society since the 1840s. Returnees contribute to modern business through 
facilitating knowledge transfer, increasing innovation, boosting productivity and 
ensuring economic growth. The evidence from other countries and the disadvantages 
of returnees are also discussed. 
 In Chapter 3, “Returnees’ Influences on China: A Business Perspective 
(1840s to 1940s)”, I review the important role played by returnees in business in 
China from the 1840s to the 1940s in order to delineate a complete picture of the role 
of returnees. By analyzing cases of a number of representative returnees in various 
industries, I summarize their charateristics and the contributions they have made to 
the advancement of modern business in China, such as the application of new 
technologies to boost productivity, their focus on R&D and the training of employees, 
and the implementation of modern management systems. 
 In Chapter 4, “Returnee CEOs under Weak Institutions: Blessing or Curse?”, 
I study the impact of returnee CEOs’ appointment on the performance of listed firms 
in China. Based on a sample of 2,847 CEO appointments in China, I find that 
Chinese returnee CEOs are associated with inferior performance, lower market 
reactions to appointment announcements and an adverse regulatory environment. I 
argue that CEOs’ international expertise is acquired at the opportunity cost of local 
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social capital, such as political and business ties, which is more critical than expertise 
in transition economies with weak legal institutions. The negative effect disappears 
when social capital is acquired, regional legal institutions are strong or returnees’ 
international expertise is in demand. 
 In Chapter 5, “Legal Enforcements and Institutional Transition of Chinese 
Entrepreneurial Firms: Evidence from Returnee CEOs”, I focus on newly public 
entrepreneurial firms, and examine the role of returnee CEOs in firms that are in a 
transition period. I argue that returnee CEOs possess tacit knowledge of foreign 
advanced legal institutions, which can help entrepreneurial firms overcome the 
formalization challenges they face in getting listed. Based on data from 355 newly 
public Chinese entrepreneurial firms, I find that returnee CEOs, especially those who 
have returned from countries with advanced legal institutions, are associated with 
superior post-IPO performance. In addition, the positive impact is more pronounced 
in foreign venture capitals (VCs) backed firms, especially when both VCs and CEOs 
are from countries with advanced institutions. 
 In Chapter 6, “Does Overseas Experience of CEOs Determine the Listing 
Location of Chinese Entrepreneurial Firms?”, I examine the managerial decisions for 
returnee CEOs in entrepreneurial firms for listing on Growth Enterprise Markets. 
Using a sample of IPOs of Chinese entrepreneurial firms in mainland China, the US 
and HK, I show that Chinese entrepreneurial firms with returnee CEOs, especially 
those operating in high-tech industries, are likely to undertake foreign IPOs. 
However, the credibility crisis for Chinese firms impedes the decision by 
entrepreneurial firms with returnee CEOs to undertake foreign IPOs. 
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In recent years, a growing number of overseas Chinese students and immigrants 
return to China to take advantage of the development opportunities by engaging 
business. Their roles in business receive increasing attention from policy makers, the 
media and scholars. This chapter intends to provide a review of the relevant literature. 
I note that returnees have started playing an important role in the society since 1840s. 
Returnees contribute to the modern business through facilitating knowledge transfer, 
increasing innovation, boosting productivity and ensuring economic growth. The 
evidence from other countries and the disadvantages of returnees are also discussed.  
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With the development and increasing importance of a number of developing 
countries, a growing number of immigrants or international students started returning 
to their home country in order to explore the opportunity by establishing business as 
returnee entrepreneurs (Kapur, 2001). Recent studies show that returnees have 
gained significance in their home countries (Dai and Liu, 2009; Filatotchev et al., 
2009; Lin, et al., 2014; Liu, et al., 2010b; Liu et al., 2014; Pruthi, 2014; Wright et al., 
2008). Such a trend of “brain gain” mitigates the concern of the phenomena of “brain 
drain” observed in early days when the talents from developing countries were 
attracted to developed countries (Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974). With the trend of 
“brain gain”, Chinese returnees play a key role in linking China to the world (Wang 
et al., 2011). 
 In modern China, from the first overseas student in 1841 to 413,900 overseas 
students in 2013, China had overtaken India becoming the largest origin of 
international students. With an increasing number of returning overseas Chinese, 
Chinese returnees made a great contribution to the development of society, economy 
and business. For example, from Xinhai Revolution in 1911 to the establishment of 
People’s Republic of China, returnees launched and led the China’s social change. In 
addition, the reform of the Chinese economy in 1978 and the establishment of the 
capital market in 1990 were led by returnee as well. The Chinese government 
launched a series of policies to attract overseas talents returning since returnees could 
bring the benefits in the past decades. For example, ‘Cheung Kong Scholars 
Programme’, ‘Recruitment Program of Global Experts’ and ‘Recruitment Program of 
8 
 
Global Experts’  were implemented in 1998, 2008, 2011, respectively,  intending to 
support overseas talents to contribute to the innovation of the academic and the 
business. Relying on survey data, Wadhwa et al. (2011) find that the government 
incentive is very important for the return of Chinese overseas talents. Accordingly, 
these policies could motivate the returning of overseas talents with the higher 
education. Wang and Lu (2012) document that among returnees 36.1% has 
postgraduate degrees and 35.5% has PhD degrees. The increasing importance of 
returnees has stimulated research interest, and there is a growing number of studies 
on this topic.  
 From the historical perspective during 1840s to 1940s, returnee entrepreneurs 
contribute to the nation’s industrialization and the nation’s business through applying 
the advanced technology and the management mode as well as focusing on the R&D 
and the employees training (Wang et al., 2014).  
 In addition to the historical perspective, returnees also contribute to the 
modern business by bringing expertise or technology from other countries to China. 
For example, returnees have a positive impact on firm innovation (Liu et al., 2010; 
Filatotchev et al., 2011), growth (Wright et al., 2008), and operating performance 
(Filatotchev et al., 2009; Giannetti, et al., 2014). The evidence of other countries is 
consistent with China’s studies. However, due to the underdeveloped institutions in 
China (Allen et al., 2005), the “brain gain” through returnees may be acquired at the 
cost of “resource loss”. Duan and Hou (2014) find the supportive evidence that 
returnees CEOs underperform local CEOs in the listed firms due to the lack of local 
resources. Li et al. (2012) find the returnee entrepreneurs underperform native 
entrepreneurs in the technology ventures. 
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 This chapter reviews the previous literature studying returnees and 
contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, I systematically review the 
existing literature that is related to returnees and talents mobility in China. Second, I 
not only discuss the role of returnee in business, but note that returnees contribute to 
the innovation of academia for their home country. Third, I extend the discussion of 
the role of returnees to other countries. 
 The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses history and 
institutional background. Section 3 reviews and discusses the literature about the role 
of returnees. Section 4 concludes. 
2.2 History and Institutional Background 
Returnees play an important role in the development of society in the modern 
China. The first overseas student of the modern China could be traced back to 1850. 
Rong Hong, the father of overseas students, attended Yale University in the US. 
After graduation, he returned China and led the “Westernization Movement”. The 
movement helped the Qing Dynasty start learning from the West in developing 
industries and education. In addition, in 1872, the Qing dynasty started to dispatch 
youth to study overseas with the advice of Rong Hong. 
 Along with the large-scale trend for Chinese studying abroad, a large number 
of overseas Chinese returned to China and contributed to the development of the 
Chinese society in the following century, especially three large leaps. First, in 1911, 
the Xinhai revolution led by Sun Yat-sen, a returnee from Japan, overthrew China’s 
imperial rule of 2000 years. Second, the People’s Republic of China was established 
by a batch of returnees in 1949. More specifically, 6 out of 10 founding marshals 
10 
 
were returnees. Third, the reform and opening-up in 1978 was led by Xiaoping Deng 
who returned China from France. The reform establishes the independent role of the 
market and introduces the market economy. 
 In addition to three large leaps for the development of society in modern 
China, returnees also contribute to the development of China’s modern business and 
the capital market, especially after 1978. For example, the establishment of the 
Chinese capital market was launched in 1990 by 8 returnees from the US, which 
accelerated the development of Chinese enterprises, and offered returnee CEOs 
opportunities to use their expertise and experience. They acted as the ‘pushing hand’ 
in developing corporate governance and corporate strategic management and 
bringing experiences and expertise from foreign mature stock markets to China. 
 Since returnees play an important role in the modern China, the Chinese 
government launches a series of policies to support and attract overseas Chinese. For 
example, the “Recruitment Program of Global Experts” was launched in 2008 by the 
Organization Department of the Communist Party in order to attract and support 
overseas outstanding Chinese to enhance innovation in enterprises and academia. 
The program intended to recruit approximately 2000 experts (including university 
professors, corporate top executives, and other technology- or innovation-oriented 
talents) with overseas PhD degrees within five to ten years. The Chinese government 
also offers favourable treatments in terms of registered residences (hukou), residence 
permits (for foreigners), a premier medical service, social security for the spouses 




2.3. Review and Discussion 
 Previous literature has widely explored the role of returnees in the business, 
ranging from the historical perspective to their impact on modern business in China. 
In particular, an increasing number of studies has examined the impact of 
international experience of returnees on the modern business not only in China, but 
also in other countries such as India, Argentina. In addition, returnees in developed 
countries, such as the US, also play a role in the business (Roth, 1995; Daily et al., 
2000; Carpenter et al., 2001), but the perspective of these studies focus on the 
international working experience which could facilitate firms obtain the information 
about foreign markets. 
2.3.1 Historical Perspective 
 During 1840s to 1940s, China started to learn from western countries and 
accelerated the nation’s industrialization. Returnees helped the nation’s 
industrialization to take-off with bringing back the advanced technology and 
ideology from foreign countries which had completed the industrialization revolution. 
Wang et al. (2014) conduct the case studies that include several industries with a 
number of representative returnees, and subsequently analyse the role of returnees in 
the development of the nation’s industrialization during 1840s to 1940s. They find 
that returnee entrepreneurs apply the advanced technology and the management 
mode to boost productivity, and focus on R&D and employees’ training.  
2.3.2 The impact of returnees on Chinese listed firms 
 As the largest emerging market, the role of returnees in the Chinese capital 
market is a debatable issue. Giannetti, et al. (2014) argue that the expertise of board 
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directors is valuable to firms and find that the proportion of board directors with 
international experience is associated with the higher profitability and the higher 
productivity in listed firms. In addition, the proportion of board directors with 
international experience is positively associated with firm internationalization. 
However, although returnees are expected to add value to firms with their knowledge 
and expertise, they still have weaknesses, such as the lack of local resources due to 
their absence from the home-country environment for a period of time when living in 
foreign countries (Li, et al., 2012; Obukhova, Wang and Li, 2012; Lin et al., 2014). 
By testing the competing hypothesis from expertise- and resource-perspective, Duan 
and Hou (2014) find that returnee CEOs underperform local CEOs by ROA, ROS 
and market-to-book ratio, and such underperformance is driven by the overseas 
working experience. The possible explanation for their underperformance is that 
returnee CEOs are less likely to appoint politically connected executives to 
compensate their weaknesses. Returnee CEOs are also more likely to adopt 
aggressive corporate strategies due to the overconfidence. 
 In addition to the Chinese capital market, international experience which 
constitutes the representative feature of returnees, has been confirmed to have a 
positive effect on firm performance in the US capital market (Roth, 1995; Daily et al., 
2000; Carpenter et al., 2001) since they are familiar with foreign markets. More 
specifically, Roth (1995) and Daily et al. (2000) find that CEO international working 
experience has a positive effect on ROA, ROI, and Market-to-Book ratio. Moreover, 
they further test that CEOs with international working experience could positively 
affect ROA, ROA and market-to-book ratio if the degree of firm internationalization 
is high. From the perspective of multinational firms, Carpenter et al. (2001) find that 
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U.S. multinational companies performed better with CEOs with international 
assignment experience through using ROA and stock return to proxy firm 
performance. Their findings support the resource- and dynamic capability-based 
theory. In addition, as the compensation to CEOs with international experience, these 
CEOs receive the higher salary. 
2.3.3 The impact of returnees on small Business 
 Although returnees are expected to carry technical expertise, managerial and 
entrepreneurial skills acquired in developed countries, Kenney et al. (2013) question 
the importance of returnees for igniting the take-off of the ICT (information and 
communications technology) industry in India, China and Taiwan in that most 
returnee entrepreneurs only returned after the success had been achieved by local 
entrepreneurs. Therefore, returnee entrepreneurs only contributed to the subsequent 
expansion phase of the industry rather than serving as the critical factor in the early 
formation and development of the ICT industry. Contrary to the impression of 
returnees, they are more beneficiaries of home nation development rather than 
initiators of the change. Almeida and Kogut (1999) and Song et al. (2003) note the 
importance of the talent mobility in helping emerging economies to catch up by 
adopting advanced technology through human mobility.  
Specific to China, seeing the benefits brought about by returnees, the Chinese 
government launched a series of talent schemes to encourage overseas Chinese 
talents return to the home country. Cheung Kong Scholars Programme attracted new 
faculty members from overseas reputable universities, typically the overseas alumni, 
and provided critical academic resources for Chinese universities. Li et al. (2014) 
find the alumni returnee scholars as faculty tend to publish in journals with a higher 
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impact than non-alumni returnee ones. However, returnee scholars exhibit decrease 
in international collaboration. 
 In addition to the impact of returnees on Chinese higher education, existing 
research has found that returnees act as a new channel for international knowledge 
spillovers and also contribute to the innovation of Chinese entrepreneurial firms 
(Filatotchev et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2010a; 2010b; Obukhova, 2012b). The findings 
from these studies show that returnee entrepreneurs positively affect the innovative 
activities of local firms through knowledge spillovers, and the presence of returnee- 
owned firms helps to enhance the technological capabilities of other local firms 
(Filatotchev et al., 2011). The technology gap between returnee-owned firms and 
non-returnee firm strengthens the positive impact of returnee-owned firms on the 
innovation of local firms based on a sample of SMEs in Zhongguancun Science Park 
(ZSP) in Beijing (Liu et al., 2010b). These studies suggest that returnees, as 
“knowledge brokers”, facilitate knowledge flows and stimulate innovation in 
emerging economies due to their dual exposure to the home and host countries. By 
transferring knowledge to local engineers, returnee entrepreneurs have a positive 
impact on the emergence of technological clusters in China (Obukhova, 2012b).  
In addition, returnee entrepreneurs also contribute to firm performance and 
employment growth. By analysing high-tech Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises 
(SMEs), Wright et al. (2008) investigated how returnees choose locations for starting 
their new venture and how their location choices subsequently affect firm 
performance (Wright et al., 2008). The findings indicate that returnee entrepreneurs 
with knowledge advantage proxied by the number of patents they transferred from 
abroad tend to locate in non-university science parks, while those with previous start-
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up experience abroad choose university science parks to start their business. 
Moreover, the firms set up by returnee entrepreneurs in non-university science parks 
enjoy stronger employment growth, and those with commercial experience abroad 
perform better in university science parks. The empirical evidence confirms the view 
that returnee entrepreneurs seek complementarity concerning their location choices 
in the home country and have a positive effect on employment growth on their firms 
located in non-university science parks. Also focusing on SMEs in science parks, 
Filatotchev et al. (2009) find that returnee entrepreneurs are associated with the 
higher export orientation and the better export performance. Liu et al., (2014) 
examine the impact of the learning capabilities of returnee entrepreneurs on firm 
performance. They found that experiential and vicarious learning help enhance firm 
performance, whereas vicarious learning is positively associated with employment 
growth. Firm age weakens reduces the impact of vicarious learning on employment 
growth. By examining the interrelationship between returnee entrepreneurs’ learning 
capabilities and firm age, their research indicates that the impact of returnees’ 
learning capabilities is contingent on organizational contexts. 
Relatedly, Batjargal (2007) finds that the interaction of social capital and 
Western overseas experience of entrepreneurs help to increase the chance of survival 
of Internet firms based on the Internet ventures in an earlier sample period,. The 
overseas experience brings returnee entrepreneurs benefits in sparse networks which 
help to connect different clusters, regions and countries. For entrepreneurial firms in 
the IPO that is the transition period from the private to the public, Cumming et al. 
(2014) find that returnee CEOs outperform local CEOs in terms of IPO performance 
and post-IPO performance.  
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 However, Li et al. (2012) find that the new technology ventures managed by 
returnee entrepreneurs underperform those managed by native entrepreneurs. Lin et 
al. (2014) use the survey data from the Zhongguancun Science Park and find that 
SMEs with returnee CEOs are not more innovative than those with native CEOs. 
Obukhova (2012a) uses the survey data of Shanghai’s semiconductor-design industry 
and finds that the role of brokers for returnee entrepreneurs is insecure when they 
launched firms in the home country. These mixed empirical findings may imply that 
returnees have weaknesses due to their absence from the home-country environment 
for a period of time when living in foreign countries. They may encounter cultural 
shock, and face considerable difficulties in adjusting to China’s under developed 
institutional environment (Li, et al., 2012; Obukhova et al., 2012; Lin et al., 2014; 
Zhou and Hsu, 2011). Some earlier studies may have overestimated the advantages 
of returnees.  
 From the perspective of other counties, returnees also play an important role 
in the innovation. For example, Alnuaimi et al. (2012) examine to extent to which 
labour mobility promotes innovation in India. Indian firms can hires new inventors 
from abroad and some of them could be returnees. The impact of their patents is 
higher in comparison to inventors hired from other Indian organisations. Jonkers and 
Cruz-Castro (2013) examine the collaboration patterns and outputs upon return of the 
Argentinean returnee scholars, and find the overseas experience indeed increases the 
propensity to publish in journals with a higher impact. A big proportion of such 
publications are made without having international co-authorship. Gibson and 
McKenzie (2014) survey the migration outcomes and scientific productivity of 
researchers from small Pacific Islands countries. Although the overseas scholars 
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from these countries have better access to research funds and more active scientific 
networks, they find the return rates of overseas scholars are 5-8 times larger than 
previous results (e.g. Gaule, 2011). Also using the survey data, Scellato et al. (2014) 
find that returnees and foreign born scientists are associated with the larger 
international research networks comparing with native scientists across sixteen 
countries. 
2.4 Conclusion 
 This chapter mainly reviews the role of returnees in China, and furthermore 
expanding the discussion to other countries. Since returnees play an important role in 
the development of society and business in modern China, the Chinese government 
launches a series of programmes to attract and support returnees playing a role. By 
reviewing a large number of studies for returnees across various issues, I conclude 
that returnees are associated with a high level of innovation (Liu et al., 2010; 
Filatotchev et al., 2011), higher growth (Wright et al., 2008), and better export 
performance (Filatotchev et al., 2009; Giannetti, et al., 2014). However, some 
scholars have suggested that returnee entrepreneurs have disadvantages due to their 
exit from the home-country environment for a period of time when living in foreign 
countries. Returnees may suffer from the liability of ‘outsiderness’ and a lack of 
local connections as well as difficulties in cultural readjustment (Li, et al., 2012; Lin 
et al., 2014). The underdeveloped institutional environment in China may exacerbate 
difficulties and challenges facing returnees when operating in China (Duan and Hou, 
2014; Li et al., 2012). This may explain why returnees underperform locals and 
imply that the “brain gain” through returnees may be associated with the cost of 
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“resource loss”. Thus, I call for more studies taking account of both the advantages 
and disadvantages of returnees and interactions between returnees and the local 
institutional context in their home country.   
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Chapter 3 Returnees’ Influences on China: A 




Since the first Chinese student, Yung Wing, studied abroad in 1847, large waves of 
Chinese have followed his lead, aiming to study advanced technology and ideologies, 
with the mission to save their backward country. This chapter discusses the benefits 
and changes of this overseas experience for the students, and reviews the important 
role played by the returnees in the nation’s industrialization. By analyzing the cases 
of a number of representative returnees in various industries, I summarize their 
features and the contributions they have made to the advancement of modern 
business in China, such as the application of new technologies to boost productivity, 






With as many as 340,000 Chinese students studying in foreign countries in 
2011, China has become the largest country of origin of overseas students in the 
world. When the students return to China after graduation, they are known as 
‘returnees’ or ‘haigui (海归)’. Returnees have played a very important role in 
society. For example, Sun Yat-sen, the Father of the Republic of China, Zhou Enlai 
and Zhu De, the main founders of the People’s Republic of China under Mao 
Zedong, and Deng Xiaoping, the ‘Chief architect’ of Chinese economic reform and 
the opening-up policy, are all returnees. Returnees are believed to use their 
expertise acquired from their international experience to contribute to the 
modernization of China, through revolution, reforms and the development of 
technology. Despite the importance of the Chinese returnees, their role in business 
history has not been examined. This chapter aims to shed light on this issue.  
In the 19
th
 century, China was very backward as a result of the isolation 
policy of the Qing dynasty, and foreign products dominated the domestic market 
because modern national industry had not yet been developed. The situation began to 
change as Chinese overseas graduates returned to China in the late 19
th
 century to 
lead the development of modern business practices. The returnees brought back 
advanced technology and new business modes after studying various subjects in the 
developed western countries, thus making a great contribution to the development of 
the national industry and the modern business of China. 
The first Chinese overseas higher education student dates back to 1847. With 
the help of American missionary Samuel Robbins Brown (1810-1880), Yung Wing 
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(Rong Hong or 容闳，1828-1912), commonly known as the ‘Forefather of Chinese 
Overseas Students’, left the isolated ‘Middle Kingdom’ to study in America (Yung, 
1909). His fellow classmates, Wong Shing (黄胜, 1827-1902) and Wong Kuan (黄宽，
1829-1878), from the Morrison Memorial School joined him to study abroad as well. 
Advocated by Yung Wing, the unprecedented state-sponsored study abroad program, 
named the China Educational Mission (CEM), of the Qing dynasty later dispatched 
120 young male Chinese students to study in America from 1872 to 1875, marking 
the inception of waves of students studying abroad in modern times. Around the 
same time, prompted by a series of military defeats, the Qing government also sent 
nearly 100 students to Europe to study naval warfare. 
As for the first group of returnees, the three of them made their marks in 
different areas, and promoted China’s modernization on their return. Wong Shing 
became an editor, writer, translator, publisher and educator, and is commonly 
regarded as the forerunner of the modern Chinese newspaper industry. In 1858, he 
launched the first Chinese newspaper, Sino-Foreign Gazette (中外新报), in Hong 
Kong. In 1871, he cofounded the China Printing Company (中华印务总局), the first 
printing company to be created by Chinese founders in modern Chinese history. The 
books they produced played an important part in China’s early cultural exchanges 
with the outside world (Xisuo Li, 2009a: 46-48). 
Wong Kuan joined the University of Edinburgh to study medicine, and 
became the first Chinese person to receive a doctorate in medicine. After he returned 
to China, apart from running hospitals and medical schools, he also set up the first 
western clinic in China in 1860. Under Wong Kuan’s influence, the western hospital 
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system, medicine, medical education, and medical research began to take root and 
spread in China (Xisuo Li, 2009a: 49). 
 Yung Wing, the first Chinese person to receive a degree from a western 
university, became an educator and a senior advisor to the Qing dynasty. Yung was a 
staunch supporter of capitalism and economic modernization. Employing his 
political clout, he earnestly pushed for the learning of American science and 
technology, the establishment of a banking system, the founding of shipping 
companies, and the building of mines and factories. To put his ideas for building key 
modern industries for China into practice, Yung went back to America to purchase 
industrial equipment at Zeng Guofan’s
3
 request (Jiansheng Xu, 2011: 9). With the 
equipment bought by Yung, the Jiangnan arsenal (江南制造总局), the supreme 
arsenal of the late Qing dynasty and one of the early modern industrial bases in 
China, was established in 1865. 
In terms of the development level of countries such as the US, the UK, and 
Japan in that period, they had already experienced the industrial revolution. Both 
their societies and their technology enjoyed dramatic development as a result. Firstly, 
the ideology of the society in such countries had developed from the ‘divine right of 
kings’ to one of freedom and republic. The new ideology provided a precondition for 
change in society, and subsequently laid a foundation for the development of modern 
science and technology. Secondly, the application of the modern machine raised 
productivity and improved work efficiency. For example, in the UK during the 18
th
 
century, steam heating technology was widely applied in the cotton textile industry 
                                                 
3
 Zeng Guofan was the officials of Qing dynasty and the representative officials of westernizationists. 
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(Tann, 1973), and sewing machines in the clothing industry (Godley, 1995). Thirdly, 
university disciplines were greatly expanded. For example, business programs were 
launched in the late 19
th
 century to teach the efficient operation of modern firms. 
Finally, the development of the modern city changed people’s lifestyles. For example, 
high-rise buildings started to appear in the late 19
th
 century in the US, and the private 
car made daily life more convenient. In contrast, China did not keep pace with the 
western countries’ industrial revolution as the Qing dynasty adopted an isolation 
policy. As a result, China’s development in many aspects fell far behind western 
countries’.  
Overseas Chinese students were shocked by the development gap between 
western countries and their home country, and were therefore determined to acquire 
the advanced ideologies and technology they learned there to revitalize China. The 
waves of Chinese students studying abroad bore the clear imprint of the prevailing 
national strategy of the time, namely, the ‘Self-strengthening Movement’. This 
referred to an internal reform of the economy and technology, driven by the 
westernizationists of the Qing dynasty, with the objective of ‘self-strengthening’ and 
‘wealth seeking’. Although the ‘Self-strengthening Movement’ did not prevent the 
fall of the Qing dynasty, it still opened the way for and advanced the modernization 
of China, laying the foundations for national capitalism. Despite their relatively small 
numbers, the early returnees played a key role in creating and developing China’s 
early mining, transportation, telegraph and defense industries.  
Previous studies on returnees have largely focused on returnees’ contributions 
to China from political, social, cultural, and educational angles (Zweig, Chen, and 
Rosen, 2004; Han and Zweig, 2010; Zweig and Wang, 2013), though attempts have 
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been made to examine contemporary returnees’ roles in China’s economic 
development (Duan and Hou, 2014; Liu et al., 2010). This chapter adds a historical 
perspective to this important issue and aims to examine the differences in business 
mode development between returned and domestic entrepreneurs, and to discuss how 
the returned entrepreneurs have contributed to modern business through their 
expertise and experience during the periods of the late Qing dynasty and the 
Republic of China.  
I specifically focus on the national industry development by examining the 
role of returnees in various industries. From the analysis of the characteristics of 
returnee-operated businesses, I summarize three major contributions they have made. 
First of all, returnee entrepreneurs tend to be experts in their industries and therefore 
put more effort into research and development (R&D). For example, Fan Xudong, 
known as the king of salt and sodium carbonate, studied chemistry in Japan and 
subsequently established the first national soda factory (Di, 2005; Xiong, 2011). 
Secondly, returnee-managed companies try to establish industrial chains in order to 
obtain raw materials of good quality at a lower cost. For example, Mu Ouchu, 
China’s cotton textile tycoon, a returnee from the US, imported cotton seeds from the 
US in order to produce quality cotton (Wu, 2011). Thirdly, returnee entrepreneurs are 
typically willing to provide support to their employees for studying or training 
overseas, in order to cultivate and retain their talent pool. For example, Fan 
Xudong’s enterprises selected and dispatched talented employees to study chemistry 
in the US (Di, 2005). Last but not least, returnees have brought back and 





 that promotes efficiency, and modern accounting systems such as the 
double-entry bookkeeping approach. Nelson (1974) shows that the application of 
Taylor’s scientific management laid the foundation for ‘scientific management’ and 
boosted efficiency and productivity. Boyns and Edwards (1997) emphasize that the 
double-entry bookkeeping system was already the bedrock of financial accounting in 
western countries when it was brought to China. Both systems contributed to the 
modernization of management in China. 
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the influence 
of the overseas study experience on Chinese returnees. Section 3 reviews the 
ideology and practice of saving the nation through industrialization and the inputs of 
returnees. Sections 4, 5, and 6 analyze cases of a number of representative returnee 
entrepreneurs in light, heavy, and service industries, respectively. Section 7 
concludes. 
3.2 The Influence of the Overseas Study Experience 
Although Chinese students started going abroad to study in the 1840s, Japan 
did not become the main destination until the beginning of the 20
th
 century (L. Liu 
and Sun, 2009). After the Sino-Japan war in 1895, the Qing dynasty started to 
consider making reforms to save the nation (Sanetou, 2012). Consequently, the Qing 
dynasty dispatched a group of students to study social reform and technology in 
Japan, in order to catch up with that country, which had developed rapidly since the 
‘Meiji Restoration’. Sanetou (2012) points out that the language, culture, and 
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ideology in Japan were easy for Chinese students to learn, and the lifestyle was also 
easy for them to adapt to. In addition, it was more convenient and less costly for 
them to travel between these two neighboring countries. These facts encouraged a 
large number of Chinese students to study in Japan.  
  The ‘Meiji Restoration’ had been launched by the lower-level samurai, and 
had subsequently overthrown the feudal dynasty of the high-level samurai in Japan. 
In essence, it had been a revolution carried out to establish a new regime and a new 
social system. The revolution had not only encouraged Japan to learn advanced 
science and technology from western countries, but had also advocated western 
ideologies, starting with the translation of western publications. Chinese overseas 
students in Japan thus had opportunities to gain exposure to these new ideologies 
about revolution and capitalism, which had led to Japan’s national prosperity. 
The returnees’ study experience in Japan helped to break the conservative 
ideology in China (L. Liu and Sun, 2009), directly contributing to the ideas of 
revolution during the enlightenment stage of China’s modernization, and cultivating 
revolutionists such as Huang Xing and Song Jiaoren. As a result, from 1906, the 
Qing dynasty restricted studying in Japan (L. Liu and Sun, 2009), and students 
started going to the US instead, sponsored by the refund of ‘Geng Zi Indemnity’ in 
1908. 
 China was dominated by the feudal emperor, and the development of Chinese 
society was still lagging far behind the rest of the world. In contrast, the US ideology 
focused on cultivating a ‘public spirit’, which gave the Chinese students a new 
perspective (Ye, 2012: 30), along with democracy and equality. They were very 
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active in campus activities and accepted the ideology through practice (Ye, 2012: 22). 
The returnees from the US brought back new thoughts of changing China into a 
republic.  
Meanwhile, the returnees also brought back modern technology from the US. 
Due to the industrial revolution, the science and technology of western countries far 
exceeded that of China in the 19
th
 century. For example, skyscrapers emerged in 




, and electricity was widely 
used and private cars commonplace in large cities. The contrast between China and 
the US shocked the overseas Chinese students and inspired patriotic enthusiasm 
among them. They were therefore determined to use their knowledge to contribute to 
the development of their home country. 
The Chinese students also benefited greatly from the university curriculum in 
the US, not available in China, whose education system was totally different from 
that of the US. The Qing dynasty had inherited the imperial examination system, 
which had started in 605 AD during the Sui dynasty. As the imperial examination 
system was mainly aimed at selecting administrative officials for the state’s 
bureaucracy, the contents of the examination focused on the ‘Four Books and Five 
Classics’ dealing with the classical Chinese philosophy of Confucianism. However, 
during the 19th century, the US education system offered a much wider variety of 
subjects, such as science, technology, and business. Some emerging disciplines 
related to industrialization were set up. Through some of these courses, Chinese 
overseas students learned how to transform technology into productivity. For 
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example, the application of machines in the cotton textile industry had boosted 
productivity and efficiency. Some universities also started business programs at this 
time6. For example, the first business school in the world was established by the 
University of Pennsylvania in 1881. The first Chinese banker, Chen Guangfu, 
graduated from this school and went on to run the first Chinese private commercial 
bank in China.  
In summary, the development gap between China and developed countries 
inspired the patriotic ardor of the overseas Chinese students, as they gained 
opportunities to learn advanced technology and access to modern ideologies. Their 
overseas experience brought about great benefits and made a big difference to them, 
as they would not have acquire these expertises if they stayed in China. The overseas 
experience lays a foundation for the important role to be played by the returnees 
when they return to their home country.  
3.3 Saving the Nation through Industrialization 
 As a result of the Qing dynasty’s isolation policy, China fell far behind the 
western countries that had gone through the Industrial Revolution in the middle of 
the 18
th
 century. After their failure in the first and second Opium Wars, the Qing 
dynasty realized that its isolation policy had led to China’s backwardness, and felt 
that the development of the western countries was largely based on modern science 
and technology. A group of bureaucrats advocated that the Qing dynasty should learn 
from the western countries for self-strengthening purposes. One, named Wei Yuan, 
                                                 
6




published a book entitled ‘Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime Kingdoms’ (Haiguo 
Tuzhi) to introduce the science and technology of the western countries to China, and 
encouraging the Qing dynasty to ‘learn from western countries in order to defeat 
them’. The self-strengtheners initiated the ‘Self-strengthening Movement’ in 1861, 
importing advanced industrial technology and business modes in order to obtain 
powerful modern weapons and increase the national revenues. In addition, during the 
‘Self-strengthening Movement’, on the advice of Yung Wing (‘the Father of the 
Returnees’), the Qing dynasty not only encouraged people to study abroad but also 
dispatched 30 youths to the US each year between 1872 and 1875 to study advanced 
industrial technology and advanced production approaches.  
At the end of the 19
th
 century, along with the crushing defeat in the Sino-
Japanese War (1894-1895), the ‘Self-strengthening Movement’ failed. However, the 
reform had provided a welcoming environment in which Chinese returnees could 
play a role. Meanwhile, it had motivated students to study abroad in order to find a 
way to make China more powerful. The ideas of ‘saving the nation by science’ and 
‘saving the nation by industrialization’ gained consensus among Chinese students. 
Therefore, the majority of overseas students, especially those studying in America, 
chose science and engineering as their majors. For example, among the first batch of 
students dispatched to America under the overseas study program of the ‘American 
Remission of the Boxer Indemnity’, 43 out of 47 students studied science and 
engineering (Ye, 2012: 53).  
Based on their study experience abroad, some returnees whose studies had 
been funded by the CEM became China’s first generation of mining engineers, 
including Wu Yangzeng (1862-1939), Kuang Bingguang (1863-1962), and Kuang 
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Rongguang (1863-1965). In particular, to acknowledge their contribution to China’s 
mining industry, the Qing court conferred ‘Jin Shi’ on Wu Yangzeng and Kuang 
Rongguang in 1909
7
. Some became pioneers in China’s communications industry. 
For example, Zhou Wanpeng, Zhu Baokui, Tang Yuanzhan, Yuan Changkun, and 
Tao Tinggeng built China’s first national telegraph system and integrated it with the 
international telegraph industry. In the railway industry, Zhan Tianyou，the ‘Father 
of the Chinese Railway’ and the ‘Father of Modern Chinese Engineering’ designed 
and built China’s first railway, the Jing-Zhang Railway, which was regarded as a 
miracle by his western contemporaries (Xu and Mao, 2005). After its completion, in 
1909 the Qing court conferred upon him too the award of ‘Jin Shi’. 
Returnees from studying naval defense in Europe became the mainstay of the 
Qing dynasty’s navy and played a key role in modernizing China’s weapons 
production industry and in building China’s civil ship-building industry, which 
marked the beginning of China’s early industrialization (Albert, 1990: 1). These 
returnees were also pioneers of China’s aviation industry. Led by Liu Guanxiong, 
Chen Shaokuan and other returnees, the Foochow arsenal manufactured China’s first 
planes in 1919 (Wang, 1995). 
Returnees not only contributed to the reform of the late Qing dynasty through 
industrialization but also led to its downfall. In addition to the modern science and 
technology they brought back, they also spread the ideology of revolution and 
democracy. In 1911, the Xinhai Revolution overthrew the Qing dynasty, and Sun 
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Yet-Sen, a returnee from Japan, became the first president and founding father of the 
Republic of China. With a new democratic China established, a large batch of 
overseas Chinese were attracted to return and contribute to the development of the 
new China. They not only pushed the development of Chinese modernization but 
also encourage a change in people’s ideology. The ideology of ‘saving the nation by 
industrialization’ became the mainstream thought. Many returnees set up their own 
enterprises out of patriotism. Returnees of the late 19
th
 century and early 20
th
 century 
made remarkable achievements in industries such as textiles, finance, chemicals, 
electrical, steel, etc. Following the procedure of ‘technology introduction – 
improvement – development’ (Feng Zuo, 2011), these returnees helped lay the 
foundation for China’s early industrialization and in turn made substantial 
contributions to the national economy as a whole.  
3.4 Contributions to Light Industry 
3.4.1 The Cigarette Industry 
 As a very profitable industry, the domestic cigarette industry was 
monopolized in the early 20
th
 century by foreign producers from America, Japan, and 
Europe, leading to a large wealth outflow to the western countries (Sun, 2012). The 
tobacco industry started in western countries such as the UK and the US. The 
operating modes and strategies were mature in the foreign tobacco industry. Cox 
(1989) shows that tobacco companies in the UK and the US, such as the Imperial 
Tobacco Company and the American Tobacco Company, not only sold their 
products to domestic markets but also extensively to overseas markets such as 
Australia, China, Japan, India and others. This demonstrates the western tobacco 
companies’ international strategy of entering and dominating foreign markets. In 
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terms of their entry into China, Cox (1997) argues that the Britain American Tobacco 




Due to the backwardness of its production facilities, techniques and business 
mode, the national firms could not compete with foreign companies in the cigarette 
industry until returnees brought back the mature technology needed to rapidly 
establish a national tobacco industry in China. For example, Jian Zhaonan and his 
brother Jian Yujie, returnees from Japan, established the ‘Guangdong Nanyang 
Tobacco Company’ in Hong Kong in 1905 to produce a nationally branded cigarette 
and ‘prevent foreign companies from grabbing wealth from China’ (Xiong, 2011: 44). 
Having relevant overseas working experience and a deep understanding of tobacco 
technology and operating strategies, they established relationships in Japan that 
enabled them to import cigarette-producing techniques and equipments. With the 
help of Japanese cigarette production experts, they rapidly developed cigarette 
products. In addition to their technology advantage, their sales strategy was similar to 
that of the BAT Company (global strategy), which helped them to rapidly occupy the 
market in Southeast Asia (W. Xue, 2010). Then, they expanded their business to 
Guangzhou with their mature cigarette product and competed with foreign cigarette 
producers. Until 1920, their business had great success, making a yearly profit of 
more than 4 million US dollars. Finally, the raw material of tobacco leaf was 
important, as it accounted for a large proportion of the assets of the western tobacco 
companies (Fitzgerald and Hirao, 2005). They therefore followed the western 
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companies’ lead and imported tobacco seeds to plant in China, so as to obtain quality 
raw materials at a lower cost, breaking the raw material embargo of the foreign 
companies (Sun, 2012). 
 Based on their experience in Japan, the Jian brothers also adopted a modern 
management system. For example, they recruited a returnee (Chen Qijun) from MIT 
to manage the company. Following Taylor’s management method, the operation and 
management style of the Jian group was similar to that of a large western enterprise 
(Sun, 2012). Instead of relying on the compradors
9
, they also raised funds from 
foreign commercial banks such as HSBC and CitiBank, and from insurance 
companies (Xiong, 2011: 56; Sun, 2012). Similarly to most returnee-owned 
enterprises, the Jian brothers’ enterprises also invested in dispatching employees to 
study abroad and subsidizing their studies (Sun, 2012).                                                                                                                                                            
3.4.2 The Cotton Textile Industry 
Following the industrial revolution in western countries, technological 
progress and the application of machines substantially advanced the cotton 
manufacturing industry. Mass and Lazonick (1990) explain that, with effort-saving 
technological change, a given amount of human effort produces more goods and 
services of a given quality. In addition, the application of modern management 
methods in the UK’s cotton textile industry contributed to its efficiency and 
productivity (Toms, 1998). Chapman (1979) notes that the application of spinning 
and power-loom weaving technology contributed to the development of the cotton 
industry in the 19th century.  
                                                 
9
 Refer to Chinese citizens that helped foreign companies to develop business in China. 
38 
 
Mu Ouchu (穆藕初，1876-1943), a returnee from the US, was arguably the 
most influential figure in China’s early textile industry. Commonly known as 
China’s ‘Cotton Textile Tycoon’, Mu Ouchu set up the Deda Yarn Factory in 1914, 
the Housheng Yarn Factory in 1918, and the Yufeng Yarn Factory in 1919 (Yi, 2004: 
148-151). In 1920, he also cofounded the China Industrial Bank in Shanghai. Aside 
from his achievements in the textile industry, Mu Ouchu was also known as a 
pioneer of Chinese corporate management. He was the first to introduce Taylor’s 
theory of scientific management into China and put it into practice in his own 
factories (Tang, 2006: 17).  
Song Feiqing (宋棐卿 , 1898-1956) was another influential returnee in 
China’s textile industry. The East Asia Woolen Company he founded in 1932 
produced a series of household brand names such as ‘Ram Sheep’, ‘Peacock’, ‘Five 
Sheep’ and ‘Riding Sheep’ in the woolen industry. Other notable returnee 
entrepreneurs in the textile industry included Zhu Xianfang, who founded the 
Jiujiang Jiuxing Yarn Factory in Jiangxi, Zhang Pinti, who set up the Dayuanxing 
Weaving Factory, and Shen Jiuru, who founded the Shanghai Silk Factory, the 
Tongcheng Silk Factory, and the Fuhua Silk Company (Jiang, 2001). 
In the historical context of the development of the national industry, returnees 
advanced the development of the textile industry in various aspects. Firstly, they 
brought back the advanced technology needed to improve production. Although 
many non-returnee entrepreneurs also introduced advanced technology, purchased 
some machines from foreign companies, and appointed professionals from foreign 
companies, returnees contributed to technological development by bringing the 
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systematic techniques of the whole textile industry chain back to China. For example, 
in the six years Mu Ouchu (穆藕初 , 1876-1943) spent studying overseas, he 
systematically studied the whole technical process from the cotton-planting 
techniques to the textile techniques (Wu, 2011: 110). In the beginning stages of his 
start-ups, he focused on improving the planting technique and introducing cotton 
varieties from the US. Later, he would make his planting technology available to all 
the cotton planting farmers for free (Wu, 2011: 111). He therefore made a great 
contribution to the entire cotton planting industry by improving its productive 
efficiency and quality. In addition, Mu Ouchu’s ‘Meiya’ Silk Textile Company sent 
employees to Japan to study silk textile technology.  
 Second, Mu Ouchu introduced Taylor’s scientific management method in his 
own textile company, and also helped other textile companies to improve their 
management. The modern management method later became widely applied 
throughout the cotton textile industry, improving productive efficiency for 
companies managed by returnee entrepreneurs. More specifically, Mu Ouchu 
formulated a complete management system including an exhaustive reward and 
punishment system, financial management system, salary system, and employment 
system (Wu, 2011: 112). This was significantly different from the systems used by 
his non-returnee peers. First, the traditional textile enterprises applied the ‘foreman 
management style’, and the foremen were usually local bullies with no knowledge of 
production and technology. Mu used engineers and technicians to replace the 
foremen in managing the textile production process. Second, in order to improve the 
quality of the employees, Mu set a higher standard for recruitment and also paid 
higher salaries than other textile enterprises. Third, Chinese enterprises widely used 
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the single-entry bookkeeping method, which has been shown to lead to financial 
chaos in enterprises (Zhang, 2003). Mu introduced the double-entry bookkeeping 
method in his enterprises, and they became the first in China to use modern financial 
reporting (B. Zhao, 2005). Following Mu’s lead, other enterprises also started 
adopting double-entry bookkeeping.  
His reforms to the selection of managers and to the compensation system 
reflect Mu’s awareness of corporate governance issues. Cheffins (2001) shows that 
US firms started their corporate governance revolution to apply the ‘separation of 
ownership and control’ from 1880. Hannah (2007) notes that the separation of 
ownership from control became very prevalent in British and French companies 
during 1900. Hannah (2014) documents that the UK issued legislation on corporate 
governance in 1845. Burhop (2009) shows that the corporate governance mechanism 
was being used in German banks by the 1870s.   
3.4.3 The Pharmaceutical Industry  
The pharmaceutical industry was also more advanced in western countries, 
thanks to the development of science and technology. Liebenau (1984) shows that 
German drug-producing companies paid more attention to R&D and allocated 
sufficient funds to R&D staff and facilities. In a later work (Liebenau, 1988), the 
same author argues that the most important factor influencing the development of the 
pharmaceutical industry in western countries such as Britain, Germany, and the US 




With the involvement of returnees, the modern Chinese pharmaceutical 
industry took off in the 1920s. The case of New Asiatic Pharmaceuticals illustrates 
the prominent roles that returnees played in the development of this industry. 
Cofounded in 1926 by Xu Guanqun and Zhao Rudiao, who studied medicine in 
Japan, New Asiatic Pharmaceuticals gathered a large number of graduates from 
overseas universities to build its research and management teams. For example, 
Wang Dianxiang, the manufacturing engineer, and Wu Liguo, the deputy director, 
had studied in France, Zeng Guangfang, Director of Medical Research, had studied 
in Japan, Qian Siliang, the chemist, had gained his PhD from the University of 
Illinois, and Cheng Muyi, the director, had studied in both Japan and America 
(Huang, 2000: 103). Through their joint efforts, New Asiatic Pharmaceuticals set up 
and invested in as many as 35 enterprises, making it the leading Chinese 
pharmaceutical company of the time. Inheriting a set of famous brands from its 
predecessor, Shanghai New Asiatic Pharmaceuticals is now part of the Shanghai 
Pharmaceutical Group, a giant in the Chinese pharmaceutical industry.  
During the 1910s, following the eruption of World War I, the foreign 
enterprises that undertook medicine production and sales in China decreased the 
supply to the Chinese market. As a result, medicine prices in the domestic market 
increased sharply, which brought opportunities for the development of national 
medicine production (Xuchu Zuo, 2013: 85). At that time, although non-returnee 
national entrepreneurs began to establish pharmaceutical-producing factories, they 
still relied on raw materials provided by foreign pharmaceutical enterprises, and 
lacked knowledge in medical science and technology. However, with the help of 
returnees, Chinese enterprises started researching and developing medicine-
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producing technology independently from the foreign companies, and subsequently 
established a complete production chain in the industry. For example, the Tang Shiyi 
Pharmaceutical Factory was established in 1918 by Tang Shiyi and his son Tang 
Taiping who was a returnee from Germany with an MD degree. In the 1930s, under 
the guidance of Tang Taiping, they imported and then updated the production 
facilities to make them more advanced and efficient (Xuchu Zuo, 2013: 88). This 
helped their enterprise to increase its productivity and its product quality. They also 
spent more on R&D for the raw materials of pharmaceutical production in order to 
decrease their production costs (Xuchu Zuo, 2013: 88). Thus, they laid the 
foundation for national industry to produce pharmaceuticals independently.   
3.4.4 The Electronics Industry 
The electronics industry relied on the cutting-edge high technology of that era. 
Using the expertise they had learned abroad, numerous returnees created their own 
enterprises in this field. In 1930, Zhang Huikang, a returnee from America, founded 
the Oriental Nianhong Electrical Lights Company, which manufactured China’s first 
neon lights. In 1944, the company produced China’s first single-door refrigerator
10
. 
In 1924, Su Zuguo, also a returnee from America, cofounded the Asia-America 
Radio Company, the first radio company in Shanghai. Later, in 1929, the company 
also founded its own radio station – Asia-America Radio Station, which later became 
Shanghai Radio Station. In 1925, Cai Shuhou, a returnee from Japan, founded the 
Shaodun Electrical Motor Company. In 1929, Li Qingxiang, a returnee from 
America, set up the Huade Electrical Lights Company. Other influential returnee 
entrepreneurs in this field included Lu Bohong, founder of the Shanghai Huashang 
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Electrical Vehicle Company, Tong Shiheng, founder of Shanghai Pudong Electricals, 
Li Qingxiang, founder of the Huade Factory, and Zhou Jinshui, founder of Shanghai 
Huacheng Electricals. 
In addition to the industries discussed above, returnees also played important 
roles in other industries. Ding Zuocheng, a returnee from America, founded the 
China Scientific Instrument Factory, the first meter manufacturer in China. Feng Jiyu, 
a returnee from France, created the Baoding Electrical Lights Company, the Tianjin 
Hengyuan Yarn Factory, the Tianjin Continental Bank, Dacheng Bank, and most 
successfully, the Oriental Paint Factory (Zhengzhong Li, 2004: 220-221).
 
There are 
also numerous examples of returnees setting up companies to manufacture pencils, 
flour, needles, and other daily necessities.  
3.5 Contributions to Heavy Industry 
3.5.1 The Chemical Industry 
The modern science of chemistry was initiated in western countries based on 
developments in modern science and technology. The success of chemical 
enterprises relies on the recruitment of chemical experts and investment in R&D. 
Matthews, Boyns, and Edwards (2003) show that American entrepreneurs spend 
sufficient funds on exploiting the proper chemical technology, and that engineers 
with chemical knowledge and complex skills are also important for chemical 
manufacturing and production management.   
Due to their lack of expertise, non-returnee enterpreneurs in China were in a 
disadvantaged position when it came to the establishment of successful chemical 
enterprises. The modern Chinese chemical industry was initiated and developed by 
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Fan Xudong, who graduated from Kyoto University (Japan), majoring in chemistry. 
He launched the first modern refined-salt-producing company. As the ‘Father of the 
Modern Chinese Chemical Industry’ and the ‘King of Salt and Sodium Carbonate’, 
he mainly contributed to the establishment and development of techniques for 
producing refined salt and sodium carbonate. 
After returning from Japan in 1912, Fan was appointed by the Peiyang 
Government as a professional engineer to investigate the laws on selling salt and the 
facilities for producing salt in Europe (Xiong, 2011:133). Fan first founded the 
Tianjin Jiuda Refined Salt Company in 1914, with the aim of improving the 
techniques used in the domestic production of quality salt. At that time, the 
techniques used to produce salt in China were extremely backward and inefficient, 
used highly toxic substances, and led to coarse salt. Domestic producers were not 
able to produce refined salt and therefore foreign products dominated the domestic 
market (Di, 2005). Based on his research and experiments, Fan successfully 
produced refined salt and his products rapidly occupied the market. Fan’s success in 
producing refined salt not only broke the monopoly of the foreign salt producers, but 
also challenged the traditional salt-selling system and pushed for its reform (Di, 
2005).  
In 1917, Fan established the Yongli Soda Factory, which was the first 
company in Asia to specialize in the production of sodium carbonate and which is 
still in operation today (Xiong, 2011; Wen, 2013; Chen, 2006: 3). In 1921, Fan 
Xudong appointed Hou Debang, a graduate of Columbia University and one of the 
world’s leading experts on soda, as chief engineer at the factory. As the technique for 
producing sodium carbonate was monopolized as a closely guarded secret of the 
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western countries, Fan’s company had to develop techniques, production facilities 
and production drawings on its own (J. Zhao and Li, 2007). Without any experience 
of sodium carbonate factory design, a batch of returnees led by Chen Diaofu finally 
successfully designed the production factory. Then, Hou Debang solved the 
company’s technical problems and created the so-called ‘Hou’s Process’ to produce 
the sodium carbonate. His soda-manufacturing method broke the monopoly of the 
foreign firms, making him another pioneer of China’s chemical industry (J. Zhao and 
Li, 2007; Wen, 2013).  
Later, in 1934, Fan Xudong further opened the Yongli Ammonia Factory, the 
first to produce synthetic ammonia in China. The Jiuda-Yongli-Yellow Sea 
conglomerate founded by Fan Xudong left indelible marks on China’s chemical 
industry. When he died in 1945, both Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong, the 
supreme leader of the Republic of China and the soon-to-be leader of the People’s 
Republic of China, mourned the nation’s loss (Jin Zhao, 2006: 3). In addition to their 
technical contribution, Fan Xudong’s enterprises also contributed to the cultivation 
of a batch of individuals talented in chemical techniques, by dispatching them to 
America for study and training (Di, 2005). This provided the talent pool needed for 
the development of China’ chemical industry. 
Returnees’ entrepreneurial enthusiasm was also perceptible in other heavy 
industries. Yu Mingyu, a returnee from America, created the Daxin Steel Factory, 
which produced China’s first arc furnace (Dingxin Xu, 1995: 68-69). The factory 
later became Shanghai Heavy Machineries. Lu Bohong, a returnee from France, also 
set up steel factories in Shanghai. Zhou Ren, a graduate of Cornell University, set up 
ceramic factories and steel factories (Xisuo Li, 2009b: 149).  
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3.6 Contributions to the Service Industry 
3.6.1 The Banking Industry 
The financial industry first emerged in western countries to provide services 
to industrial enterprises. Taking the UK as an example, Davis (1966) documents that 
commercial banks regularly made mortgage loans, and also made such funds 
available to manufacturing and trade. The banking industry greatly developed its 
management approach and operating style to ensure its success. For example, Seltzer 
(2010) shows that large banks in the UK dramatically increased the number of 
branches they had and the size of their back offices around 1913. In a 2013 work, 
Seltzer finds that recruiting women in routine positions helped UK banks to expand 
their branch networks over the period 1890-1941. In addition, Baker, Eadsforth, and 
Collins (2009) find that UK commercial banks applied a conservative (i.e. risk-
averse) management approach to ensure bank stability and avoid toxic assets during 
the period of 1880-1910. 
In the 1920 and 1930s, returnees dominated China’s banking industry. Most 
of the nation’s banks, particularly the famous ‘four northern banks’ and ‘three 
southern banks’, were headed by returnees. For example, four returnees from Japan 
became prominent bankers of the time. Wu Dingchang led the Yanye Bank; Zhou 
Zuomin cofounded the Jincheng Bank, one of the best-known banks of that time; Qin 
Renzhi was a board director for the Continental bank. Zhang Jiaao led the Bank of 
China for nearly twenty years and built the Bank of China into the largest bank in 
republican China. According to Ten Chinese Bankers, eight of the ten best-known 
bankers of that time were returnees (Mao Xu, 1997).  
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Chen Guangfu, a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania, was arguably 
the most notable entrepreneur in the industry during this period. Chen Guangfu was 
the first Chinese businessman to introduce modern management models to China’s 
banking industry
11
. In 1915, with the support of Zhang Jiaoao from the Bank of 
China, and Li Ming from the Bank of Zhejiang, Chen Guangfu founded the Shanghai 
Commercial and Savings Bank, the first modern private bank in China. Under his 
leadership, the bank developed into the largest private commercial bank in China 
within 20 years. Chen developed the banking business in three aspects. First, he 
focused on providing services to individual civilians who generally had little wealth 
and could not get services from the foreign commercial banks and traditional 
Chinese banks (‘Qianzhuang’) (Xiong, 2011: 175). Since the market was dominated 
by the large established commercial banks, which only provided services for large 
amounts of savings and chose to focus on the wholesale banking business, Chen 
decided to provide services for small savings amounts in order to attract non-wealthy 
and private customers. Customers could open an account with Chen’s bank with just 
one silver dollar (Xiong, 2011: 175). This policy helped his bank to attract a large 
number of private customers and obtain a large amount of savings. Second, Chen 
Guangfu was the first to abolish the currency conversion fees between the silver 
dollar and the silver (Shi and Xu, 2000). His policy earned him trust and popularity 
from the public, and savings held at the bank increased quickly. Then, other banks 
followed his lead, and the entire banking industry abolished the conversion fees (Shi 
and Xu, 2000). Third, Chen Guangfu made great efforts to maintain the bank’s 
credibility and reputation (N. Xue, 2006). For example, when the government 
                                                 
11
 http://www.china.org.cn/top10/2011-10/30/content_23750853_6.htm  
48 
 
prohibited all banks from providing the currency conversion service in 1927, the 
Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank continued providing the service to the 
public. In addition, during World War II, in his role as the government’s financial 
advisor, Chen Guangfu helped China to obtain huge loans from the US to address the 
country’s urgent financial difficulties. 
It is also worth noting that the chief members of the so-called ‘Four Big 
Families’ of the Republic of China, who controlled much of China’s economy and 
politics during the first half of 20
th
 century, all had overseas study backgrounds. 
Chiang Kai-shek, a returnee from Japan, became the first president of the Republic of 
China; Soong Tse-ven, who once served as governor of the Central Bank of China 
and as Minister of Finance, studied at Harvard University; Kung Hsiang-hsi, known 
to be the richest man of that time in China (Tingyi Chen, 2008), and who served as 
premier of the Republic of China and governor of the Central Bank of China, 
graduated from Yale University; Chen Li-fu, Minister of Education, was a graduate 
of the University of Pittsburg.  
Returnees’ contributions can also be observed in other service industries. Pan 
Xulun, China’s ‘Father of Accounting’, a graduate of Columbia University, founded 
the Pan Xulun Accounting Firm, which later became the prestigious Lixin 
Accounting Firm. Besides his achievements in the banking industry mentioned above, 
Chen Guangwu also established China’s first travel agency, China Travel Service, 
earning himself the accolade of ‘Father of Chinese Travel Agencies’ (Shou, 1996). 
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3.6.2 The Entertainment Industry  
The modern (in the early 19
th
 century) entertainment industry emphasized the 
technological facilities available in western countries, especially in the film industry. 
Kerr (1990) documents that Vitagraph Company, an American Film Studio, paid 
more attention to technological expertise than to particular performers, plots, or films 
in the early 20
th
 century.  
In 1905, Ren Jingfeng, a returnee from Japan, produced China’s first movie – 
the silent movie ‘Ding Jun Shan’. After that, in addition to writing movie scripts and 
directing movie production, some returnees also set up their own movie companies to 
compete with foreign studios. Some also built their own movie theaters. Li Zeyuan, 
who had studied engineering in the US, cofounded the Great Wall Movie Company 
in New York in 1921, and then moved it to Shanghai in 1924. In the 1924, Wang 
Xuchang and Xu Hu, two returnees from France, set up the Divine Land Studios in 
Shanghai. Three returnees, Tian Han, Tang Huaiqiu and Tanglin, launched the South 
China Movie Club in 1926. Another influential movie studio of that time was the 
Diantong Movie Company, which was originally a movie equipment manufacturer 
set up by Situ Yimin and Gong Yuke, two engineering graduates from Harvard 
University, and Ma Dejian, a graduate of Washington University. In 1933, Diantong 
successfully manufactured their own recorder, which enabled them to produce 
movies with sound on their own. Among their productions, ‘Tao Li Jie’, ‘Feng Yun 
Er Nv’, ‘Zi You Shen’, and ‘Du Shi Feng Guang’ are the best known (Xisuo Li, 
2009b).  
To sum up, the period of the 1850s to the 1940s witnessed the inception and 
burgeoning of Chinese national capitalism. With their knowledge and experience 
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acquired abroad, the returnees became the indisputable pioneers of virtually all 
China’s modern economic sectors, including the communications, mining, textiles, 
chemical, banking, insurance, publishing, medicine and electrical industries. With a 
strong sense of having the mission to save and strengthen their nation, the returnees, 
though relatively small in numbers, created numerous enterprises and contributed to 
the introduction of modern technology and ideology, thereby helping lay the 
foundation for China’s early industrialization and modernization.  
3.7 Discussion and Conclusion 




 centuries, western countries 
surpassed China in many aspects, including technology, ideology, infrastructure, 
university education, and business operating modes. To learn from the developed 
countries, Chinese students started going abroad as early as 1847. These overseas 
Chinese students benefited greatly from their overseas experience, and acquired 
expertise unavailable in China. When they returned to China with their knowledge 
and the determination of industrial salvation, they made great contributions to the 
modernization of national industry and the commercial development of China. This 
study has provided an overview of how they advanced the development of modern 
business in various industries with their knowledge and expertise.  
From the case analyses of a number of representative returnees in various 
industries, I have summarized some of the main features of the businesses operated 
by returnees and their contributions. In terms of technology transfer, returnees 
contributed by bringing back advanced technology and the knowledge to boost 
productivity. From the perspective of business operations, returnee entrepreneurs 
51 
 
applied Taylor’s scientific management method to corporate management to promote 
efficiency. Returnees also introduced double-entry bookkeeping, which had been 
essential to the development of capitalism in western countries (Yamey, 1949), to 
solve the financial chaos caused by single-entry bookkeeping. In addition to 
management styles and operating processes, returnees also brought back modern 
governance ideologies and approaches from western countries, such as the selection 
of professionals as managers and efficient compensation systems.  
As the returnees had obtained advanced knowledge about business operating 
and management approaches, they tried to implement new business modes. First, 
returnee-operated businesses tended to allocate more resources to R&D and thus 
owned core technology that was sometimes even more advanced than that of foreign 
companies. Second, they tended to construct and develop entire industrial chains. 
This provided high-quality raw materials for production at a low cost and also broke 
the raw material trading restrictions of foreign companies. Third, returnee-controlled 
firms subsidized their employees’ training or studying abroad, cultivating their 
company’s talent pool and sustainable development. Finally, the business 
development and prosperity in the US and UK also provided a new perspective to the 
Chinese students. Companies there applied different business modes to improve firm 
performance. For example, the producer co-operatives mode was widely used and 
achieved success in the British cotton textile industry in late 19
th
 century (Toms, 
2012). In Chinese cotton textile industry in the 20
th
 century, the returnee 
entrepreneurs led and participated to establish the producer co-operative to develop 
the national industry. For example, Mu Ouchu was elected as the chairman to Cotton 
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Planting Improving Society of the National Spinners Association in order to help and 
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Chapter 4 Returnee CEOs under Weak Institutions: 




This chapter studies CEOs with overseas experience, known as returnee CEOs. I 
show that Chinese returnee CEOs are associated with inferior performance, lower 
market reactions to appointment announcements and an adverse regulatory 
environment. I argue that CEOs’ international expertise is acquired at the opportunity 
cost of local social capital, such as political and business ties, which is more critical 
than expertise in transition economies with weak legal institutions. The negative 
effect disappears when social capital is acquired, regional legal institutions are strong 
or returnees’ international expertise is in demand. Exploiting an exogenous increase 
in the supply of returnee talent as a result of new provincial policies, I find the results 






The characteristics and experience of CEOs have been found to map onto 
firm performance (Adams et al., 2005; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Kaplan et al., 
2012; Malmendier and Tate, 2009; Bernile, et al., 2017). In particular, two major 
functions of CEOs depend on CEO-specific heterogeneity: knowledge and expertise 
help CEOs to make superior organizational decisions (Benmelech and Frydman, 
2015), and networks help to provide critical resources to offset external uncertainty 
(Correia, 2014; El-Khatib et al., 2015). In the context of the globalization of human 
capital, many firms in developing countries hire individuals returned from overseas 
as CEOs. These “returnee CEOs” are expected to bring the benefits of “brain gain” in 
terms of advanced knowledge and international expertise. However, having spent 
years abroad, there is an opportunity cost of local connections for returnees. Weak 
legal institutions may impede the realization of the benefits in developing countries.
1
 
Despite the significance of international experience in shaping individuals, this 
important characteristic of CEOs remains under-researched. I therefore study 
returnee CEOs in China and explore whether international expertise or local 
connection is more important under weak legal institutions.  
Returnee CEOs in developing countries are often perceived as belonging to 
an elite social class that possess high-quality education and international expertise. 
The literature has documented benefits of the international experience of board 
members (Masulis et al., 2012; Giannetti al., 2015) and for multinational firms (e.g. 
                                                 
1
 Faccio (2006) shows that the value of political connections is more important in countries with 
higher levels of corruption. Mironov (2015) finds that firms in a corrupt country should hire a corrupt 
CEO who is able to establish connections by paying bribes, to advance shareholder interest.   
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Carpenter et al., 2001). I argue that returnee CEOs could strengthen firm 
performance with their expertise. For example, they may learn more advanced 
institutions and superior management practices in foreign organizations, which are 
shown to enhance firm performance and productivity (Bloom and Van Reenen, 
2007). They gain exposure to overseas high-quality education, shown to enhance 
profitability (Chevalier and Ellison, 1999; Gottesman and Morey, 2006). Finally, 
CEOs tend to have overseas network ties that bring about foreign business and 
financing opportunities.  
Returnees’ weaknesses are largely ignored in both public media and the 
literature. Having spent years abroad, they have missed out on opportunities to 
accumulate local social capital in the form of political connections and local network 
ties, whose importance in transition economies is acknowledged in the literature. 
Social capital refers to the resources linked to the possession of a durable network, 
through which one can claim access to economic resources such as subsidized loans 
and protected markets (Portes, 2000). These resources produce favorable business 
conditions and enhance firm performance (El-Khatib et al., 2015; Faccio, 2006).  
In countries where legal institutions are weak, firms confront expropriation 
risks and limited financing opportunities. Social capital therefore serves as an 
informal and complementary institution that protects property rights, enhances 
contract enforcement, alleviates entry barriers and in turn facilitates firm growth 
(Allen et al., 2005; Guiso et al., 2004). For example, the connections established 
through bribery in Russia help to secure government contracts and increase firm 
income (Mironov, 2015). These considerations suggest that a lack of social capital 
could offset the benefits of returnee CEOs and lead to underperformance.  
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Concerns about returnee CEOs are consistent with several anecdotes. Jack 
Ma, the founder and executive chairman of Alibaba Group, compared the mismatch 
between returnee executives and local firms to “installing an aero-engine on a 
tractor”
 2
. He believes that foreign models and experience are not necessarily 
applicable to Chinese firms. The arguments and evidence from the two sides lead to 
two competing hypotheses, namely expertise and network views. Determining the 
net effect on overall firm performance represents a timely and important question 
and can shed light on how legal institutions determine the preferential resources that 
firms need.  
China provides a unique setting to study the role of returnee CEOs under 
weak institutions. China is the leading country of origin for international students: 
there has been as many as 2.6 million studying abroad, 1.1 million having returned to 
China between 1978 and 2012.
3
 The Chinese government launched a series of 
favorable talent schemes to encourage high-level overseas professionals, including 
professional managers, to return to China and contribute to the development of its 
capital markets. Despite China’s economic achievement, its legal institutions remain 
weak. The 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index placed China 100
th
 in the world, close 
to Algeria and Bolivia. The 2015 Rule of Law Index ranked China 71
st
, marginally 
higher than Tanzania and Zambia.
4
  
                                                 
2
 See http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2005-01/11/content_2444728.htm (in Chinese). 
3
 Annual report on the development of Chinese students studying abroad, Social Science Academy 
Press (China), 2013: Beijing. 
4
 The Corruption Perceptions Index is provided by Transparency International and measures the 
perceived levels of public sector corruption in 175 countries and territories. The Rule of Law Index is 
constructed by the World Justice Project (WJP) and reports how the rule of law is experienced by the 
general public in 102 countries.   
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To conduct my research, I hand-collect data on CEOs’ international 
experience by reviewing the biographies of all 2,847 CEOs hired between 2001 and 
2010 by firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, from which I 
identify 247 returnee CEOs, accounting for 8.86% of all appointments. I conduct an 
initial assessment of the relationship between returnee CEOs and firm performance 
using regressions that include year, industry, and region fixed effects, along with an 
assortment of time-varying firm and CEO characteristics. I find that firms with 
returnee CEOs are associated with lower performance in terms of return on assets 
(ROA), return on sales (ROS) and market-to-book ratio (MTB). The results of ROA 
and ROS are robust to the inclusion of firm fixed effects to control for time-invariant 
unobserved firm heterogeneity. This finding is in line with the view that social 
capital is more important than international expertise in a country with weak legal 
institutions. The underperformance of returnee CEOs seems to hold back their 
prevalence. As shown in Figure 4.1, while the annual number of incoming returnees 
increased by 1001.04% during the sample period, the annual number of returnee 
CEO appointments increased by only 20.41%. 
[Insert Figure 4.1] 
I then build on the initial results to better identify the relation between 
returnee CEOs and firm performance. If the negative relation is attributed to the 
opportunity cost of local social capital and weak institutions in China, it should be 
less pronounced for firms that have social capital in place or that are headquartered 
in regions with relatively strong regional institutions. I therefore partition my sample 
along three dimensions, namely social capital, regional institutions and demand for 
foreign expertise. First, I find that the results are driven by CEOs with international 
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work experience who stayed abroad longer than those with overseas study experience 
only, suggesting that the longer the returnees had stayed abroad, the more difficult it 
was for them to accumulate local resources and adapt to the business culture in China. 
Second, the negative relation disappears when the firms are state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) backed by state-controlled shareholders, or when returnee CEOs acquire 
political connections or business networks. Third, the negative relation is only 
concentrated on firms located in cities with a high risk of expropriation and poor rule 
of law. Finally, the negative relation is not documented in firms engaging in 
international business, where there is ample scope for the use of returnee CEOs’ 
international knowledge and experience. These results from the partitioned samples 
further support the network hypothesis.  
Interpreting empirical results is a common challenge in the literature on CEO 
characteristics, due to the nonrandom assignment of CEOs to firms. There are at least 
two channels that the selection could bias the estimation of any possible effect of 
CEO characteristics, such as overseas experience, on firm performance. Although I 
control for many firm and CEO characteristics and time-invariant unobserved firm 
heterogeneity, there are possible omitted variables at the CEO level. For example, 
returnee CEOs might be correlated with innate talent or good education. An 
alternative interpretation of my finding is that Chinese firms tend to attract mediocre 
returnees as CEOs rather than the most capable ones, who enjoy good opportunities 
in the international labor market. Or perhaps less talented individuals tend to choose 
to go abroad. I therefore control directly for proxies of CEO innate talent by 
assuming that returnee CEOs with prestigious overseas or domestic education 
experience and with overseas experience in more developed countries are more likely 
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to grow into talented executives. The consistent result increases my confidence that 
the underperformance of returnee CEOs is not correlated with omitted variables at 
the CEO level. 
Another concern is that the endogenous matching of CEOs to firms could 
bias my results. It is possible that unobservable firm or CEO heterogeneity that 
correlates with the matching between returnee CEOs and firms may also interpret 
results. For example, certain firms might select returnee CEOs for reasons or 
returnee CEOs might have preferences to join certain firms. In fact, I find that 
younger firms and firms with more active boards are more likely to appoint returnee 
CEOs. The literature shares a common view that endogenous matching of CEOs and 
firms is not necessarily inconsistent with a casual interpretation of the documented 
effects (e.g. Custodio and Metzger, 2014; Benmelech and Frydman, 2015; Sunder et 
al., 2017). The matching and imprinting interpretations are consistent with an effect 
of CEO traits on firm outcomes. For my study, even firms that face certain 
challenges or opportunities tend to select or attract returnees, as returnee CEOs might 
still be crucial to developing and implementing coping strategies.   
I use multiple identification strategies to address the concern. Firm-fixed 
effects regressions document no evidence that endogenous matching determined by 
unobservable time-invariant firm heterogeneity drives the negative relation between 
returnee CEOs and firms. Although I do not observe the criteria of hiring decisions, 
Custodio and Metzger (2014) provide evidence that the observable characteristics of 
firms and CEOs determine their matching. In an ideal experiment, I would compare 
the performance of a firm with a returnee CEO to the same firm’s performance had a 
local CEO been hired. Because the counterfactual is not observed, I construct a 
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hypothetical one by using the propensity score matching (PSM) method to find 
otherwise identical firms with local CEOs as the control group. I ensure that the 
treatment and control groups have no observable differences in firm and CEO 
characteristics except the overseas experience of CEOs. The estimates are in line 
with my baseline regression estimates.  
I take further steps to isolate the effects of returnee CEO from selection 
effects. I exploit “exogenous” variation by using a subsample of firms that 
experience switches of CEO type. I find an increase in performance when a firm 
switches from a local to a returnee CEO, and a decrease in performance when the 
switch is from a returnee to a local CEO. Although the switch may be endogenous, 
the timing is likely exogenous. This helps in the identification of returnee CEOs’ 
effect. I find that the CAR (cumulative abnormal return) is about 3% less positive 
(4.4% vs 1.4%) when a local CEO is succeeded by a returnee than when s/he is 
succeeded by another local CEO. The analyses provide clearer insights into the 
relation between returnee CEOs and firm performance.  
I use the two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach based on two exogenous 
policy changes that result in a supply shock of professional talent in different 
provinces at different times. Since the education opportunities for their children 
largely affect the career and relocation decisions of returnees, I construct two 
instrumental variables (IV) related to the policy changes around education 
opportunities for returnees’ children to predict the likelihood of firms having returnee 
CEOs. The first IV is based on whether the provincial government has promulgated 
policies to offer returnees’ children certain privileges in entering key schools or 
universities. The second IV is based on whether the province of a firm’s headquarters 
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has approved the opening of an international school. International schools in 
mainland China use curricula from the US or UK and prepare students for the SAT 
or A-level university entry exams. The policy changes bring an exogenous supply 
shock of returnee talent and lower the cost of hiring a returnee CEO for local firms. 
Since the policies do not explicitly target listed firms, the timing of the introduction 
is exogenous to firm traits. The two IVs are found to be correlated with the 
endogenous variable of the hiring of returnee CEOs, and the IV estimates are in line 
with my baseline results. Overall, the endogenous matching of CEOs to firms caused 
by omitted variables is unlikely to be driving my results. It is important to note that 
these IVs still cannot address a concern about the selection of returnee CEOs by 
particular firms. Methods that allocate returnee CEOs in a truly random fashion are 
not available. I acknowledge that these results are suggestive rather than conclusive. 
 Taken together, the findings are consistent with the network hypothesis. As a 
result of the weak institutions in China, returnee CEOs’ absent social capital overrun 
their advantages of international expertise. The results provide an explanation for the 
unpopularity of returnee CEOs as documented in Figure 4.1. Despite the dramatic 
expansion of the returnee talent pool and the tremendous policy efforts made by the 
Chinese government aimed at introducing returnee professional managers into 
Chinese capital markets, the underperformance of returnee CEOs has impaired their 
prevalence. There are a number of possible reasons for firms to hire returnee CEOs, 
given their underperformance. For example, firms might be overoptimistic about the 
regional legal environment and irrationally hire returnee CEOs. Alternatively, firms 
may hire returnee CEOs to signal their intention to improve the internal institutions 
and culture. Nonetheless, one should not expect returnees to be eliminated in the 
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CEO labor market, because the hiring decision matrix takes a range of other factors 
into account (e.g. social value beyond economic value). The network hypothesis 
implies that the returnee can build up their network after taking on the CEO role. In 
fact, I find that survived returnee CEOs are no longer inferior to local ones after two 
to three years with a firm.  
To further explore the sources of the underperformance, I examine the 
regulatory environment faced by returnee CEOs and their personnel strategies. I 
document a higher incidence of regulatory enforcement actions imposed on firms led 
by returnee CEOs. This result, based on the matching estimator method, confirms 
that social capital is important for bringing about favorable regulatory conditions, 
especially when legal institutions are weak (Correia, 2014; Hou and Moore, 2010). In 
addition, I find that returnee CEOs are reluctant to appoint politically connected 
executives who would complement their weaknesses, but tend instead to appoint 
executives similar to themselves, such as those with a strong educational background. 
These results provide additional insights into the channel through which returnee 
CEOs hold back firm performance. 
 My study complements the growing literature on the impact of CEOs’ 
experience or characteristics on firm decisions and financial outcomes (Benmelech 
and Frydman, 2015; Custódio and Metzger, 2013, 2014; El-Khatib et al., 2015; 
Kaplan et al., 2012; Malmendier and Tate, 2009; Mironov, 2015; Bernile et al., 2017). 
In particular, this study complements and extends the seminal work of Bertrand and 
Schoar (2003), which documents that managers’ person-specific impact can explain a 
large amount of the unexplained variation in corporate practices, after controlling for 
firm-level characteristics and industry effects. Quantifying the personal traits of 
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CEOs with international experience, my study adds a new dimension to studies of 
CEO managerial effects and reveals how the international experience of CEOs 
shapes corporate performance and decisions. 
My study also makes timely contributions to the limited research on brain 
gain in capital markets by revealing how it is impacted legal institutions. Giannetti et 
al. (2015) argue that directors with foreign experience facilitate the adoption of 
strong management practices and internationalization that could improve firm 
productivity and profitability. Masulis et al. (2012) find the advisory capability of 
foreign directors on cross-border acquisitions to be enhanced by their knowledge of 
foreign markets. Carpenter et al. (2001) suggest that the international assignment 
experience of CEOs is a valuable, rare and inimitable resource for US multinational 
firms. We, however, provide original evidence on the impact of weak institutions in 
shifting the needs regarding CEO characteristics. Despite their international expertise 
and possible international networks, returnee CEOs who fail to secure local social 
capital suffer the consequences of inferior performance and an adverse regulatory 
environment. My results are complementary to those of Mironov (2015), who finds 
that firms in a corrupt country need corrupt CEOs to advance shareholder interests. 
My results show that the fit of CEO characteristics and institutional environment is 
vital, and indicate that the realization of the full benefits of introducing global talent 
could be restricted by the institutional reliance on political connections and 
relationships in transition economies like China.  
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
institutional background relating to Chinese returnees. Section 3 reviews the related 
literature and develops the competing hypotheses. Section 4 presents the empirical 
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results and robustness checks. Section 5 reports the identification strategies. Section 
6 shows additional analyses. Section 7 concludes.   
4.2 Institutional Background and Data 
4.2.1 Returnees in China 
Ancient Chinese wisdom says it is good to learn from foreign countries. A 
poem recorded in the 9
th
 century BC in Shijin says “there are other hills whose 
stones are good for working jade”, implying that the knowledge developed in other 
places could be used to solve local problems. Returnees have played a very important 
role in Chinese history by bringing advanced ideologies and technology (Wang et al., 
2014). Examples include Xuanzang (AD 602-664), arguably the best-known returnee, 
who introduced advanced Buddhist knowledge from India to ancient China, and 
Yung Wing (1828-1912), the first overseas student in modern China, who led the 
“Self-Strengthening Movement” in Qing Dynasty China to modernize its industry 
and education (Wang et al., 2014). After 1872, the government of the Qing Dynasty 
started sending groups of youths to pursue overseas education, starting a large-scale 
trend for Chinese people to study overseas. Upon returning to China, returnees led 
the New Culture Movement of 1919, calling for the creation of a new Chinese 
culture based on Western standards, especially democracy and science.
5
  
Despite the contribution of returnees to developing the country, their social 
status experienced turmoil in the Anti-Rightist Movement (1957-1959) and the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Both movements aimed to strengthen the socialist 
                                                 
5
 Sun Yat-sen, a returnee from Japan, led the Xinhai Revolution in 1911, overthrowing China’s 2,000 
years of imperial rule and bringing the country into the republican era. 
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system and nip the capitalist ideology from the West in the bud; therefore, returnees, 
especially those returning from developed capitalist countries, were deemed the main 
target and were denounced for their capitalist thoughts. Others who had returned 
from the Soviet Union were not immune, due to the deterioration of Sino-Soviet 
relations since 1960s. Following this, the Chinese government stopped funding 
students to study abroad.  
Since the first batch of 52 state-funded students went abroad after the 
Cultural Revolution in 1978, 2.6 million Chinese students have studied overseas. 
Deng Xiaoping, a returnee from France, ended China’s isolation and initiated the 
opening-up and reform of China. Deng also changed the independent development of 
the country into a style based on learning from foreign experience, providing a 
bigger stage for returnees to contribute with their advanced knowledge acquired 
abroad. China lacked a talent pool of professional managers because there was no 
modern enterprise in China until 1978. The Chinese government initially encouraged 
returnees to conduct technology transfer by starting high-tech ventures. Having seen 
the success of returnee specialists in running small businesses, the government 
extended an invitation to returnee professional managers to enter the Chinese capital 
markets, and expected them to replicate the success seen in the small business sector.  
4.2.2 Policies to Attract Returnees 
To reap the skills and experience of talented emigrants, the Chinese 
government takes multiple approaches to attract them back to China, including 
founding returnee venture parks, setting up returnee talent schemes and introducing 
convenient and supportive regional returnee policies. For example, the Organization 
Department of the Communist Party initiated a returnee-favorable policy entitled 
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“Recruitment Program of Global Experts” in 2008. The scheme targets full 
professors at overseas universities and innovation-oriented entrepreneurs, and has 
attracted 2,263 high-level returnees from 2008 to 2012. Gianetti et al. (2015) find 
that all provinces in China except Tibet introduced their first regional returnee 
policies between 1992 and 2007, bringing supply shocks of highly skilled emigrants. 
They note that the introduction of the policy is not necessarily related to higher 
economic development, but to the career concerns of the provincial leaders. 
 The first provincial policies aimed to set the tone to welcome returnees, but 
were often very vague about the support provided. Many provincial governments 
therefore issue supplementary policies from time to time to specify the detailed 
benefits for returnees, and how these will be implemented. For example, some 
supplement policies regulate that returnees’ children can transfer to a key school 
without taking an exam, or enter a university in the province with reduced entry 
requirements. In addition, provincial governments permit the opening of international 
schools, and secure final approval from the Ministry of Education.
6
 Many 
international schools are joint ventures between local schools and foreign education 
establishments. International schools in China provide children from families of 
returnees, foreigners and wealthy locals with a similar educational environment to 
that of primary and secondary schools in Western developed countries. The 
education system and curricula of international schools mainly follow those from the 
US or UK, and the schools prepare students for foreign university entry exams, such 
as SAT or A-level exams. 
                                                 
6
 Until 2013, establishing an international school in China required approval from both the 
Department of Education of the province and the Ministry of Education of China. Many such 
applications have been made, but the approval rate was low. 
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Education is highly valued in Chinese culture, but good schools and 
universities are scarce resources, leading to fierce competition.
7
 Because of the 
overly intense, exam-oriented nature of education in China, the foreign-born children 
of returnee families often find it challenging to adapt to the learning environment in 
China.
8
 Those born in China also hope to get access to high-quality education in 
either a key school or an international school. I argue that preferential treatment in 
the schooling for returnees’ children is an important factor in returnees’ relocation 
decisions. Since the policies do not explicitly aim at listed firms, other aspects of the 
benefits such as the monetary awards are often not very significant for top-end 
talents like the CEO candidates. Meanwhile, firm behavior can be affected by the 
policy changes because the education benefits lower the cost of hiring a returning 
CEO.  
Similar to the policies examined by Giannetti et al. (2015), the policies on 
education opportunities are not apparently linked to regional economic development. 
While developed Beijing and Zhejiang issued education policies in 2000 and 2001, 
far less developed Fujian and Shanxi issued theirs as early as 1992 and 1995. 
Likewise, the first international school in underdeveloped Qinghai was approved as 
early as 2000, but the first one in developed Zhejiang was in 2004.  More importantly, 
policies on education opportunities are promulgated by various provincial 
governmental agencies, including the General Office of the CPC (Communist Party 
of China) Provincial Committee, the General Office of the Provincial Government, 
the Provincial Department of Education, the Personnel Department of the Province, 
                                                 
7
 See: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/12/gaokao-china-toughest-school-exam-in-world 
(The Guardian) 
8
 See: http://news.xinhuanet.com/overseas/2009-06/09/content_11512171.htm (Xinhua News) 
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the Science and Technology Office of the Province and the Public Security 
Department of the Province, among others. Different government departments have 
different focuses and agendas. The heterogeneity reflects different motivations and 
considerations for introducing the policies. For example, developing the economy 
and listed firms is beyond the scope of the Department of Education. Although I 
cannot rule out the possibility of this being true in a few instances, it is unlikely that 
the introduction of the policies is related to expected growth opportunities.  
4.2.3 Data and Sample  
In order to identify returnee CEOs, I review the biographies of 3,324 CEOs 
disclosed in appointment announcements between 1 January 2001 and 31 December 
2010, which I obtain from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) database. This includes all appointment events of A-share firms listed on 
the main boards of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. A typical short 
CEO biography contains information on name, age, gender, educational background 
and work experience. I also cross-check the information with finance.sina.com.cn 
and complete any missing biographies. I identify the provincial policies on the 
benefits in schooling of returnees’ children in Wang et al. (2011) and the Internet. I 
collect the information of international schools in each province from the Ministry of 
Education of China.   
The cross-sectional sample excludes CEOs with no disclosed biography, 
foreign CEOs and interim CEOs in office for less than 180 days. I match the CEOs 
with the firm-level data collected from CSMAR. I require non-missing data on the 
dependent variables and the control variables on CEOs’ personal characteristics, firm 
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characteristics and governance characteristics. These filters finally leave us with a 
cross-sectional sample of 2,847 CEO hiring events, in which 247 are returnee CEOs.  
Table 4.1 summarizes the starting year of two policies for different provinces 
and shows the ratio of returnee CEO hiring affected by the policies. Between 1992 
and 2010, 23 provinces introduced regional policies entitling returnees’ children to 
reduced entry requirements or transfer opportunities in entering key schools or 
universities in the province. The year of opening international schools ranges from 
1995 to 2010 for the 18 approved provinces. In most provinces, the ratio of returnee 
CEO appointments increased following the policies. It seems that a supply shock of 
returnee professionals influences firms’ hiring behavior.   
[Insert Table 4.1] 
Figure 4.2 shows that the appointment of returnee CEOs increases from 17 to 
22 from 2001 to 2010, accounting for 8.02% and 7.91% of hiring. Returnee CEOs 
are classified into two groups according to their overseas experience: (1) CEOs with 
overseas employment experience, including exclusive work experience or combined 
study and work experience; and (2) CEOs with exclusive overseas study experience. 
Study used to be the major route for Chinese people to live abroad. Some return to 
China immediately after finishing their studies and some choose to work for a 
number of years before returning to China. Returnee CEOs with work experience 
generally account for a larger proportion than those with study experience only, 
except in 2005. These two figures show that the government’s efforts to introduce 
returnee professional managers seem not to have been very effective. Figure 4.3 
shows that the proportion of returnee CEOs in various industries is in a narrow range 
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between 5.43% and 13%, except in the telecommunication services and utilities 
industries. I control for industry fixed effects in my analyses later to ensure the 
results are not driven by specific trends in industries that disproportionately hire 
returnee CEOs.  
[Insert Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3] 
Table 4.2 provides the summary statistics for the full sample, as well as the 
subsamples with and without returnee CEOs. Panel A shows that the number of hired 
returnee CEOs accounted for 8.68% of the 2,847 CEO appointments in my sample, 
with 5.02% having overseas work experience and 3.65% having overseas study 
experience only. Panel D shows that although there is no difference in the one-year-
prior operating performance (ROA, ROS and MTB) between firms led by returnee 
CEOs and those by local ones, the subsequent performance (ROA and MTB) is 
lower for the former. This supports the network hypothesis.   
[Insert Table 4.2] 
4.3 Characteristics of Returnee CEOs 
4.3.1 Strengths of Returnee CEOs 
The rapid growth of the Chinese economy has increased the demand for 
professional managers. However, the lack of opportunities to accumulate business 
practice and the backwards education system in the not-so-distant past led to a 
shortage of professional managers. China’s management practices are inferior to all 
developed countries, and are ranked around the levels of India, Brazil and Argentina 
(Bloom et al., 2012). Monitoring and target management practices are especially 
poor. The overseas experience helps Chinese returnees develop international 
76 
 
knowledge and expertise and a high-quality education. Growing up in 
underdeveloped socialist China, their accomplishments in overseas studies and 
careers required great effort. Overseas experience widened their horizons and gave 
them the opportunity to learn the operation of foreign organizations, which could 
help to develop their superior management practices.  
Because studying used to be the only route Chinese people could follow if 
they wished to live abroad, returnee CEOs normally hold overseas university degrees. 
A survey by Wang and Lu (2012) shows that 36.1% of returnees have a Master’s 
degree and 35.5% have a PhD. In terms of university rankings, none of the 
universities from mainland China are in the top 200 in the Academic Ranking of 
World Universities, published annually since 2003, meaning that Chinese universities 
are substantially lower-ranked than universities in developed countries, which are the 
major destinations for Chinese students. Returnee CEOs are therefore believed have 
better quality of education. In addition, the university curricula of Chinese and 
Western universities used to be very different. Since 1952, universities in China 
mainly concentrated on technology and engineering, following the higher education 
model of the Soviet Union. Social sciences and management were mainly taught 
from a socialism perspective. As a result, returnee CEOs tended to have gained 
exposure to knowledge that was unavailable in China. The literature documents the 
value added by education. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) and Gottesman and Morey 
(2006) find that the risk-adjusted excess returns of funds are higher for fund 
managers who have graduated from colleges with higher SAT entry requirements 
and those from prestigious MBA programs, after controlling for expenses, risk and 
survivorship bias.  
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Returnee CEOs can also accumulate foreign network resources that may 
facilitate the expansion of foreign business. Carpenter et al. (2001) show that CEOs 
with international assignment experience possess important foreign network ties and 
knowledge of international markets, which could help multinational companies 
(MNCs) with far-flung operations to establish sustained competitive advantage in the 
global environment, thus enhancing firm performance. I hereby propose the 
“expertise hypothesis”: 
H1a: Returnee CEOs are positively associated with firm performance 
4.3.2 Weaknesses of Returnee CEOs 
Despite being largely ignored by public media and policy makers, returnee 
CEOs do exhibit weaknesses. They have usually lived abroad for many years before 
returning to their home country, and therefore are less likely to have accumulated 
local social capital, such as political connections and network ties. Allen et al. (2005) 
note that the country-level institutions are so weak in China that its quality of legal 





 worldwide in the 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index and 
the 2015 Rule of Law Index, respectively. The underdeveloped financial system 
restricts firms from easily accessing financing to fund growth opportunities. Firms 
have to rely on relationships and connections to mitigate the barriers and bring about 
a favorable business environment (see Allen et al., 2005; Guiso et al., 2004; Park and 




Returnee CEOs are less likely to have political connections for institutional 
and personal reasons. When they are abroad, they do not have opportunities to join 
the Chinese Communist Party, the prerequisite for those wishing to pursue a political 
career in China. When they return, they do not have any advantage in China’s civil 
service exam, the qualifying requirement for becoming a government bureaucrat, due 
to the exam’s focus on public policy and social knowledge of China. Even if they 
join the civil service, their overseas experience does not count toward promotion, as 
the primary criteria are the number of years served in one’s current rank and one’s 
civil service track record. The talent schemes normally do not include returnee 
bureaucrats either. Such circumstances hinder returnees from establishing political 
connections. 
Political connections often bring financing opportunities, lighter taxation and 
government contracts. The market reacts positively to announcements of newly 
established political connections (Faccio, 2006). Faccio and Parsley (2009) document 
a negative market reaction for firms that are headquartered in a politician’s 
hometown around the event of the politician’s sudden death, due to the loss of 
political connections. For the setting of China, Li et al. (2008) find that private 
entrepreneurs who hold the Chinese Communist Party Membership (CCPM) are 
positively related to firm performance and access to bank loans, especially for firms 
located in regions with weaker market institutions and legal protection.  
Returnee CEOs have also had fewer opportunities to establish local networks 
because of their prior geographic distance from China. CEO networks refer to the 
linkages between CEOs and other individuals or organizations, from which both 
parties can benefit. Such connections can be established through common 
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educational, work or recreational experiences. The geographic distance and time 
zone differences impede returnee CEOs from establishing such connections with 
local business communities. Even if some returnees had established networks before 
going abroad, their time overseas would cut them off from local networks. 
Returnees’ lack of networks restricts the transmission of knowledge, ideas or 
funds and therefore limits channels for exchanging information and favors. Both 
formal and informal networks are found to positively impact firm performance and 
access to essential external resources, reducing environmental uncertainty and 
consequently contributing to profitability (El-Khatib et al., 2015; Engelberg et al., 
2012). CEO networks also increase the CEO’s managerial power (Daily and Johnson, 
1997), and the lack of a network could undermine the leadership of returnee CEOs. 
Portes (2000) notes that social networks are not a given and can only be 
acquired through cultural inputs. Guanxi serves as a special type of network with an 
ancient and important Chinese cultural element beyond ordinary connections, 
defined as the exchange of favors and a person’s credibility, which is transferable, 
reciprocal, intangible and utilitarian (Park and Luo, 2001). It has a strong and direct 
impact on social attitudes and economic life in China. The 2015 White Book of 
China’s Study Abroad documents that 53.80% of returnees experience culture shock 
and difficulty integrating into the working environment after they return to China.
9
 
CEOs in China need to conform to the business culture in order to establish guanxi, 
by paying bribes or exchanging favors in a delicate manner. For example, in order to 
overcome high entry barriers, CEOs offer profit sharing to government officials 
                                                 
9
 See: http://edu.163.com/special/2015whitebook/ (in Chinese). 
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(Allen et al., 2005). Without guanxi, a returnee CEO will fail to secure a flow of 
resources, undermine their firm’s interaction with the surrounding environment, and 
in turn depress firm performance.  
Local social capital is an inimitable intangible resource for creating firm 
growth and competitive advantage. Their foreign experience with advanced 
institutions often make returnees disapprove of Chinese business culture, slowing 
their adaptation and ability to catch up. Cultural fit is essential for the accumulation 
of social capital. I hereby propose the following competing “network hypothesis”: 
H1b: Returnee CEOs are negatively associated with firm performance. 
4.4 Returnee CEOs and Firm Performance  
4.4.1 Baseline Results 
To test the competing hypotheses on the relation between returnee CEOs and 
firm performance, I first apply the following ordinary least squares (OLS) and firm 
fixed effects regressions on the cross-sectional sample: 
   
k
1k tk,1kt101t
εControlαEOReturnee_CααerformanceP   (1) 
where Performance denotes one-year-lead return on assets (ROA), return on sales 
(ROS) and market-to-book ratio (MTB). I also test two- and three-year-lead 
performance in additional analyses. ROA is measured by net income over total assets 
and reflects efficiency in using assets to generate earnings. ROS is calculated as net 
income over total sales and indicates the operational efficiency with which a firm 
generates profits from revenue. MTB is calculated as the market price over the book 
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value of net assets per common share, and reflects the premium or discount that the 
market gives to the firm on its net assets.  
The independent variable Returnee CEO is a dummy variable equal to one if 
the CEO has overseas experience, and zero otherwise. In addition, I create two 
dummy variables to capture their type of overseas experience. Returnee CEO (study) 
is set to one for CEOs with exclusive overseas study experience, and zero otherwise. 
Returnee CEO (work) is set to one for CEOs with work experience (including pure 
work experience and combined work and study experience abroad), and zero 
otherwise. To support H1a (H1b), I need to observe significantly positive (negative) 
coefficients on Returnee CEO. 
I incorporate control variables to account for firm characteristics (market-to-
book ratio, firm size, leverage, firm age and block ownership), governance 
characteristics (board size, supervisory board size,
10
 board meeting frequency, 
supervisory board meeting frequency and board independence) and CEO 
characteristics (CEO age, MBA, CEO education and gender). These variables have 
been found by the literature to influence firm performance. Variables are defined in 
the appendix. Variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The regressions 
include year, industry and region fixed effects.  
Table 4.3 shows the results. Columns 1, 3 and 5 present the estimates of 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. The coefficients of Returnee CEO are 
significantly negative, indicating that firms with returnee CEOs underperform those 
                                                 
10
 In addition to the board of directors, China’s company law requires Chinese firms to establish a 
board of supervisors, usually including shareholder representatives and employee representatives. 
Board members and executives cannot join the supervisory board. 
See: https://www.ft.com/content/b81b7dc2-00d0-11dd-a0c5-000077b07658 (Financial Times) 
82 
 
with non-returnee CEOs. For example, the former achieves 2.51% lower ROA than 
the latter. Since returnee CEOs might be correlated with some of the firm and CEO 
characteristics, I apply a univariate test to mitigate the concern of multicollinearity. 
The untabulated results are consistent. To separate the effect of overseas experience 
from a pure education effect, I control for CEO education and MBA. Their 
coefficients are positive in some regression models.  
In Columns 2, 4 and 6, I run the same specifications with firm fixed effects to 
address the joint determination problems in which an unobserved time-invariant 
variable may simultaneously determine firm performance and the hiring of returnee 
CEOs. The results for ROA and ROS are consistent, suggesting that the differences 
between returnee CEOs and local CEOs in terms of operating performance are not 
explained by time-fixed firm-specific omitted variables. Overall, the results are 
consistent with the network hypothesis, implying that the lack of local social capital 
outweighs the benefits of international expertise.  
[Insert Table 4.3] 
The negative relation is in line with Mironov (2015)’s finding on the 
importance of social capital of CEOs in corrupt countries, but seemingly contradicts 
the benefits of international experience among board directors documented in 
Giannetti et al. (2015). I attribute the contradiction to the different responsibilities of 
directors and CEOs. Board directors play a monitoring and advisory role, and their 
function is enhanced by their international experience. By contrast, CEOs are 
responsible for continuously securing critical resources to diminish the uncertain 
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external environment and implement their strategic decisions. A lack of social capital 
undermines their capability.  
 The negative relation helps to explain the increasing discrepancy between the 
returnee talent pool and the hiring of returnee CEOs, as shown in Figure 4.1. The 
annual number of incoming returnees increased by 1001.04% from 2001 to 2010, but 
the annual number of returnee CEO appointments only increased by 20.41%. I argue 
that despite the tremendous efforts of the government to introduce returnee 
professional managers, returnees’ weaknesses in social capital hindered a greater 
prevalence of such managers in the capital markets. There are several possible 
reasons for firms to appoint returnee CEOs. For example, companies cannot forecast 
the environment perfectly. It is possible that some firms expected the environment to 
require less social capital in future and therefore rationally hired returnee CEOs, but 
the environment did not improve in the direction that they forecast. It is also possible 
that appointing a returnee CEO is done to send a signal to the market that the firm 
does not rely on social capital or corruption to do business. One should not expect 
that CEOs with certain characteristics that may depress operating performance would 
be eliminated in the labor markets.
11
  
 The network hypothesis implies that returnees can start accumulating social 
capital after taking office as CEOs. I test whether returnee CEOs who are still in their 
job two to three years after their appointment remain inferior. The results reported in 
Appendix A2 show that the coefficients of returnee CEOs are no longer significantly 
                                                 
11
 For example, Masulis et al. (2012) show that although foreign directors are associated with firm 




negative for ROA or ROS two years after their appointment. The results suggest that 
returnee CEOs who have been in their role for two to three years are no longer 
inferior to local CEOs. Firms that appoint returnees as CEOs may believe that they 
could remedy the shortcomings in a few years.  
4.4.2 The Type and Length of Overseas Experience 
The baseline results provide evidence supporting the network hypothesis. 
Next, I aim to further establish that the inferior performance of returnee CEOs is 
indeed due to the lack of social capital under weak legal institutions. The partitioned 
sample strategy helps to address challenges and limitations of the baseline 
specification by assessing whether returnee CEOs differently affect performance 
across firms as predicted by the network hypothesis.  
The network view implies a higher opportunity cost for returnees who stay 
aboard for a long period. Living abroad longer also makes it more difficult for 
returnees to adapt to Chinese business culture. Returnee CEOs with work experience 
tend to stay abroad longer than those with study experience only, because the most 
common overseas degree (80 out of 105 in the sample) for returnee CEOs is a 
Master’s degree, which typically takes no more than two years. The biographies 
included in appointment announcements do not report the exact duration of returnee 
CEOs’ stays abroad. I therefore search for the name of each CEO in Baidu, the 
leading Chinese search engine, and find detailed information for about 10% of the 
returnee CEOs in my sample. Confirming my conjecture, the average time spent 




To confirm my conjecture, I incorporate the type of overseas experience, 
namely through Returnee CEO (work) and Returnee CEO (study) in Table 4.4. I use 
OLS and firm fixed effects regressions and incorporate the same set of control 
variables. The results show that the underperformance is driven by the returnee 
CEOs with overseas work experience. The higher cost induced by a longer time 
aboard further supports the network hypothesis. 
[Insert Table 4.4] 
4.4.3 Social Capital and Returnee CEOs 
Firms and returnee CEOs have different levels of social capital. For example, 
SOEs establish political connections through their state-controlled shareholders 
rather than relying on CEOs to gain this resource. Returnee CEOs who have 
previously worked in the government or are sitting on the boards of other firms do 
not share the typical weaknesses. I therefore predict that the negative association 
between returnee CEOs and firm performance disappear for resource-affluent firms 
and CEOs.  
To test such prediction, I replicate the baseline test using split samples based 
on whether the resources are in place. Specifically, I partition the sample according 
to whether the firm is an SOE, whether the CEO has political connections and 
whether the CEO has business networks. SOE status is obtained from the CCER 
(China Center for Economic Research), and is constructed based on whether the 
ultimate controlling shareholder is the government. CEOs are classified as politically 
connected if they have experience working in government (Fan et al., 2007). CEO 
Network is a dummy variable based on whether a CEO sits on the boards of other 
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listed firms. The resources are in place for SOEs, for CEOs with political 
connections and for CEOs with social networks. 
Panel A of Table 4.5 presents the results for the split samples of SOEs and 
non-SOEs. It shows that the negative relation between a returnee CEO (work) on 
ROA, ROS and MTB is only pronounced in non-SOEs. In other words, SOEs with 
returnee CEOs do not have inferior performance. When I consider CEO-level 
resources in Panels B and C, I find that the negative association of returnee CEOs is 
concentrated among the samples of CEOs with no political connections and those 
with no business networks. Politically connected returnee CEOs and those sitting on 
the boards of other listed firms are not associated with underperformance. The 
findings from the three panels further support the network hypothesis by attributing 
the underperformance to the lack of a local social network.   
[Insert Table 4.5] 
4.4.4 Regional Institutions and Returnee CEOs 
Although country-level institutions in China are weak in general, the quality of 
regional institutions vary across cities. In regions where the rule of law and legal 
enforcement are relatively strong and corruption is relatively low, firms face less 
expropriation from governments and enjoy better protection from well-functioning 
courts. In these regions, social capital should be less vital for mitigating the poor 
institutions. For example, returnee CEOs do not need to use bribery or establish 
relationships with government officials to avoid the excess burden of taxation or to 
gain access to loans. I therefore predict that the relation between returnee CEOs and 




I test the prediction above by replicating the test based on samples partitioned 
by the level of regional institutions, as measured by risk of expropriation and rule of 
law from a World Bank (2006) report on the governance and investment climate in 
120 cities in China. Although the survey was conducted in 2005, institutions tend to 
endure over decades. Risk of expropriation is measured by the number of days a 
company spends with government departments, including tax administration, public 
security, environmental protection, and labor and social security. Expropriation does 
not necessarily imply an immediate risk of nationalization but does indicate possible 
rent seeking and the occupying of time and firm resources due to government 
intervention. I obtain city-level data and use the cross-sectional median level to 
classify firms into two sets: those headquartered in cities with high and low 
expropriation risk. Some cities are not covered in the World Bank report, but city-
level data are still more suitable than province-level because of the institutional 
disparity within provinces.  
Rule of law is measured by the protection of producers’ legal rights, recorded 
in Fan, Wang and Wu (2010). A high value indicates strong protection of producer’s 
legal rights. I use the median value across all provinces in each year to classify all 
firms into those located in provinces with strong or weak rule of law, according to 
the province-year level index.  
Panels D and E in Table 4.5 show that the negative relation between returnee 
CEOs and performance is mainly concentrated within the subsample of firms located 
in cities with high expropriation risk or weak rule of law. In untabulated tests, I also 
proxy institutions by using an index of corruption based on whether firms need to 
make informal payments to get loans, as recorded in the World Bank report. As I 
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expect, the negative relation is seen most in firms located in more corrupt cities. 
These results further support the network hypothesis and highlight the importance of 
legal institutions in shifting the needs of firms toward social capital.  
4.4.5 International Business and Returnee CEOs 
The need for returnees’ international expertise varies across firms. For 
example, the international scope and experience of CEOs will be more valuable for 
multinational firms than for locally operated ones. This is one possible reason why 
the benefits documented in Carpenter et al. (2001) regarding international assignment 
experience are based on the CEOs of multinational firms in the US. In other words, a 
globalization strategy will exaggerate the benefits of a CEO with knowledge of 
foreign markets and institutions, and with foreign networks on which to draw. By 
contrast, local networks are more important for locally operated firms that largely 
depend on the local business community as their main suppliers and clients. Their 
reliance on local government is also heavier, because they are more sensitive to local 
policies. I therefore predict that the effects of returnee CEOs are more positive (or 
less negative) when firms demand international expertise. 
To test such prediction, I divide the firms into those that engage in international 
business and those that do not, using foreign sales, and expect to observe that the 
negative relation between returnee CEOs and firm performance is concentrated 
among firms without international business. Foreign sales data are taken from WIND 
and CSMAR. Panel F shows that the coefficients on Returnee CEOs are only 
significantly negative for firms with no foreign sales. The results confirm my 
prediction and suggest that the weaknesses of returnee CEOs are offset by the 
demand for their international expertise in firms that engage in international business.  
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To sum up, the results in Table 4.5 help to establish that the negative relation 
between returnee CEOs and performance documented in the baseline regressions is 
due to the lack of local social capital and weak legal institutions, as I argued.  
4.5 Identification Strategies 
4.5.1 Unobserved CEO heterogeneity 
Identification is a common challenge in interpreting the results of studies of 
CEO characteristics. One concern is that the overseas experience might be correlated 
with omitted variables at the CEO level, which would bias the findings. For example, 
the overseas experience may capture a CEO’s innate talents. It is possible that 
Chinese firms fail to attract the most capable overseas Chinese executives, and only 
attract mediocre ones. Or, it might be that CEOs that move abroad and then come 
back to their home country are less talented than those who never left the country. 
This alternative hypothesis implies a spurious or a biased effect.  
In Table 4.3, I have already controlled for CEO age, MBA, CEO education and 
gender in baseline regressions. To further address the concern, I incorporate more 
proxies for CEO talent and background by assuming that executives with prestigious 
overseas education experience and with overseas experience in more developed 
countries are more likely to grow into talented executives. I classify the 
characteristics according to the following perspectives: (1) the quality, subject and 
level of their overseas education, and (2) the development level of their host 
countries. To perform the analyses, I regress these characteristics on the performance 
measures (ROA, ROS and MTB) based on the subsample of 247 firms that appointed 
90 
 
returnee CEOs. The summary statistics of returnee CEO classification are shown in 
the appendix.   
The results reported in Table 4.6 show that whether CEOs studied in one of 
the top 100 universities in the Academic Ranking of World Universities,
12
 whether 
they majored in science or technology, and whether they obtained their first degrees 
in China from elite universities of the “985 project” does not influence their 
association with firm performance. Their experience in any of the 34 OECD (the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) developed countries, in 
English-speaking countries, and in Hong Kong, Macao or Taiwan does not make a 
difference. The results suggest that the alternative interpretation is not plausible.  
A similar concern is that people who choose to study abroad are different 
from others. For example, perhaps they went abroad because they had fewer 
opportunities in China, due to a lack of local connections. In this case, their lack of 
social network is not because of the opportunity cost of social capital associated with 
overseas experience. This argument, however, is not supported by the earlier results 
that the length of overseas experience exaggerates the negative relation between 
returnee CEO and firm performance. If the lack of social capital were an inherent 
characteristic, the relation would not be affected by how long they stay abroad. 
Overall, the battery of tests alleviates the concern over the omitted variables at CEO 
level.  
                                                 
12
 I use the Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU) 2012 to identify prestigious 
universities. The criteria used by the Center for World-Class Universities of Shanghai Jiaotong 
University to construct the ranking include the number of alumni and staff winning Nobel Prizes and 
Fields Medals, the number of highly cited scientists, and the number of publications in Nature and 
Science and a number of publications in SCI and SSCI. ARWU takes a century’s performance into 
account for these two indicators in order to avoid short-term fluctuations. The ranking is regarded as 
stable and transparent. See http://www.shanghairanking.com/.  
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[Insert Table 4.6] 
4.5.2 Propensity Score Matching  
Another important concern is the endogeneity in the assignment of CEOs to 
firms. Although I rely on within-firm variation and include firm fixed effects, the 
baseline models can address the matching problem only if the matching is based on 
time-invariant unobservable factors. Under this assumption, the estimates of returnee 
CEOs can be interpreted as casual effects.  
In Table 4.2, I show that firm age and board characteristics are different for 
firms with and without returnee CEOs. To alleviate the concern that returnee CEOs 
and firms are endogenously matched based on these time-variant characteristics, I 
apply a nearest-neighbor matching estimator (Abadie et al., 2004; Shipman et al., 
2017), which allows us to match certain observable characteristics. To convincingly 
draw a causal inference, ideally I should compare the performance of a firm that 
appoints a returnee CEOs with the same firm’s performance had it appointed a non-
returnee CEO. Since the counterfactual setting is not available, I construct a 
matching sample using observable firm and CEO characteristics linked to CEO 
selection. Custodio et al. (2013) and Custodio and Metzger (2014) argue that the 
selection decision mostly relies on public information. Although I incorporate factors 
that are likely to influence the appointment decision, the baseline model may suffer 
from functional form misspecification. Shipman et al. (2017) show the benefits of the 




Panel A of Table 4.7 estimates a first-stage probit regression on the likelihood 
of a firm appointing a returnee CEO. It is important to note that the coefficients of 
prior performance are insignificant, suggesting that it is not plausible to interpret my 
results as showing that returnee CEOs are disproportionally hired by firms with 
financial problems. Younger firms, firms with more active boards, indicated by 
meeting frequency, and firms that are located in regions that offer preferential 
education opportunities for returnees’ children are found to be positively related to 
hiring returnee CEOs. I then apply PSM with no replacement to match each of the 
247 firms (treatment group) that appointed a returnee CEO with an otherwise 
identical firm that would have been just as likely to appoint a returnee CEO but in 
fact appointed a non-returnee CEO (control group). Panel B of Table 4.7 shows that 
the difference in the matching characteristics is insignificant between the treatment 
firms and their matched counterparts. Panel C of Table 4.7 shows that the 
coefficients of Returnee CEO remain significantly negative for ROA, ROS and MTB. 
The negative relation is concentrated on these with work experience who stayed 
overseas longer. The findings based on the matched sample are in line with the 
resource hypothesis.  
Since the propensity score matched-pair research design may be sensitive to 
the choice of matching variables, it is useful to examine the sensitivity of my results 
to different choices of econometric approach. In the sensitivity analyses, I use the 
following two sets of matching covariates to generate new propensity score samples 
to replicate the tests: 1) firm characteristics, region, year and two-digit GICS code; 
and 2) by discretionary accruals (DACC) based on the modified Jones model 
(Dechow et al., 1995), in addition to the current matching variables. Untabulated 
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results show that my findings are robust to different matching covariates, suggesting 
that my results are not likely to be driven by the observable sample selection bias.  
The limitation of the propensity score matching method is the unobservable 
omitted variable issue, or “hidden bias”. I use the bounding approach developed by 
Rosenbaum (2002) to assess the impact of unobservable omitted variables and 
endogenous match between firms and CEOs. Following the argument of Rosenbaum 
(2002), the propensity score matching process is based on the assumption that 
matched observations have an equal probability (defined as Γ=1) of receiving 
treatment conditional on hiring returnee CEOs, i.e. two observations with identical 
observable covariates have an identical probability of receiving treatment. If Γ is not 
equal to one, each observation in a matched pair has an unequal probability of 
receiving treatment. Rosenbaum (2002) shows that relaxing the assumption of Γ = 1 
can be used to test whether the results are sensitive to hidden bias. I calculate Γ when 
the difference of outcomes between treatment and control groups is significant at the 
10% level. The tests show that although the differences of ROA, ROS and MTB 
between firms with and without returnee CEOs are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, 
and 5%, respectively, estimates of Γ =1 for ROA, Γ =1 for ROS and Γ =1.095 for 
MTB would result in significance at 10% level. This finding suggests that these 
results are sensitive to hidden bias and should be interpreted with caution. 
[Insert Table 4.7]   
4.5.3 Switch in the Type of CEOs 
The endogenous matching suggests that returnee CEOs tend to be hired by 
poorly performing firms, while the resource hypothesis suggests that CEOs influence 
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firm performance. The literature on CEOs’ experience points out that the endogenous 
matching between firms and CEOs and my imprinting interpretation are not mutually 
exclusive, because CEO-firm matching occurs largely because the firm believes that 
the CEO can imprint his or her personal style on the firm to meet its challenges 
(Benmelech and Frydman, 2015; Sunder, Sunder and Zhang, 2017).  
To ideally identify the effect of returnee CEOs on firm performance, I would 
need a sample in which local CEOs are exogenously replaced by returnee ones (or 
vice versa). If there is a change in firm performance, I could conclude that firm 
performance is correlated with the type of CEO rather than firm unobservable 
characteristics. Unfortunately, such a setting is not available. The closest experiment 
in practice is a switch of CEO type. Although most CEO departures are not random 
(Fee, Hadlock and Pierce, 2013), the timing is not likely to be optimal (Custodio and 
Metzger, 2014). 
I then examine the impact of a switch in the type of CEO on the change in 
operating performance. The change in ROA is calculated as the difference between 
the post-one-year ROA and the mean of the prior two years’ ROA. The change in 
ROS is defined as the difference between the post-one-year ROS and the mean of the 
prior two years’ ROS. In the subsample of predecessors as non-returnees (work), 
Other to Returnee (work) is set to one if the successor is a returnee (work), and 0 
otherwise. In the subsample of predecessors as returnees (work), Returnee (work) to 
Other equals one if the successor is a non-returnee (work), and zero otherwise. Table 
4.8 reports the results. The coefficients of Other to Returnee (work) are significantly 
negative, while the coefficients of Returnee (work) to Other are significantly positive 
for the regressions of the change in ROA and the change in ROS. The results indicate 
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that firms that switch to returnee CEOs are associated with inferior performance, but 
switching to local CEOs results in improved performance. This is further evidence 
supporting the network hypothesis, although I cannot completely rule out the 
possibility of endogenous matching between CEOs and firms.  
 [Insert Table 4.8] 
I further examine the market reaction to the switch in type of returnee CEO. I 
obtain CEO appointment announcement dates and daily stock returns from CSMAR 
and estimate the abnormal return as the difference between the daily stock return 
adjusted by dividends and the value-weighted market return including distributions. I 
focus on the subsample of firms in which the previous CEOs were non-returnees 
(work) and then compare the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for appointing 
returnee (work) vs non-returnee (work) successors. Table 4.9 presents the regressions 
results for the CARs for various event windows. Panel A is based on the original 
sample. The coefficients of Other to Returnee (work) are significantly negative after 
controlling for firm characteristics, governance characteristics and CEO 
characteristics, further supporting the network hypothesis. Although the public media 
in China hold a positive view of returnees, it seems that investors are aware of their 
weaknesses in the capital market. Because other factors may influence investors’ 
reactions to the hiring of returnee CEOs, I replicate the event based on the propensity 
score matching sample and report the results in Panel B. The market reaction remains 
more positive for hiring non-returnee successors, but the difference in CARs between 
the two groups becomes smaller. Figure 4.4 shows that although the replacement of 
non-returnee CEOs (work) leads to a positive market reaction in general, the CARs is 
substantially more positive (4.4% vs 1.4%) when the incoming CEO is a non-
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returnee (work) than a returnee (work). The positive CAR for the switch to returnee 
CEOs suggests that investors do not perceive return CEOs very negatively.  
 [Insert Figure 4.4 and Table 4.9]  
4.5.4 Instrumental Variable Approach  
I still cannot completely rule out the possibility that certain time-variant 
unobserved omitted factors explain my finding. For example, two matched firms 
with similar matching covariates may have different growth potential and challenges. 
To address the concern that my OLS estimates might be biased by unobserved firm 
characteristics that are correlated both returnee CEOs and firm performance, I use the 
exogenous provincial polices that increase the supply of potential CEOs with foreign 
experience. The policies are introduced by different government departments at 
different times in different provinces. Because the listed firms’ prospects do not fall 
into the scope of many of the provincial departments, such as the Department of 
Education, Personnel Department and Public Security Department, the variation in 
the timing of the policies is not likely to be related to firms’ prospects or demand for 
returnee CEOs. In fact, none of the returnee policies explicitly target listed firms and 
their CEOs. This increases my confidence in the exogenous nature of the policies.   
Since the median age of the returnee CEOs in my sample is 43 years old, and 
they generally have school-aged children, the provincial policies that alleviate their 
education concerns arguably lead to an exogenous increase in the supply of qualified 
returnee candidates for CEO positions.
13
 Education opportunities play an important 
                                                 
13
 Giannetti, Liao and Yu (2015) show that the first provincial policy, regardless of the content, helps 
to increase the proportion of directors with foreign experience in the province. I find that it does not 




role in family relocation decisions in Chinese culture, in turn lowering the cost of 
hiring returnee CEOs and influencing the hiring decision.
14
 Table 4.1 show that the 
policies increase the hiring of returnee CEOs in the province following their 
introduction. 
I construct two instrumental variables for returnee CEOs using two policy-
related dummies. I set Local School to one if the provincial policies offer specific 
schooling benefits to returnees’ children, and zero otherwise. I set International 
School to one if the province approves the opening an international school, and zero 
otherwise. If both IVs are valid, they estimate a local average treatment effect for 
compliers, i.e. firms which appoint returnee CEOs as a result of the instruments. 
They do not estimate an effect for “always takers” that appoint returnee CEOs 
anyway, or for “never takers” that would never appoint returnee CEOs regardless of 
the policies (Atanasov and Black, 2016).  
Both IVs are plausible in that I believe there are no contextual shocks that 
independently affect the firms in the province introducing the policies. As discussed 
earlier, it is unlikely that a provincial department will issue a policy that does not 
target listed firms at the same time as listed firms increase their demand for returnee 
CEOs. The asymmetric shocks are not a big concern between firms that eventually 
hire returnee CEOs and firms do not. This is because the staggered introduction of 
                                                                                                                                          
vague and the offered benefits are often trivial in the relocation decisions of wealthy high-end 
professionals like returnee CEO candidates.  
14
 To stress the importance of education opportunities in the family relocation decision, Chinese 
people often refers to an idiomatic allusion about the Chinese philosopher Mencius (Mengzi, 372-289 
BC). It refers to the legend that Mencius’s mother moved houses three times before finding a location 
that provided a good environment for the child’s education and upbringing.  
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the policies means the control sample includes not only firms with local CEOs but 
also firms that eventually hire or have already hired returnee CEOs.
15
  
Even the supply shock of emigrant talents was a good predictor for hiring 
returnee CEOs, it would be still difficult to convincingly claim that it meets the 
exclusion restriction. The policies might be able to influence firm performance 
through the channel of human capital. Apart from returnee CEO candidates, the 
policies could also attract more capable employees and directors with overseas 
experience who may enhance firm performance. However, given the value of 
overseas experience documented in the literature (Giannetti et al., 2015; Wang et al., 
2014), such a channel, if it exists, should bias against finding evidence consistent 
with the network hypothesis. 
Table 4.10 shows that both Local School and International School 
significantly predict the likelihood of a firm appointing a returnee CEO in the first-
stage models. Following the introduction of the education policies (opening of 
international schools), firms in the affected province are 2.30% (4.12%) more likely 
to hire returnee CEOs. For each regression, I estimate an F-statistic as prescribed in 
Stock and Yogo (2005) to check for weak instruments. The F-statistics (10.56) is 
above the rule of thumb (10), which indicates that the instruments satisfy the 
relevance condition.   
The results in the second stage with fixed effects show that the predicted 
Return CEOs significantly reduces the subsequent ROA and ROS, broadly consistent 
with my baseline results. The finding further supports the network hypothesis about 
the cost of returnee CEOs and highlights the importance of social capital. Overall, 
                                                 
15
 See Giannetti et al. (2015) for a similar argument.  
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the results are not driven by the endogenous matching between CEOs and firms. A 
caveat is that the instrumental variable estimates are larger than the baseline 
estimates. One possible reason for the difference is that the instruments may have 
some other direct or indirect effect on the outcome (Atanasov and Black, 2016).  
I perform additional analyses to mitigate the concern of possible shocks 
concurrent with the policies. First, I replicate the analyses based on a sub-sample of 
firms by excluding firms that have never hired returnee CEOs during the sample 
period and find consistent results. The treatment group remains firms that responded 
to the policies, but the control group becomes those that hired returnee CEOs at 
different points in the sample period. The firms in the restricted control sample are 
likely to be subject to shocks similar to those faced by firms that hire returnee CEOs 
after the policy changes. Second, the results are robust to the inclusion of industry-
year, region-year fixed effects or region-specific time trend to control for time-
varying industry and regional traits. I also use industry-province-median-adjusted 
ROA and ROS to control for industry- and province-specific shocks. The results 
remain consistent. Third, since the first stage results show that firm age is related to 
the hiring decision, I partition the sample based on the ex-ante median firm age.
16
 
Following the new polices, younger firms are more likely to hire returnee CEOs than 
older listed firms from the same province. In the second stage regression of the 
industry-province-median-adjusted performance, the coefficients of predicted 
returnee CEOs are significantly positive in the sample of younger firms.  
 [Insert Table 4.10] 
                                                 
16
 I do not use the interaction-based IV based on firm age and returnee policies because of the 
endogeneity between lagged and contemporaneous firm age (Atanasov and Black, 2016). 
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4.6 Additional Tests  
4.6.1 Returnee CEOs and Regulatory Conditions 
In addition to firm performance, I explore the regulatory environment faced 
by returnee CEOs. Allen et al. (2005), Correia (2014) and Hou and Moore (2010) 
suggest that social capital brings about favorable regulatory conditions for firms. For 
example, laws and regulations are not enforced effectively for politically connected 
firms. Therefore, I predict that the appointment of returnee CEOs leads to more 
severe inspections from the regulator, and thus a higher incidence of regulatory 
enforcement.  
I collect regulatory enforcement actions against fraud from the CCER.  
Regulatory Enforcement is equal to one for firms that experienced regulatory 
enforcement against fraud in the year in question, and zero otherwise. Based on the 
propensity score matching sample, I perform the test to examine the impact of 
returnee CEOs on enforcement against fraud. Table 4.11 shows that the coefficients 
of Returnee CEO, Returnee CEO (work) and Returnee CEO (study) are significantly 
positive, indicating that returnee CEOs could not avoid government intervention and 
fail to create a fair legal environment for their firms.  
[Insert Table 4.11] 
To confirm that the negative impact is not due to negative earnings 
management (EM) that returnee CEOs may engage in to blame their predecessor for 
the company’s problems, I test whether returnee CEOs tend to manipulate earnings. 
Earnings management is measured by modified Jones model-based discretionary 
accruals (DACC) (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995). I find that returnee CEOs do 
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not have a significant impact on subsequent earnings management. In addition, I also 
test the earnings management prior to the appointment to exclude the possibility that 
the underperformance is due to the predecessor’s earnings management in the year 
prior to the turnover. Again, I find that the prior earnings management is not 
significantly different for firms that appoint returnee CEOs and those that appoint 
local CEOs. The results suggest that it is not plausible to attribute the negative 
impact to hidden problems that manifest soon after returnee CEOs take office.  
4.6.2 Returnee CEOs and the Appointment of Executives 
 I next explore the personnel strategies of returnee CEOs in terms of the 
composition of their management teams. Because executives with heterogeneous 
knowledge and expertise can complement each other, returnee CEOs should appoint 
those who are able to bring local social capital to complement their weaknesses. I 
collect information on the executives’ backgrounds from the RESSET database. To 
perform the test, I review the biographies of newly appointed executives and 
construct the following variables: (1) the ratio of China’s Communist Party members 
among executives appointed in the year following the CEO’s appointment, to proxy 
for political connections; (2) the ratio of accounting, auditing or law professionals 
among the executives appointed in the year following the CEO’s appointment; (3) 
the ratio of executives with a Master’s degree or higher among the executives 
appointed in the year following the CEO’s appointment; and (4) the ratio of female 
executives among the executives appointed in the year following the CEO’s 
appointment.  
I regress the dummy variables Returnee CEO on the variables related to 
executive appointments. The results reported in Table 4.12 show that returnee CEOs 
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are reluctant to appoint executives with political connections. Their preference is 
presumably because politically connected executive members may undermine their 
leadership, and they may also feel more comfortable working with people with 
similar experience. The results help to explain returnee CEOs’ underperformance. 
 [Insert Table 4.12] 
4.6.3 Returnee CEOs and Corporate Strategy  
 Finally, I explore the corporate finance strategies of returnee CEOs by 
examining their influence on corporate decisions of corporate diversification, 
investment, R&D expenditure and cash holdings. Since returnee CEOs in China are 
regarded as an elite social group, they may exhibit overconfidence by overestimating 
their ability in choosing positive NPV (net present value) projects in various sectors 
and may pursue corporate diversification, which in turn could destroy firm value 
(Lang and Stulz, 1994). They may also have a greater sensitivity of corporate 
investment to cash flow due to overestimating returns on projects and viewing 
external funds as unduly costly (Malmendier and Tate, 2005), and may increase risk-
taking, as reflected by R&D expenditure and cash holdings (Kim and Lu, 2011; 
Opler et al., 1999).  
To test my predictions, I use the number of business segments multiplied by 
the number of geographic segments to proxy for the firm’s diversification, following 
Markarian and Parbonetti (2007). The corporate investment policy is measured by 
the ratio of capital expenditure to cash flow, following Malmendier and Tate (2005). 
I obtain data on business segments and geographic segments from CSMAR (2003-
2010) and WIND (2001-2002), capital expenditure and earnings from CSMAR, and 
depreciation from CSMAR (2003-2010) and GAOTIME (2001-2002). I regress 
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Returnee CEO on diversification, the sensitivity of investment to cash flow, R&D 
expenditure and cash holdings, using the original sample, and the results are reported 
in Table 4.13. The results show that returnee CEOs tend to pursue firm 
diversification but are not significantly different from local CEOs in terms of their 
other corporate strategies. Firm diversification serves as one of the possible reasons 
for the inferior performance of returnee CEOs.   
[Insert Table 4.13] 
4.7 Conclusion 
As the leading country of origin for international students, China’s incoming 
returnees increased more than tenfold from 2001 to 2010. Despite the dramatically 
expanded talent pool, the number of returnee CEO appointments only increased by 
29.41% in this period. I show that the benefits of CEOs’ international experience are 
less clear-cut in transition economies like China, in that international expertise can 
only be acquired at the opportunity cost of local connections. The setting of Chinese 
returnee CEOs enables us to test whether international expertise or local social 
capital is more important for firms operating in a country with weak legal institutions.  
I find that the appointment of returnee CEOs leads to less positive market 
reaction and inferior firm performance compared to local CEOs. The results support 
the network hypothesis and indicate that weak legal institutions shift the demand for 
resources of listed firms. Social capital can create a favorable business environment 
and reduce the dependence of firms on adverse environment, but returnee CEOs lack 
the resources needed to maneuver around bad institutions and therefore are 
associated with underperformance.  
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Furthermore, I confirm that the underperformance is indeed due to a lack of 
social resources and weak institutions, in that performance is no longer inferior for 
either resource-affluent returnee CEOs or returnee CEOs working for firms located 
in areas with stronger regional institutions. The effect of returnee CEOs also depends 
on the firm’s need for international expertise. For firms engaging in international 
business, the underperformance of returnee CEOs is not documented. My results are 
robust to the control of omitted variables issue at CEO level and the endogenous 
matching between firms and CEOs. Finally, I explore the channel through which 
returnee CEOs underperform local CEOs. I find that returnee CEOs are less likely to 
appoint executives with political resources to complement their disadvantages, but 
are instead more likely to appoint executives with a good educational background, 
limiting the heterogeneity of their management team. Returnee CEOs also exhibit 
overconfidence by engaging in business diversification. I argue that the mismatch of 
CEOs’ international expertise with the demand for local social capital impedes 
returnees from flourishing in the Chinese CEO labor market. Overall, I show that 
measurable CEO characteristics regarding international experience significantly 
determine firm performance and provide direct evidence of the importance of local 
social capital versus international experience in transition economies. In the context 
of the globalization of human capital, my findings suggest that the development of 
legal institutions, which reduce expropriation risks and enhance rule of law, will help 
transition economies like China to fully enjoy the benefits of introducing global 
talent. With regard to CEOs, my findings suggest a corporate governance question 
that has not been identified in prior literature: To what extent does international 
experience influence the leadership, entrenchment and remuneration arrangements of 
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returnee CEOs? For example, it would be interesting to know whether returnee CEOs 
possess more power in exercising their decision rights due to their international 
experience and knowledge, or less power due to their lack of local networks. 
Although I document that returnee CEOs bring little economic value to shareholders, 
it is important to explore the societal value, such as the patents, culture and social 
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Figure 4.1 Growth Rates of New Returnees and New Returnee CEOs 
This figure presents the growth rates of incoming returnees and returnee CEO appointments 
relative to their initial levels in 2001. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Returnee CEOs Appointment Frequency 
This figure presents the number of appointments of returnee CEOs, returnee CEOs (with 
work experience) and returnee CEOs (with study experience) from 2001 to 2010 in Chinese 







Figure 4.3 Returnee CEOs Appointments by Industry 
This figure presents the number of appointments of returnee CEOs, returnee CEOs (with 
work experience) and returnee CEOs (with study experience), as well as the proportion of 
appointments of returnee CEOs, broken down into ten industries (by two-digit GICS code), 





Figure 4.4  Mean CARs around Changes of CEOs 
Mean cumulative market-adjusted compound stock returns (CARs) around changes of CEOs 
based on the PSM sample, between 7 trading days prior to and 60 trading days post the CEO 
announcements during 2001-2010 under the propensity score sample, sorted by whether non-
returnee CEOs (work) are succeeded by non-returnee CEOs (work) or returnee CEOs (work). 
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Table 4.1 International Schools and Returnee Policies to Attract Returnee CEOs 
This table reports the issuing year of the first provincial policy benefiting returnees’ children’ schooling and opening year of the first international 
school in each province. The sample period is 2000-2010. CEO # denotes the observation of CEO appointments in each province. Returnee CEO% 
denotes the proportion of returnee CEOs hired in each province. “After” corresponds to observations after and during the issuing or opening year. 
“Before” corresponds to observations before the issuing or opening year.  
Province 
 
Returnee Policy International School 
 
CEO #. 
CEO # Returnee CEO % CEO # Returnee CEO % 
Year Before After Before After Year Before After Before After 
Anhui 84 2006 33 51 3.03 9.8 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Beijing 166 2000 0 166 0 17.47 1996 0 166 0 17.47 
Chongqing 80 2005 29 51 13.79 7.84 2001 0 80 0 10 
Fujian 84 1992 0 84 0 19.05 1997 0 84 0 19.05 
Gansu 45 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Guangdong 301 1999 0 301 0 14.29 1995 0 301 0 14.29 
Guangxi 47 2005 16 31 6.25 9.68 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Guizhou 26 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Hainan 38 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Hebei 60 2009 48 12 4.17 0 2002 5 55 0 3.64 
Heilongjiang 67 2002 5 62 0 3.23 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Henan 78 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Hubei 129 2002 9 120 0 5.83 2004 37 92 5.41 5.43 
Hunan 108 2001 0 108 0 6.48 2010 99 9 5.05 22.22 
Inner Mongolia 45 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Jiangsu 152 1999 0 152 0 7.89 1995 0 152 0 7.89 
Jiangxi 47 2003 7 40 0 2.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Jilin 73 2001 0 73 0 8.22 1998 0 73 0 8.22 
Liaoning 115 1999 0 115 0 8.7 2000 0 115 0 8.7 
Ningxia 30 2003 5 25 0 8 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Qinghai 23 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2000 0 23 0 0 
Shaanxi 58 1995 0 58 0 8.62 1999 0 58 0 8.62 
Shandong 150 1998 0 150 0 2.67 1996 0 150 0 2.67 







Shanxi 42 2007 22 20 0 5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Sichuan 156 2005 68 88 0 5.68 2009 128 28 3.13 3.57 
Tianjin 52 2001 0 52 0 15.38 1998 0 52 0 15.38 
Xinjiang 54 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Xizang 15 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Yunna 55 2001 0 55 0 14.55 2003 11 44 18.18 13.64 
Zhejiang 157 2001 0 157 0 8.92 2004 36 121 8.33 9.09 
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Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 This table presents the descriptive statistics for the full sample and the subsamples with and without returnee CEOs. The variable Returnee CEOs 
equals one if a returnee CEO (with any type of experience) is appointed, and zero otherwise. The other variables are defined in the appendix. The 
sample period covers 2001 to 2010. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 














Panel B - Panel C 
 
Obs Mean Median Std. Dev 
 
Obs Mean Median Std. Dev 
 
Obs Mean Median Std. Dev 
 
Mean Difference 
Returnee CEO 2847 0.0868 0 0.2815 
 
247 1 1 0 
 
2600 0 0 0 
 
N/A 
Returnee CEO (work) 2847 0.0502 0 0.2185 
 
247 0.5789 1 0.4947 
 
2600 0 0 0 
 
N/A 
Returnee CEO (study) 2847 0.0365 0 0.1876 
 
247 0.4211 0 0.4947 
 
2600 0 0 0 
 
N/A 
Size 2847 20.4395 20.4425 1.5711 
 
247 20.4722 20.4963 1.6614 
 
2600 20.4364 20.4387 1.5625 
 
0.036 
MTB 2847 4.0960 3.0459 6.0155 
 
247 3.7948 3.3174 5.7611 
 
2600 4.1246 2.9935 6.0394 
 
-0.330 
Leverage 2847 0.5691 0.5235 0.3833 
 
247 0.5506 0.5164 0.3544 
 
2600 0.5708 0.5237 0.3859 
 
-0.020 
Firm Age 2847 7.8226 8 4.0070 
 
247 7.2955 7 4.2481 
 
2600 7.8727 8 3.9806 
 
-0.577** 
Board Size 2847 9.2655 9 2.0282 
 
247 9.1093 9 2.0680 
 
2600 9.2804 9 2.0242 
 
-0.171 
Board Independence 2847 0.3225 0.3333 0.1001 
 
247 0.3305 0.3333 0.0979 
 
2600 0.3217 0.3333 0.1002 
 
0.009 
Block Ownership 2847 38.89 36.1 16.3730 
 
247 39.2517 36.03 16.8325 
 
2600 38.8557 36.115 16.3316 
 
0.396 
Supervisory Size 2847 4.0376 3 1.3591 
 
247 3.7773 3 1.3109 
 
2600 4.0623 3 1.3612 
 
-0.285*** 
Bmeetf 2847 9.1124 9 3.2451 
 
247 9.8097 9 3.5315 
 
2600 9.0462 8 3.2094 
 
0.764*** 
Smeetf 2847 4.4292 4 1.7671 
 
247 4.6437 4 1.9134 
 
2600 4.4088 4 1.7516 
 
0.235** 
CEO Age 2847 43.7418 43 6.4111 
 
247 43.0081 43 6.9017 
 
2600 43.8115 43 6.3595 
 
-0.803* 
MBA 2847 0.1282 0 0.3344 
 
247 0.3603 0 0.4811 
 
2600 0.1062 0 0.3081 
 
0.254*** 
CEO Gender 2847 0.9519 1 0.2141 
 
247 0.9393 1 0.2393 
 
2600 0.9531 1 0.2115 
 
-0.014 
CEO Education 2847 1.3576 1 0.7966 247 1.7166 2 0.6931 2600 1.3235 1 0.7975 0.393*** 
Prior ROA 2847 0.0003 0.0220 0.0985 
 
247 0.0046 0.0268 0.1029 
 
2600 -0.0001 0.0214 0.0981 
 
0.005 
Prior ROS 2847 -0.1002 0.0386 0.6473 
 
247 -0.1027 0.0489 0.7209 
 
2600 -0.1000 0.0377 0.6400 
 
-0.003 
Prior MTB 2831 4.3306 3.2260 4.7099 
 
242 4.0287 3.5609 4.4464 
 
2589 4.3588 3.2139 4.7336 
 
0.330 
ROA (t+1) 2847 0.0094 0.0243 0.1207 
 
247 -0.0040 0.0217 0.1575 
 
2600 0.0106 0.0246 0.1166 
 
-0.015* 
ROS (t+1) 2847 -0.0465 0.0451 0.7094 
 
247 -0.1122 0.0475 0.9400 
 
2600 -0.0402 0.0445 0.6834 
 
-0.072 
MTB (t+1) 2846 4.1682 2.8144 6.7370 
 
247 3.1715 2.7829 5.1169 
 





Table 4.3 Returnee CEOs and Firm Performance 
This table reports the results for the relation between returnee CEOs and firm performance. 
The dependent variables are return on assets (ROA) in (1) - (2), return on sales (ROS) in (3) - 
(4) and market-to-book ratio (MTB) in (5) - (6) in the year t+1. Returnee CEOs equals one if 
a returnee CEO (with any type of experience) is appointed, and zero otherwise. All variables 
in the table are defined in the appendix. T-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Variables (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 
ROA  ROS  MTB 
Returnee CEO -0.0251** -0.0250**  -0.1345** -0.1568**  -0.8764*** -0.8076 
 
(-2.57) (-2.11)  (-2.25) (-2.23)  (-2.65) (-1.19) 
Prior ROA 0.2961*** 0.1698***       
 
(5.15) (3.76)       
Prior ROS 
 
  0.2185*** 0.0806**    
  
  (3.07) (2.10)    
Prior MTB 
 
     0.5509*** 0.2319*** 
  
     (8.27) (5.52) 
MTB 0.0006 0.0006  -0.0036 -0.0048    
 
(0.78) (1.04)  (-0.78) (-1.46)    
Size 0.0049** -0.0055  0.0188 -0.0269  -0.3251*** -0.5157** 
 
(2.19) (-1.24)  (1.35) (-0.99)  (-2.88) (-2.11) 
Leverage 0.0035 0.0804***  -0.0542 0.4041***  -0.4660 -2.0617*** 
 
(0.24) (5.80)  (-0.59) (5.11)  (-0.79) (-2.96) 
Firm Age -0.0019*** -0.0124  -0.0064* -0.0312  0.0573* 1.6882 
 
(-2.99) (-0.52)  (-1.78) (-0.22)  (1.67) (1.15) 
Board Size 0.0009 0.0028  0.0131** 0.0146  0.0816* 0.0067 
 
(0.75) (1.23)  (1.97) (1.08)  (1.65) (0.05) 
Board Independence 0.0736* 0.1341**  0.5377 0.7599**  -1.3540 -0.0283 
 
(1.68) (2.37)  (1.62) (2.26)  (-0.65) (-0.01) 
Block Ownership 0.0005*** 0.0014***  0.0031*** 0.0084***  0.0032 0.0032 
 
(4.08) (4.03)  (4.13) (4.17)  (0.50) (0.16) 
Supervisory Size -0.0006 -0.0045  -0.0028 -0.0169  0.1684** 0.0735 
 
(-0.43) (-0.98)  (-0.33) (-0.62)  (2.22) (0.28) 
Bmeetf -0.0011 -0.0012  -0.0009 -0.0025  0.0304 0.0146 
 
(-1.61) (-1.03)  (-0.25) (-0.36)  (0.71) (0.21) 
Smeetf 0.0022 0.0036*  0.0154** 0.0189  -0.0671 -0.1153 
 
(1.53) (1.68)  (1.99) (1.47)  (-0.93) (-0.93) 
CEO Age -0.0003 -0.0006  -0.0012 -0.0020  0.0262 0.0299 
 
(-0.80) (-1.27)  (-0.53) (-0.68)  (1.20) (1.04) 
MBA 0.0187*** 0.0212**  0.1173*** 0.1129*  0.6954 0.4499 
 
(3.44) (2.19)  (3.64) (1.96)  (1.56) (0.81) 
CEO Gender -0.0018 0.0101  -0.0225 0.1037  0.1024 0.3367 
 
(-0.16) (0.71)  (-0.33) (1.23)  (0.18) (0.41) 
CEO Education 0.0027 0.0032  0.0213 0.0499**  0.1277 0.2745 
 (0.92) (0.75)  (1.24) (1.98)  (0.84) (1.13) 
Constant -0.0821* 0.1446  -0.6818** -0.0396  4.1157 -7.2406 
 
(-1.83) (0.47)  (-2.19) (-0.02)  (1.56) (-0.39) 
Year dummies YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Industry dummies YES NO  YES NO  YES NO 
Regional dummies YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Firm fixed effects NO YES  NO YES  NO YES 
R
2
 0.141 0.5277  0.119 0.5160  0.229 0.5018 
No. of Obs 2847 2847  2847 2847  2830 2830 
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Table 4.4 Returnee CEOs with Foreign Working Experience and Firm 
Performance 
This table reports the results on the effect of appointing returnee CEOs on firm performance. 
The dependent variables are return on assets (ROA) in (1) - (2), return on sales (ROS) in (3) - 
(4) and market-to-book ratio (MTB) in (5) - (6) in the year t+1. Returnee (work) equals one 
for those with overseas work experience or combined work and study experience abroad, and 
zero otherwise. Returnee CEO (study) equals one for those with overseas study experience 
only, and zero otherwise. All variables in the table are defined in the appendix. T-values are 
in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Variables (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 
ROA  ROS  MTB 
Returnee CEO (work) -0.0343** -0.0274*  -0.1957** -0.1970**  -0.9904*** -1.3210 
 
(-2.48) (-1.92)  (-2.33) (-2.33)  (-3.32) (-1.61) 
Returnee CEO (study) -0.0116 -0.0207  -0.0452 -0.0864  -0.7070 0.0905 
 (-1.03) (-1.14)  (-0.65) (-0.80)  (-1.08) (0.09) 
Prior ROA 0.2958*** 0.1703***       
 
(5.15) (3.77)       
Prior ROS    0.2186*** 0.0823**    
 
   (3.08) (2.14)    
Prior MTB       0.5509*** 0.2317*** 
 
      (8.28) (5.51) 
MTB 0.0006 0.0006  -0.0036 -0.0048    
 
(0.79) (1.04)  (-0.77) (-1.47)    
Size 0.0049** -0.0055  0.0192 -0.0267  -0.3246*** -0.5075** 
 
(2.23) (-1.23)  (1.39) (-0.98)  (-2.88) (-2.07) 
Leverage 0.0037 0.0805***  -0.0527 0.4054***  -0.4642 -2.0591*** 
 
(0.25) (5.80)  (-0.57) (5.12)  (-0.78) (-2.96) 
Firm Age -0.0018*** -0.0123  -0.0064* -0.0293  0.0574* 1.7206 
 
(-2.99) (-0.51)  (-1.76) (-0.20)  (1.66) (1.17) 
Board Size 0.0009 0.0028  0.0131** 0.0143  0.0815* 0.0025 
 
(0.74) (1.22)  (1.97) (1.06)  (1.65) (0.02) 
Board Independence 0.0729* 0.1338**  0.5332 0.7555**  -1.3654 -0.0873 
 
(1.67) (2.36)  (1.61) (2.24)  (-0.65) (-0.03) 
Block Ownership 0.0005*** 0.0014***  0.0031*** 0.0084***  0.0032 0.0027 
 
(4.07) (4.02)  (4.12) (4.15)  (0.50) (0.14) 
Supervisory Size -0.0006 -0.0045  -0.0026 -0.0165  0.1687** 0.0773 
 
(-0.41) (-0.97)  (-0.31) (-0.60)  (2.22) (0.29) 
Bmeetf -0.0011 -0.0012  -0.0010 -0.0025  0.0303 0.0152 
 
(-1.63) (-1.03)  (-0.28) (-0.35)  (0.71) (0.22) 
Smeetf 0.0022 0.0036*  0.0153** 0.0187  -0.0672 -0.1181 
 
(1.52) (1.67)  (1.97) (1.45)  (-0.93) (-0.95) 
CEO Age -0.0003 -0.0006  -0.0011 -0.0019  0.0265 0.0310 
 
(-0.73) (-1.25)  (-0.45) (-0.65)  (1.21) (1.08) 
MBA 0.0174*** 0.0209**  0.1089*** 0.1081*  0.6788 0.3883 
 
(3.18) (2.15)  (3.36) (1.86)  (1.53) (0.69) 
CEO Gender -0.0018 0.0100  -0.0225 0.1017  0.1025 0.3127 
 
(-0.16) (0.70)  (-0.33) (1.20)  (0.18) (0.38) 
CEO Education 0.0028 0.0032  0.0218 0.0500**  0.1285 0.2762 
 (0.94) (0.75)  (1.27) (1.98)  (0.84) (1.13) 
Constant -0.0849* 0.1430  -0.6996** -0.0636  4.0862 -7.7499 
 
(-1.90) (0.47)  (-2.25) (-0.03)  (1.55) (-0.42) 
Year dummies YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Industry dummies YES NO  YES NO  YES NO 
Regional dummies YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 





 0.142 0.5277  0.120 0.5162  0.229 0.5022 




Table 4.5 Effect of Local Resources, Institutions and Firm Demands 
This table reports the estimates of ordinary least squares (OLS) based on partitioned samples. 
Panel A presents the results for the sample split between SOEs and non-SOEs. Panel B 
presents the results for the sample split between those with politically connected CEOs and 
those without politically connected CEOs. Panel C presents the results for the sample split 
between networked CEOs and non-networked CEOs. Panel D presents the results for the 
sample split between firms headquartered in cities with high expropriation risk and those in 
cities with low expropriation risk. Panel E presents the results for the sample split between 
firms headquartered in cities with a strong rule of law and in cities with a weak rule of law. 
Panel F presents the sample split between firms conducting international business and those 
not doing so. The dependent variables are return on assets (ROA), return on sales (ROS) and 
market-to-book ratio (MTB) in the year t+1. The independent variables are Returnee CEO 
(work) and Returnee CEO (study). The regressions for ROA, ROS and MTB include control 
variables that are consistent with the control variables for ROA, ROS and MTB in Table 4.3, 
respectively. The full tables are provided in the unpublished appendix. The regressions 
include year, industry and regional dummies in Panels A, B, C and F, along with a constant. 
The regressions include year and industry in Panels D and E, along with a constant. T-values 
are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
 


































Controls YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Fixed effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
R
2



































Returnee CEO (work) 0.0136 -0.0448*** 0.0494 -0.2680***  -0.3633 -1.0141*** 
 
(1.36) (-2.68)  (0.75) (-2.61)  (-0.49) (-2.98) 
Returnee CEO (study) 0.0043 -0.0158  0.1658 -0.0652  0.8555 -0.9560** 
 
(0.16) (-1.26)  (0.96) (-0.85)  (0.24) (-2.05) 
Controls YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Fixed effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
R
2
 0.192 0.140  0.240 0.102  0.258 0.236 


















Network  Network 
Non-
Network  Network 
Non-
Network 
Returnee CEO (work) -0.0270 -0.0397**  -0.1149 -0.2262**  -1.1355* -0.9743*** 
 
(-1.33) (-2.24)  (-1.12) (-2.05)  (-1.73) (-2.63) 
Returnee CEO (study) 0.0091 -0.0157  0.1122 -0.0810  -0.8896 -0.4505 
 
(0.66) (-1.11)  (0.93) (-0.95)  (-1.25) (-0.55) 
Controls YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Fixed effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
R
2
 0.190 0.151  0.247 0.119  0.228 0.250 
No. of Obs 662 2185  662 2185  658 2172 
 












Returnee CEO (work) -0.0068 -0.0437**  0.0171 -0.2606**  -1.2013 -0.8361*** 
 
(-0.69) (-2.32)  (0.33) (-2.30)  (-1.61) (-2.61) 
Returnee CEO (study) 0.0027 -0.0028  0.0420 0.0297  1.1591 -1.3614** 
 
(0.23) (-0.27)  (0.50) (0.55)  (0.63) (-2.16) 
Controls YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Fixed effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
R
2
 0.206 0.146  0.206 0.116  0.168 0.322 
No. of Obs 668 1713  668 1713  663 1701 
 












Returnee CEO (work) -0.0191 -0.1126**  -0.0856 -0.7550**  -1.0522*** -1.2389* 
 
(-1.53) (-2.36)  (-1.30) (-2.32)  (-3.06) (-1.81) 
Returnee CEO (study) -0.0125 -0.0081  -0.0292 -0.0547  -0.8355 -0.1665 
 
(-0.94) (-0.48)  (-0.35) (-0.67)  (-1.11) (-0.28) 
Controls YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Fixed effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
R
2
 0.151 0.181  0.137 0.160  0.195 0.351 
No. of Obs 1984 863  1984 863  1970 860 
 






















Returnee CEO (work) -0.0159 -0.0404**  -0.0156 -0.2414**  -0.6181 -1.1070*** 
 
(-1.09) (-2.32)  (-0.51) (-2.24)  (-1.14) (-3.09) 
Returnee CEO (study) -0.0142 -0.0133  -0.0417 -0.0541  -1.3044 -0.2955 
 
(-1.19) (-0.85)  (-1.11) (-0.54)  (-1.54) (-0.34) 
Controls YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Fixed effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
R
2
 0.219 0.153  0.176 0.137  0.223 0.250 
No. of Obs 729 2118  729 2118  724 2106 
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Table 4.6 CEO Innate Characteristics and Firm Performance 
This table reports the results of the effect of returnee CEOs’ education quality on firm 
performance in Panel A, and the effect of returnee CEOs’ overseas destination on firm 
performance in Panel B, among the sample of returnee CEOs. The dependent variables are 
return on assets (ROA), return on sales (ROS) and market-to-book ratio (MTB) in the year 
after firms appoint a returnee CEO. The independent variables are Foreign Top 100 and 
China 985. Foreign Top 100 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a returnee CEO has 
studied in one of the world’s top 100 universities in a foreign country, and zero otherwise. 
China 985 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a returnee CEO obtained their 
bachelor’s degree from one of the Chinese “985 universities”, and zero otherwise. OECD is 
a dummy variable that is equal to one if a returnee CEO has overseas work or study 
experience in one of the OECD countries, and zero otherwise. English-Speaking Country is a 
dummy variable that is equal to one if a returnee CEO has overseas work or study experience 
in an English-speaking country (the US, the UK, Australia, Canada or New Zealand, in my 
sample of destinations), and zero otherwise. HK&Macau&Taiwan is a dummy variable that 
is equal to one if a returnee CEO has overseas work or study experience in Hong Kong, 
Macao or Taiwan, and zero otherwise. The full tables are provided in the unpublished 
appendix. The regressions include year, industry and regional dummies, along with a 
constant. The regressions apply year, industry and region fixed effects. T-values are in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Education Quality and Firm Performance 
 ROA ROS MTB  ROA ROS MTB 
Foreign Top 100 0.0083 0.0181 -0.2457     
 (0.33) (0.14) (-0.37)     
China 985     0.0430 0.2936* -0.0752 
     (1.54) (1.87) (-0.09) 
Controls YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Fixed effects YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
R
2
 0.356 0.332 0.287  0.363 0.342 0.287 
No. of Obs 247 247 242  247 247 242 
 
Panel B: Overseas Destination and Firm Performance 
 ROA ROS MTB  ROA ROS MTB  ROA ROS MTB 
OECD 0.0194 0.0577 -0.1558         




    
0.0020 -0.0748 -0.1627 
    
     (0.10) (-0.67) (-0.22)     
HK & Macau 
&Taiwan 
        
0.0009 -0.0292 -0.2580 
          (0.04) (-0.24) (-0.48) 
Controls YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Fixed effects YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
R
2
 0.358 0.332 0.288  0.355 0.333 0.288  0.355 0.332 0.288 




Table 4.7 Propensity Score Matching 
This table reports the determinants of returnee CEO hire, difference in mean tests for the 
PSM sample and the estimates of the effect of returnee CEOs on firm performance. Panel A 
reports the determinants of returnee CEO hire, Panel B reports the difference in mean tests 
for the PSM sample. Panel C reports results for the effect of returnee CEOs on firm 
performance. The dependent variables are return on assets (ROA), return on sales (ROS) and 
market-to-book ratio (MTB) in the year t+1. I use the 1-to-1 nearest-neighbor estimator. I use 
all observable factors, including firm variables, CEO variables, regulatory reform and 
institutional factor (in Table 4.8 Panel A) to obtain the propensity score for matching to test 
the impact of returnee CEOs on ROA and ROS. For MTB, I use all the factors in Table 4.2 
plus regulatory reform and Protection of Legal Rights to obtain the propensity score for 
matching. Furthermore, I consider the industry, year and regional effects in the matching 
process. All variables in the table are defined in the appendix. T-values are in parentheses. 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
Panel A: Determinants of Returnee CEO Appointments 
Variables Returnee CEO 
Prior ROA -0.0971 
 
(-0.15) 












Firm Age -0.0355*** 
 
(-3.29) 
Board Size -0.0050 
 
(-0.24) 
Board Independence 0.3166 
 
(0.50) 
Block Ownership 0.0003 
 
(0.11) 















CEO Gender -0.1118 
 
(-0.71) 
CEO Education 0.2075*** 
 
(4.15) 
International School 0.2789** 
 
(2.57) 
Local School 0.3066** 
 
(2.30) 








Year Dummies YES 
Industry Dummies YES 




No. of Observations 2847 
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Panel B: Differences in Mean Tests in PSM Sample 
 
Variables Returnee CEO (R) Non-Returnee CEO (N) R-N 
 
Mean Mean Mean in Difference P-value 
Prior ROA 0.0046 0.0041 0.0004 0.9623 
Prior ROS -0.1027 -0.1204 0.0177 0.7872 
MTB 3.7948 4.1236 -0.3288  0.5367 
Size 20.4722 20.4709 0.0014 0.9928 
Leverage 0.5506 0.5288 0.0218 0.4742 
Firm Age 7.2955 7.2470 0.0486 0.8952 
Board Size 9.1093 9.1457 -0.0364 0.8383 
Board Independence 0.3305 0.3227 0.0078 0.3886 
Block Ownership 39.2517 39.8254 -0.5738 0.6971 
Supervisory Size 3.7773 3.7571 0.0202 0.8566 
Bmeetf 9.8097 9.8178 -0.0081 0.9787 
Smeetf 4.6437 4.7530 -0.1093 0.5025 
CEO Age 43.0081 42.8138 0.1943 0.7435 
MBA 0.3603 0.3401 0.0202 0.6380 
CEO Gender 0.9393 0.9474 -0.0081 0.6979 
CEO Education 1.7166 1.7490 -0.0324 0.6040 
International School 0.8300 0.8462 -0.0162 0.6260 
Local School 0.9190 0.9312 -0.0121 0.6090 
Protection of Producer’s Legal 










Panel C: Returnee CEOs and Performance in PSM sample 
 

















































Controls NO NO NO NO NO NO 

























Table 4.8 Switches of CEO Type and Change in Firm Performance 
This table reports the effect of switching CEO types on the change in firm performance. The 
dependent variables are Change ROA, which is the difference between post-one-year ROA 
and the mean of the prior two years’ ROAs, and Change ROS, which is the difference 
between post-one-year ROS and the mean of the prior two years’ ROSs. The independent 
variables are Other to Returnee (work) and Returnee (work) to Other. Other to Returnee 
(work) is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a returnee CEO (work) replaces a non-
returnee CEO (work), and equal to zero if a non-returnee CEO (work) replaces a non-
returnee CEO (work). Returnee (work) to Other is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a 
non-returnee CEO (work) replaces a returnee CEO (work), and equal to zero if a returnee 
CEO (work) replaces a returnee CEO (work). All variables in the table are defined in the 
appendix. T-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variables                    Panel A 
 
Panel C 
  Change ROA Change ROS 
 
Change ROA Change ROS 
Other to Returnee (work) -0.0375* -0.2471* 
   
 
(-1.78) (-1.78) 
   Returnee (work) to Other 
   
0.1701** 0.7809* 
    
(2.54) (1.83) 



























































































CEO Education 0.0026 0.0086 0.0136 0.0466 
 (0.58) (0.29)  (0.39) (0.21) 







Year dummies YES YES 
 
YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES 
 
YES YES 





 0.196 0.180 
 
0.480 0.545 





Table 4.9 Market Reaction to Switch in Type of CEO  
This table reports the regression results of the market reaction to a switch in the type of CEO. Panel A reports the results from the original sample. Panel 
B reports the results in the PSM sample. Other to Returnee (work) is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a returnee CEO (work) replaces a non-
returnee CEO (work), and equal to zero if a non-returnee CEO (work) replaces a non-returnee CEO (work). The dependent variables are cumulative 
abnormal returns (calculation method shown below) over different windows, given by CAR(-1,1), CAR(-3,3), CAR(-5,5), CAR(-7,20), CAR(-7,40) and 
CAR(-7,60). All variables in the table are defined in the appendix. T-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 












  Model 1 Model 2 
 
Model 3 Model 4 
 
Model 5 Model 6 
 
Model 7 Model 8 
 
Model 9 Model 10 
 
Model 11 Model 12 
Other to Returnee 












































Controls NO YES  NO YES  NO YES  NO YES  NO YES  NO YES 
Adj-R
2























Panel B: Market Reaction to Switch in type of CEOs using PSM sample 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7) 
 CAR(-1,1) CAR(-3,3) CAR(-5,5) CAR(-7,20) CAR(-7,40) CAR(-7,60) 

















 (1.61) (1.89) (2.71) (2.40) (2.07) (1.74) 
Controls NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Adj-R
2
 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.008 0.003 
No. of Obs. 248 248 248 248 248 248 
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Table 4.10 Instrumental Variable (IV) 
This table reports instrumental variables results. The table reports the results of two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) regression analyses for the effect of returnee CEOs on firm 
performance. The instrumental variables are based on the policy changes related to education 
opportunities for returnees’ children. Local School is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
headquartered province has promulgated provincial returnee policies that offer preferential 
treatment to returnees’ children in entering local key schools or universities, and zero 
otherwise. International School is a dummy variable equal to one if the Ministry of 
Education has approved opening an international school in the headquartered province, and 
zero otherwise. Returnee CEO is the fitted value predicted by the first stage model. Firm 
characteristics are controlled. I also include the year, industry and regional dummies in my 
analyses. All variables in the table are defined in the appendix. T-values are in parentheses. 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 































Firm Size 0.0021 0.0057** 0.0026 0.0242* 0.0005 -0.2937*** 
 
(0.46) (2.35) (0.57) (1.70) (0.12) (-2.67) 
Leverage -0.0146 0.0010 -0.0170 -0.0709 -0.0125 -0.5299 
 
(-0.92) (0.07) (-1.07) (-0.77) (-0.97) (-0.88) 
Firm Age -0.0068*** -0.0034*** -0.0067*** -0.0143** -0.0060*** 0.0238 
 
(-3.75) (-3.04) (-3.75) (-2.40) (-3.37) (0.45) 
Board size -0.0012 0.0006 -0.0012 0.0120* -0.0014 0.0784 
 
(-0.42) (0.48) (-0.41) (1.65) (-0.49) (1.54) 
Indr 0.0345 0.0848* 0.0336 0.5908* 0.0121 -1.2639 
 
(0.33) (1.78) (0.33) (1.72) (0.12) (-0.58) 
Block Ownership -0.0001 0.0005*** -0.0001 0.0029*** -0.0001 0.0022 
 
(-0.29) (3.23) (-0.31) (3.45) (-0.42) (0.32) 
Supervisory Size -0.0085** -0.0026 -0.0085** -0.0132 -0.0085** 0.1191 
 
(-2.04) (-1.32) (-2.05) (-1.14) (-2.04) (1.27) 
Bmeetf 0.0040* -0.0001 0.0041** 0.0043 0.0044** 0.0568 
 
(1.94) (-0.11) (1.96) (0.80) (2.07) (1.11) 
Smeetf 0.0038 0.0030* 0.0037 0.0195** 0.0038 -0.0427 
 
(1.06) (1.79) (1.05) (2.19) (1.06) (-0.54) 
MTB -0.0012 0.0003 -0.0012 -0.0048 
  
 
(-1.34) (0.44) (-1.32) (-1.02) 
  Prior ROA -0.0186 0.2940*** 
    
 
(-0.24) (4.99) 




   
(-0.51) (3.00) 
  Prior MTB 
    
-0.0019* 0.5419*** 



























 Constant 0.0354 -0.0089 0.0724 -0.4984 0.3855* 6.5162* 
 
(0.34) (-0.12) (0.65) (-1.43) (1.72) (1.68) 
Regional effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
F-statistic 10.56  10.51  9.94  
No. of Obs. 2847 2847 2847 2847 2830 2830 
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Table 4.11 Returnee CEOs and Regulatory Environment 
This table reports the results of probit regression analyses for the effect of appointing 
returnee CEOs on the subsequent year’s regulatory enforcements against fraud, for a 1-to-1 
propensity score matched (nearest-neighbor matching without replacement) regulatory 
enforcement against fraud sample, from 2001 to 2010. The propensity score matching 
sample is the same as the sample in Column 1 of Table 4.8 Panel C. The dependent variable 
equals one if the firm was subject to regulatory enforcement against disclosed fraud, and zero 
otherwise. The independent variables are Returnee CEO, Returnee CEO (work) and Returnee 
CEO (study). All the independent variables in the table are defined in the appendix. T-values 











Variables Regulatory Enforcement Against Fraud 
 
(1) (2) 














Constant -1.9058*** -1.9058*** 
  (-11.70) (-11.70) 
Controls NO NO 
Pseudo R
2
 0.0266 0.0268 
No. of Obs. 494 494 
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Table 4.12 The Effect of Returnee CEOs on Executive Appointments 
This table presents the results of OLS regression analyses for the effect of returnee CEOs on 
the subsequent appointment of executives. CCPM is the ratio of members of China’s 
Communist Party among the executives appointed in the year following the CEO’s 
appointment. Professional Background is the ratio of executives certified as accountants, 
auditors or lawyers among the executives appointed in the year following the CEO’s 
appointment. Postgraduate Education is the ratio of executives possessing a Master’s degree 
or higher among the subsequently appointed executives. Female Executives is the ratio of 
female executives among the subsequently appointed executives. The dependent variable is 
Returnee CEO, which is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO has overseas work or 
study experience, and zero otherwise. Other control variables are defined in the appendix. 
Industry and year effects are also included. The sample period covers 2001 to 2010. T-values 









Returnee CEO -0.0367* 0.0173 0.0259 -0.0191 
 
(-1.85) (0.94) (1.09) (-1.14) 
Prior ROA 0.0182 -0.1836*** -0.0591 0.0012 
 
(0.23) (-2.65) (-0.77) (0.02) 
MTB 0.0022** 0.0003 0.0018** 0.0004 
 
(2.44) (0.43) (2.13) (0.42) 
Size 0.0155*** -0.0022 0.0154*** -0.0131*** 
 
(3.28) (-0.56) (2.96) (-3.14) 
Leverage 0.0177 -0.0163 -0.0151 -0.0085 
 
(1.04) (-1.09) (-0.87) (-0.49) 
Firm Age 0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0012 
 
(0.67) (-1.00) (-0.77) (-0.84) 
Board Size 0.0057 -0.0014 0.0096*** 0.0012 
 
(1.60) (-0.49) (2.93) (0.47) 
Board 
Independence -0.2137** 0.0049 0.0812 0.0517 
 
(-2.16) (0.07) (0.76) (0.71) 
Block Ownership 0.0007 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
 
(1.56) (-0.30) (0.22) (0.08) 
Supervisory Size 0.0129** 0.0033 -0.0078 -0.0027 
 
(2.35) (0.84) (-1.59) (-0.71) 
Bmeetf 0.0006 0.0015 0.0012 0.0034** 
 (0.30) (0.97) (0.60) (2.02) 
Smeetf -0.0024 0.0015 0.0062 -0.0009 
 (-0.58) (0.48) (1.55) (-0.28) 
CEO Age 0.0018* -0.0011 0.0012 -0.0002 
 
(1.80) (-1.53) (1.19) (-0.31) 
MBA -0.0172 -0.0062 0.0044 -0.0103 
 
(-0.89) (-0.39) (0.21) (-0.65) 
CEO Gender -0.0083 -0.0515* 0.0239 -0.0316 
 
(-0.30) (-1.93) (0.97) (-1.19) 
CEO Education 0.0046 0.0075 0.0338*** 0.0076 
 (0.52) (1.10) (4.16) (1.17) 
Constant -0.3396*** 0.2273** -0.4882*** 0.3378*** 
 
(-2.80) (2.18) (-3.95) (3.39) 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES 
R
2
 0.037 0.016 0.035 0.021 
No. of Obs 2847 2847 2847 2847 
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Table 4.13 The Effect of Returnee CEOs on Corporate Strategy 
This table reports the OLS regression analyses results for the effect of returnee CEOs on 
corporate strategy. The dependent variables are Firm Diversification, Investment to Cash 
Flow Sensitivity, R&D and Cash Holding. Firm Diversification is calculated as the number 
of business segments multiplied by the number of geographic segments. Investment to Cash 
Flow Sensitivity is the ratio of capital expenditure to cash flow (earnings before 
extraordinary terms plus depreciation). R&D is the natural log of one plus the R&D 
expenditure from 2007 to 2010. Cash Holdings is the ratio of cash and marketable securities 
to net assets computed as total assets minus cash and marketable securities, from 2007 to 
2010. The independent variable is Returnee CEO. The regressions control other factors, 
along with year and industry effects. All variables in the table are defined in the appendix. T-






Investment to Cash 
Flow Sensitivity R&D Cash Holdings 
Returnee CEO 1.7624* 0.0339 -0.0492 0.0020 
 
(1.82) (0.64) (-0.12) (1.02) 
Prior ROA 1.5970 1.0771*** 3.8362*** 0.0054 
 
(0.54) (4.79) (3.26) (0.82) 
MTB -0.0379 -0.0006 0.0368** 0.0001** 
 
(-1.24) (-0.22) (2.17) (2.29) 
Size 1.3636*** -0.0350*** 0.1259 0.0009** 
 
(7.07) (-2.88) (1.52) (2.22) 
Leverage 0.1640 0.0151 0.2874 0.0016 
 
(0.24) (0.30) (1.25) (1.62) 
Firm Age 0.0872 -0.0162*** -0.0007 -0.0002* 
 
(1.24) (-3.92) (-0.02) (-1.94) 
Board Size 0.0478 0.0067 0.0085 0.0005 
 
(0.39) (0.92) (0.11) (1.54) 
Board Independence -0.0152 -0.1584 1.4445 0.0060 
 
(-0.00) (-0.70) (0.59) (0.87) 
Block Ownership -0.0601*** -0.0025*** -0.0041 -0.0001*** 
 
(-4.09) (-2.93) (-0.54) (-3.26) 
Supervisory Size 0.1541 -0.0041 0.0084 0.0008 
 
(0.79) (-0.44) (0.10) (1.60) 
Bmeetf 0.4143*** -0.0022 0.0129 -0.0001 
 (4.52) (-0.41) (0.36) (-0.68) 
Smeetf -0.2670* 0.0271*** 0.1455** 0.0001 
 (-1.71) (2.65) (2.09) (0.48) 
CEO Age -0.0369 -0.0026 -0.0001 0.0001 
 
(-0.97) (-1.11) (-0.01) (1.48) 
MBA -0.7412 -0.0041 0.0278 -0.0036*** 
 
(-0.96) (-0.09) (0.07) (-3.57) 
CEO Gender 1.1603 0.1074* 0.3324 0.0027*** 
 
(1.13) (1.69) (0.80) (3.03) 
CEO Education 0.2342 0.0067 0.3815*** 0.0015** 
 (0.71) (0.37) (2.70) (2.13) 
Constant -25.8891*** 1.1475*** -6.5579*** -0.0357*** 
 
(-5.75) (4.41) (-2.78) (-2.73) 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES 
R
2
 0.059 0.047 0.064 0.075 




Table A4.1 Variable Definitions 
Variables Definitions 
Returnee CEO 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO has had overseas experience, either 
studying at university, training or working, and 0 otherwise. 
Returnee CEO (work) 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO has had overseas work experience or 
combined work and study experience, and 0 otherwise. 
Returnee CEO (study) 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO has had overseas experience studying at a 
university, or overseas training experience, and 0 otherwise. 
Other to Returnee (work) 
Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a returnee CEO (with work experience 
abroad) replaces a non-returnee CEO, and equal to 0 if a non-returnee CEO 
replaces a non-returnee CEO. 
Returnee (work) to Other 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a non-returnee CEO replaces a returnee CEO (with 
work experience abroad), and equal to 0 if a returnee CEO (with work 
experience abroad) replaces a returnee CEO (with work experience abroad). 
Local School 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the government of the headquartered province has 
promulgated returnee policies to offer returnees’ children favorable treatment in 
entering local key schools or universities, and 0 otherwise.  
International School 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the province has approved opening an 
international school in the headquartered province, and 0 otherwise.  
ROA Net income over total assets at the end of the year. 
ROS Net income over total sales at the end of the year. 
MTB Market price per share over book value per ordinary share. 
Change in ROA 
The one-year-post ROA minus the average of one-year-prior ROA and the 
announcement-year ROA. 
Change in ROS 
The one-year-post ROS minus the average of the one-year-prior ROS and the 
announcement-year ROS. 
Regulatory Enforcement 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is subject to regulatory enforcement 
against disclosed fraud, and 0 otherwise. 
CCPM 
The ratio of members of China’s Communist Party among the executives 
appointed in the year following the CEO’s appointment. 
Professional Background 
The ratio of executives certified as accountants, auditors or lawyers among the 
executives appointed in the year following the CEO’s appointment. 
Postgraduate Education 
The ratio of executives possessing a Master’s degree or higher among the 
executives appointed in the year following the CEO’s appointment. 
Female Executives 
The ratio of female executives among the executives appointed in the year 
following the CEO’s appointment. 
Firm Diversification 
The number of business segments multiplied by the number of geographic 
segments. 
Investment to Cash Flow 
Sensitivity 
The ratio of capital expenditure to cash flow (earnings before extraordinary 
terms plus depreciation). 
R&D Expenditure The natural logarithm of one plus the R&D expenditure from 2007 to 2010. 
Cash Holdings 
The ratio of cash and marketable securities to net assets computed as total assets 
minus cash and marketable securities, from 2007 to 2010. 
Prior ROA The average of the one-year-prior ROA and the announcement-year ROA. 
Prior ROS The average of the one-year-prior ROS and the announcement-year ROS. 
Prior MTB The average of the one-year-prior MTB and the announcement-year MTB. 
Firm Size The natural logarithm of firm sales at the end of the year. 
Leverage Total debt over sales at the end of the year. 
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Firm Age The number of years since the firm’s IPO year. 
Block Ownership The ownership of the largest shareholder. 
SOE 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is a state-owned enterprise, and 0 
otherwise. 
Foreign sales  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has foreign sales, and 0 otherwise. 
CEO Age The age of the CEO in the year they were appointed. 
MBA 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO possesses an MBA or EMBA degree, and 
0 otherwise. 
CEO Gender Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is male, and 0 otherwise. 
CEO Education 
The average score for the education level of the CEO when appointed. The score 
ranges between 0 and 3: If a CEO does not hold a bachelor’s degree, the value is 
0; if they have a bachelor’s degree, the value is 1; if they have a Master’s degree 
(including MBAs and EMBAs), the value is 2; if they have a doctoral degree, 
the value is 3. 
CEO Political Connections 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO was or still is an officer of the central 
government, local government or the military, and 0 otherwise. 
CEO Network 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO sits on the board of other firms at the end 
of the year, and 0 otherwise. 
Board Size The total number of directors on the board at the end of the year. 
Supervisory Size The total number of supervisors on the board at the end of the year. 
Bmeetf The total number of directors’ board meetings in one year. 
Smeetf The total number of supervisory board meetings per year. 
Board Independence The proportion of outside directors among the board directors. 
Risk of Expropriation 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is headquartered in a city with lower 
bureaucratic interactions, and 0 otherwise. 
Rule of Law 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is headquartered in a city with higher 
protection of producers’ legal rights, and 0 otherwise. 
Protection of Legal Rights 
A high value indicates better protection of producers’ legal rights in the 
province. 
Industry  
The first two digits of the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) are 
utilized to construct the industry dummy variables. Some industry dummy 
variables may be automatically omitted in different regressions. 
Region 
The location of the firm is classified into a city with a stock exchange, the 
coastal area, the inland area or the northwest area. 
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Table A4.2 Returnee CEOs and Long-run Performance 
This table reports the effect of appointing returnee CEOs on firm performance two and three 
years after the appointment. The PSM sample only includes the survived returnee and local 
CEOs (i.e. these do not experience turnover). The dependent variables are return on assets 
(ROA), return on sales (ROS) and market-to-book ratio (MTB) two and three years after the CEO 
appointment. The regressions apply year, industry and region fixed effects. All variables in the 
table are defined in Table A4.1. T-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 




ROA ROS MTB 
 
ROA ROS MTB 
Returnee CEOs 0.0073 0.0284 -0.6015* 0.0091 0.0951*** -0.3636 
 
(1.13) (0.56) (-1.81)  (0.99) (2.85) (-1.57) 
Prior ROA 0.2628***    0.1431**   
 
(4.07)    (2.03)   
Prior ROS  0.5037***    0.1280  
 
 (3.65)    (1.55)  
Prior MTB   0.2366***    0.1396 
 
  (3.07)    (1.46) 
MTB -0.0004 -0.0047   0.0005 0.0027  
 
(-0.51) (-0.67)   (0.64) (0.69)  
Size 0.0044** 0.0067 -0.2926**  0.0010 0.0084 -0.7885*** 
 
(2.08) (0.47) (-2.57)  (0.40) (0.79) (-5.32) 
Leverage -0.0095 0.1192 -0.5444  -0.0104 -0.0601 1.1143 
 
(-0.50) (0.94) (-0.67)  (-0.52) (-0.60) (1.02) 
Firm Age 0.0001 0.0004 0.0494  -0.0001 0.0013 0.1146*** 
 
(0.11) (0.13) (1.64)  (-0.19) (0.42) (3.41) 
Board Size -0.0001 0.0073 0.0210  0.0008 0.0117* 0.0264 
 
(-0.05) (1.05) (0.39)  (0.59) (1.83) (0.39) 
Board Independence 0.0469 0.6393 2.9965  0.0331 0.2763 0.7155 
 
(1.13) (1.53) (1.26)  (0.74) (1.09) (0.37) 
Block Ownership 0.0004*** 0.0022* 0.0002  0.0003* 0.0007 0.0001 
 
(2.68) (1.89) (0.03)  (1.93) (0.76) (0.02) 
Supervisory Size -0.0018 0.0032 -0.1167*  0.0015 -0.0005 0.0363 
 
(-1.05) (0.29) (-1.69)  (0.82) (-0.06) (0.41) 
Bmeetf -0.0014* 0.0075 -0.0557  -0.0001 0.0041 -0.0534 
 
(-1.72) (1.45) (-1.53)  (-0.12) (1.23) (-1.35) 
Smeetf 0.0020 -0.0079 -0.0227  0.0021 0.0029 0.0462 
 
(1.46) (-0.82) (-0.35)  (1.41) (0.33) (0.64) 
CEO Age 0.0001 -0.0005 0.0013  0.0000 -0.0009 -0.0012 
 
(0.21) (-0.18) (0.07)  (0.01) (-0.36) (-0.05) 
MBA 0.0107* 0.0807** 0.0816  -0.0010 -0.0052 0.3659 
 
(1.82) (2.10) (0.22)  (-0.17) (-0.16) (1.03) 
CEO Gender -0.0157 -0.0258 -0.1818  -0.0049 -0.0409 -0.2205 
 
(-1.41) (-0.22) (-0.40)  (-0.32) (-0.50) (-0.31) 
CEO Education -0.0073** -0.0260 0.3368**  -0.0070* -0.0443** 0.1360 
 (-2.23) (-1.10) (2.24)  (-1.95) (-2.22) (0.70) 
Constant 0.0003 -0.2559 7.5687***  -0.0340 -0.4268 16.0265*** 
 
(0.00) (-0.89) (2.91)  (-0.59) (-1.34) (4.64) 
Year Dummy YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES 
Regional Dummy YES YES YES 
 





 0.141 0.142 0.134 
 
0.074 0.083 0.156 
No. of Obs 1960 1954 1836 
 





Table A4.3 Summary Statistics of Returnee CEO Classification 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the background of returnee CEOs. Foreign Top 
100 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a returnee CEO has studied in one of the world’s 
top 100 universities in a foreign country, and zero otherwise. China 985 is a dummy variable 
that is equal to one if a returnee CEO obtained their bachelor’s degree from one the Chinese 
“985 universities”, and zero otherwise. The 985 universities refer to 39 universities included in 
“Project 985”, which is a national project to promote the development and reputation of the 
Chinese higher education system by founding world-class universities in the 21
st
 century. OECD 
is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a returnee CEO has overseas work or study 
experience in an OECD country, and zero otherwise. English-Speaking Country is a dummy 
variable that is equal to one if a returnee CEO has overseas work or study experience in an 
English-speaking country (the US, the UK, Australia, Canada or New Zealand), and zero 
otherwise. HK&Macau&Taiwan is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a returnee CEO has 








 Obs Mean Median Std.Dev 
Foreign Top 100 247 0.0526 0 0.2238 
China 985 247 0.1377 0 0.3452 
OECD 247 0.5547 1 0.4980 
English-Speaking Country 247 0.3684 0 0.4834 
HK&Macao&Taiwan 247 0.3806 0 0.4865 
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Chapter 5 Legal Enforcements and Institutional 
Transition of Chinese Entrepreneurial Firms: Evidence 




I study the effect of CEOs’ tacit knowledge of advanced legal institutions in enhancing 
firm performance in the context of institutional transitions. Going public marks the 
formalized transformation of firms as required by regulators. I argue that such 
knowledge can facilitate the transition. The results based on entrepreneurial firms listed 
on the Chinese start-up board confirm my predictions. Returnee CEOs, especially those 
returned from countries with more advanced legal institutions, are associated with 
superior post-IPO performance. In addition, foreign venture capitalists (VCs) are found 
to strengthen the positive impact of returnee CEOs, especially when both VCs and CEOs 





The impact of cross-border differences in legal institutions on corporate 
strategies and performance is an important issue in strategic and international 
management literature (Ghemawat, 2001; Chan et al., 2008). Focusing on the 
differences between host and home countries, the literature explores the impact of 
institutional differences on market entry strategies (Estrin et al., 2009; Meyer et al., 
2009) and foreign capital market choice (Moore et al., 2012). The institutional context 
of host countries could also shape the behavior of foreign companies after they enter the 
market (Glynn and Abzug, 2002). Also, Kwok and Tadesse (2006) point out that 
multinational companies could influence the institutional environment of corruption of 
host countries over time. Whether legal institution distance influences firms through 
individuals remains under-researched.  
  In the context of globalization of human capital, international human capital 
mobility has become prevalent, especially regarding the brain gain phenomenon in 
emerging markets. Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) with international experience are 
viewed as having inimitable knowledge, worldviews, and professional ties (Athanassiou 
and Nigh, 1999; Lublin, 1996, Maruca, 1994), which have a positive impact on income 
growth in companies with high levels of international interdependence in surveyed 
medium-sized firms (Roth, 1995), on firm performance in multinational firms 
(Carpenter et al., 2001), and on financial performance in Fortune 500 firms (Daily et al., 
2000). Yet, the literature ignores the importance of CEOs’ experience with cross-border 
legal institutions. For example, the behavior of individuals from countries with high 
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corruption would be changed in host countries with advanced legal systems and 
enforcement actions (Fisman and Miguel, 2007). Individuals from countries with weak 
legal institutions could internalize the advanced legal institutions as tacit knowledge, 
which could be an important contributing factor to their firm’s performance and 
sustained competitive advantage (Barney, 1992; Grant, 1996). This chapter focuses on 
Chinese CEOs with international experience, known as returnee CEOs, and explores 
their role in the institutional transitions of entrepreneurial firms following Initial Public 
Offerings (IPOs). 
Entrepreneurial firms face formalization challenges when their strategy changes. 
The Initial Public Offering (IPO) is viewed as a critical stage of development that is 
often referred to as “the ‘re-birth’ or ‘re-start’ of organizations” (Finkle, 1998:6). IPOs 
represent a significant shift in the strategic choices open to the firm (Certo et al., 2001). 
The recently launched Chinese start-up board for innovative enterprises and growing 
start-ups, known as ChiNext, provides a unique setting to test the impact of tacit 
knowledge of foreign legal institutions on entrepreneurial transitions.  Hybels (1995) 
argues that the legitimacy status of firms reflects the external environmental 
characteristics. Entrepreneurial firms become more formalized to improve legitimacy 
and ensure regulatory compliance, which is important in predicting how the IPO will 
perform (Deeds et al., 2004). Due to the regulatory environment change caused by going 
public,
28
 in inner workings of the institution become more complex. For example, listed 
                                                 
28
 Regulatory refers to China Securities Regulatory Commission and Shenzhen Stock Exchange ChiNext 
Listed Companies Standardize Operational Guidelines. 
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firms are required to have at least one third of their board members be independent 
directors. Listed firms are required to disclose accounting and non-accounting 
information in a timely manner. Therefore, CEOs have to adapt to the new environment 
and operate under a substantially formalized internal institution and strict external 
regulatory requirements. 
The literature shows that CEOs affect firm performance (Hambrick and 
Finkelstein, 1987; Peterson et al., 2003), and such impact depends on setting (Crossland 
and Hambrick, 2007, 2011). For example, CEOs’ adaption to regulatory change is 
important to firm performance. Since the CEO’s demographic background shapes their 
understanding of internal organization and external environment (Boeker, 1997; 
Wiersema and Bantel, 1992), returnees’ knowledge and experience influence their 
ability to manage firms with more complex internal institutions and a stricter external 
regulatory environment. With weak legal institutions in China, I predict that returnee 
CEOs of entrepreneurial firms have advantages over local ones in terms of their tacit 
knowledge about more advanced legal institutions, such as a better sense of legal 
enforcement and democracy, which contributes their improved ability to manage firms 
under stricter regulatory environment in IPOs. As a result, returnee CEOs better 
overcome the formalization challenges in transition, and imprint their tacit knowledge 
on firms to promote competitive advantage and firm performance.  
To test my predictions, I examine all the 355 newly public entrepreneurial firms 
in the ChiNext board market between 2009 and 2012, and find that returnee CEOs are 
positively associated with firm performance. To further establish that the positive impact 
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is due to their tacit knowledge about more advanced legal institutions, I identify the 
overseas host countries of returnee CEOs and test whether CEOs returned from 
countries with stronger legal systems have a more positive impact on firm performance. 
Since CEOs are not randomly appointed, I take propensity score matching (PSM) and 
instrumental variables approaches to control the endogeneity issue. The results remain 
consistent and confirm that the tacit knowledge of returnee CEOs is imprinted in the 
organization.   
 Trust and share values are important during the imprinting process (Dhanaraj et 
al., 2004). As important and influential strategic investors, VC (venture capital) funds, 
with their expertise and voting power, largely affect a firm’s internal environment and 
corporate strategies. A good match of expertise between VCs and portfolio firms 
contributes to firm performance when portfolio firms go public (Lungeanu and Zajac, 
2016). I posit that foreign VCs also have tacit knowledge about advanced foreign social 
institutions, which makes someone trust for the strategy and support of implementation 
of strategies. As predicted, I find that returnee CEOs perform better when their firms are 
backed by foreign venture capital from countries with stronger institutions. The results 
are more pronounced when both returnee CEOs and foreign VCs are from countries with 
strong institutions.  
This chapter makes four major contributions to the current literature. First, it 
adds to the literature on the relationship between cross-border institutional differences 
and financial markets in strategic management studies. The literature largely focuses on 
the impact of institutional differences on the implementation of corporate strategies 
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(Estrin et al., 2009; Meyer et al., 2009; Moore et al., 2012). My study finds that the tacit 
knowledge of advanced legal institutions obtained from the overseas living experience in 
countries with more advanced legal institutions imprint the entrepreneurial firms during 
the transition period and thus enhance firm performance. To the best of my knowledge, 
this chapter is the first to provide evidence that the cross-border difference in legal 
institutions between host countries and home countries plays an important role in firms 
of home countries through international human capital movement. 
Second, this chapter extends the literature on CEO international experience. 
Mahoney and Kor (2015) stress that future empirical studies on firm-specific human 
capital should focus on the key constituent of tacit knowledge. The existing literature 
focuses on CEO international experience in the U.S., and provides evidence that CEO 
international experience plays a role in international interdependence (Roth, 1995) and 
operating firm performance (Carpenter et al., 2001; Certo et al., 2000). We, however, 
extend the focus to tacit knowledge of foreign legal systems held by CEOs with 
international experience, and I argue that individuals not only obtain inimitable 
knowledge, worldviews, and professional ties (Athanassiou and Nigh, 1999; Lublin, 
1996, Maruca, 1994) but also tacit knowledge of advanced legal institutions. The unique 
setting of entrepreneurial firms in the transition stage in China enables us to explore how 
this tacit knowledge imprints on firms and helps firms overcome the challenges 
surrounding formalization. 
Third, this chapter contributes to the literature on the matching of strategic 
investors and executives. Lungeanu and Zajac (2016) argue that a good match of 
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expertise between VC and portfolio companies (PC) has a positive impact on the PC’s 
post-IPO performance. They emphasize that the fit between the expertise of VC partners 
and portfolio firms’ top executives is an important issue to explore in future research. I 
advance the literature by proposing indicators for a good match, such as their shared 
knowledge of and experience with advanced institutions. 
Finally, this chapter contributes to the development of empirical approaches in 
strategic management studies. Bettis et al. (2014) suggest that strategy researchers use 
various empirical approaches, such as instrumental variables, matching techniques, and 
difference-in-difference, to address potential endogeneity issues such as reverse 
causality, simultaneity, and nonrandom sample selection. Previous studies on CEOs with 
international experience do not address the potential endogeneity issue (Carpenter et al., 
2001; Certo et al., 2000; Roth, 1995). I use both propensity score matching and 
instrument variable approaches to rule out major alternative interpretations of my 
findings.   
5.2 Institutional Background 
5.2.1 Returnees and Legal Institutions  
China is the leading country of origin of international students. From 1978 to 
2013, the total number of Chinese overseas students reached 3.05 million,
29
 and 1.44 
million have since returned to China.
30
 The most popular overseas destinations for 
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Chinese students are the U.S., the U.K., Australia, Canada, and Japan, which accounted 
for 50%, 15%, 11%, 6%, and 4% of all international students, respectively, in 2013.
31
 In 
the not-so-distant past, China was very underdeveloped in research and innovation, and 
Chinese students had to go abroad to gain access to a high-quality education and learn 
advanced technologies. Returnees tend to have accumulated explicit knowledge of 
technology, which is found to bring about advantages in terms of high-tech firm 
innovation, high-tech industry development, and exportation and entrepreneurial 
decisions (Liu et al., 2010; Filatotchev et al., 2009; Filatotchev et al., 2011; Kenney et 
al., 2013; Lin et al., 2016). In recent years, China has made substantial progress. In 
terms of R&D (research and development), the total number of China’s patents exceeded 
those of the U.S. by the end of 2013.
32
 Chinese academic research output (i.e., 
publications in SCI journals) was ranked 2
nd
 worldwide in 2014.
33
 The Chinese 
Academy of Sciences was ranked first worldwide by Nature Index since 2013.
34
 
According to the Academic Ranking of World Universities,
35
 32 Chinese universities 
were included in the top 500 universities in the world in 2015, an increase from nine in 
2003. Most students were in social science than science and technology.
36
 It seems the 
advantages of studying abroad have been reduced by China’s dramatic progress. Still, 
this chapter asks: What benefits do returnees bring back with them when they return to 
China? 





 See the following Chinese website: http://ip-science.thomsonreuters.com.cn/press/press20141029/. 
33




 See http://www.shanghairanking.cn/. 
36
 See the following Chinese website: http://www.eol.cn/html/lx/2014baogao/content.html. 
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I argue that returnees learn advanced legal institutions while they are abroad. 
Compared with foreign developed countries and many developing countries, China’s 
legal institutions remain very weak (Allen et al., 2005; La Porta et al., 1998). China 
ranks 71
st
 in the world, next to Tanzania and Zambia, according to the Rule of Law 
Index by the World Justice Project.
37
 Returnees get used to advanced institutions and 
quickly obtain relevant tacit knowledge of the advanced legal institutions in which they 
live and work, which plays an important role in their lives and work when they come 
back to China. For example, compared with the U.S. legal system, China’s legal system 
has weak protection of intellectual property. Individuals can download pirated music or 
films with little risk of being punished. However, this behavior is likely to be punished 
by up to five years in prison in the U.S. Therefore, returnee CEOs get used to foreign 
advanced legal institutions during their overseas experience, and will adapt to a working 
environment with strict regulations. 
5.2.2 ChiNext and Challenges in the Transition Period 
To provide financing opportunities for innovative enterprises and growing start-
ups, ChiNext, China’s Growth Enterprise Market (GEM), was launched in the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange in 2009. The listing requirements of the ChiNext board are substantially 
more flexible than those of the main board market. ChiNext requires that an IPO firm 
must have been profitable in the two most recent consecutive years, with accumulated 
profits of no less than RMB 10 million, while the SZSE main board requires that an IPO 
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firm must have been profitable in the last three consecutive years, with net profits of no 
less than RMB 30 million.
38
 The ChiNext board provides a new platform for the 
financing of entrepreneurial firms and offers great opportunities to returnees. There were 
355 entrepreneurial firms listed in ChiNext between 2009 and 2012. After the first round 




The transition from private to public is a crucial milestone for entrepreneurial 
firms, and the IPO is also viewed as a “re-start” or “re-birth” for firms. The dramatic 
development during the transition period poses management challenges for CEOs. After 
raising equity capital from the market, new public firms often expand in their 
organizational structure in order to engage in new projects. For example, in terms of 
newly listed ChiNext firms between 2009 and 2012, the average number of employees 
increased by 41.92% from 428 to 671 in the IPO year. The total assets increased by 
241.25% from 287 to 943 million RMB. The increase for IPO firms on main boards in 
the same period was only 10.6% (from 3,690 to 4,715) for number of employees and 
77.37% (from 3.2 to 7 billion RMB) for total assets. 
The regulatory environment also changes in the transition period. Newly listed 
entrepreneurial firms are subject to new regulatory corporate governance requirements 
imposed by the CSRC and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange ChiNext Listed Companies 
Standardize Operational Guidelines (the Guidelines hereafter), designed to protect the 
                                                 
38
 Listing Requirements of the Main Board and ChiNext: 
http://www.szse.cn/main/en/ListingatSZSE/ListingRequirements/  
39
 Source: http://finance.sina.com.cn/focus/cybfh/  
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rights of investors. The mandatory part of the Guidelines refers to the operation of the 
board and supervisory board, as well as extent of information disclosure. The operating 
guidelines for the board and supervisory board state that firms must have regular 
meetings, and are required to have at least three committees (i.e. compensation 
committee, nomination committee, and audit committee), and are required to have 
boards where at least one third of the directors are independent. For information 
disclosure, firms are required to disclose both accounting and non-accounting 
information, such as quarterly earnings, M&A activities, shares issuing, shares 
repurchase, incentive plans, and information about operations, in a timely manner.  
5.3 Theory and Hypotheses 
5.3.1 Tacit Knowledge of Legal Institutions  
Resource-based theory (RBT) argues that valuable, rare, and inimitable resources 
could contribute to a firm’s sustainable growth (Penrose, 1959) and competitive 
advantage (Wernerfelt, 1984, 1995). The literature on resources has increasingly focused 
on intangible resources of human capital, such as knowledge, as important contributing 
factors to a firm’s performance and sustained competitive advantage (Barney, 1992; 
Grant, 1996). With the knowledge, firms deal with the change of the environment and 
properly choose the strategies (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Tacit knowledge is an 
important type of knowledge acquired from experience (Nonaka, 1994). The acquiring 
of tacit knowledge is slow, costly, and unpredictably transferred between people (Kogut 
and Zander, 1992). For example, acquiring skills for tasting wine, riding a bicycle, or 
playing a guitar are well-known examples of tacit knowledge. Nonaka and Takeuchi 
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(1995) show that individuals’ tacit knowledge is highly valued for technological 
innovation and organizational learning. Although legal institutions are an important type 
of tacit knowledge, the impact of CEOs’ tacit knowledge of legal institutions has not 
been studied in the literature. I intend to examine the effect of CEOs’ tacit knowledge of 
advanced legal institutions on newly public entrepreneurial firms to fill this gap in the 
literature.  
Legal institutions, including legal frameworks and their enforcement, are a 
fundamental determinant of the development of financial markets (La Porta et al., 1997, 
1998, 2000). Institutions, at a macro level, are the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction (North, 1990). 
These devised constraints include both what individuals are prohibited from doing and, 
sometimes, under what conditions some individuals are permitted to undertake certain 
activities. More specifically, legal systems are an essential element of corporate 
governance and finance, and a better legal environment, such as contract law and 
enforcement of property rights, can protect outsiders, such as shareholders and creditors, 
from expropriation by insiders (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 2000). A lack of adequate 
legal protection increases uncertainty with respect to property rights and legitimate 
returns (Delios and Henisz, 2000).  
When people live in a foreign country, the legal institutions that could influence 
social norms influence their behavior. For example, Fisman and Miguel (2007) show 
that UN diplomats from highly corrupt countries accumulated significantly more unpaid 
parking violations in New York until 2002, but the number sharply drops after 2002 
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when diplomats could no longer avoid paying parking fines. As people’s behavior is 
shaped by legal institutions, people could gradually adapt to the legal institutions of host 
countries as tacit knowledge from overseas experience. 
Given the legal institutions in China (Allen et al., 2005) such as contract law and 
enforcement of property rights is weak, Chinese returnees have experienced more 
advanced legal institutions in developed foreign countries. Chinese people have to adapt 
to advanced legal frameworks and enforcement that is stricter than in China. As a result, 
the legal institutions in developed foreign countries shape the behavior of Chinese 
individuals overseas, which, in turn, becomes tacit knowledge. 
I argue that the knowledge of legal institutions that overseas Chinese acquire in 
developed countries represents important tacit knowledge when they return to China. 
The “brain gain” phenomenon refers not only to advanced technologies but also to 
knowledge from lived experience. Wang and Miao (2013), using 913 completed 
questionnaires by returnees, show that 53.8% of returnees do not conform to the 
environment in China because of the different institutions that they have experienced. 
This evidence implies that listed firms with more complex internal institutions and 
formalized organizations would provide a suitable working environment for returnees. 
Although returnees cannot change the macro-level legal institutions in China, their tacit 
knowledge could still influence firms facing a change in regulatory requirements.   
5.3.2 Tacit Knowledge and Firm Transitions  
Going public is a transformational organizational event and often marks the start 
of the formal evolution of a firm under the framework of regulators and the Stock 
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Exchange. As a consequence of going public, firms become more complex in terms of 
corporate structure, and the strategic needs of entrepreneurial firms evolve along with 
the ongoing public process. The irregularity prior to IPO may not affect a firm’s growth 
and profitability, as long as the firm possesses certain technological advantages or 
secures a few major clients. Due to the legitimate risk of start-ups in China, irregularity 
becomes a main challenge for newly public firms. They confront several new challenges, 
such as adapting to enhanced scrutiny of their business, financing, and investment 
decisions from potential investors, regulators, analysts, and the business press (Jain and 
Kini, 2008).  
CEOs with overseas living experience become better able to adapt to institutional 
transitions. As discussed above, the legal institutions in Western developed countries are 
stronger than the legal institutions in China. The tacit knowledge of strict legal 
institutions (i.e. strong rule of law and enforcement) gained by returnee CEOs brings 
them advantages in adapting to the change in regulatory requirements. Therefore, 
returnee CEOs can better meet firm needs during transition to ensure that transformed 
entrepreneurial firms function well and perform better after IPOs.  
To establish that the positive influence of returnee CEOs on post-IPO 
performance is attributed to their tacit knowledge of advanced legal institutions, I need 
to observe whether or not returnee CEOs from countries with varying legal institutions 
impact performance in different ways. Legal institutions vary across countries, even 
within the group of developed countries where overseas Chinese tend to settle. For 
example, English common law countries such as the U.K., the U.S., and Australia are 
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associated with better legal institutions than civil law countries such as Germany and 
France (La Porta et al., 1998). CEOs returned from different host countries possess tacit 
knowledge about different legal institutions. CEOs returned from host countries with 
more advanced legal institutions should be more capable of adapting to the strict 
monitoring environment in firm transitions and enhancing firm performance.  
I predict, based on the above discussion, that the tacit knowledge of adaptability 
to stricter legal institutions can help returnee CEOs to operate within a working 
environment with stricter regulatory requirements in entrepreneurial firms during the 
transition period and, subsequently, improve firm performance. Furthermore, CEOs 
returned from host countries with more advanced legal institutions are especially helpful. 
I therefore propose Hypotheses 1 and 2, as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Returnee CEOs are positively associated with post-IPO performance of 
entrepreneurial firms. 
Hypothesis 2: H1 is more pronounced when CEOs return from host countries with 
stronger legal institutions. 
5.3.3 The Match of Tacit Knowledge on Legal Institutions 
Tacit knowledge of strict legal institutions becomes a strategic resource after 
going public. Although returnee CEOs could adapt to a working environment with strict 
regulatory requirements, implementation of the strategy of returnee CEOs depends on 
the support that they receive. Lungeanu and Zajac (2016) emphasize the importance of 
fit between the expertise of VC partners and that of portfolio firms’ top executives. For 
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entrepreneurial firms, VCs support executives with their business networks, professional 
expertise, and investment experience (Arthurs and Busenitz, 2006; Li and Zahra, 2012; 
Li et al., 2014). Lungeanu and Zajac (2016) note that with the evolving strategic needs 
of entrepreneurial firms stemming from going public, the latent resource provided by 
venture capital could be transferred to a manifest resource-in-use. Lungeau and Zajac 
also note that the internal organizational environment created by venture capital 
investors provides firm contingent expertise to facilitate their success, due to the change 
in strategic needs during the transition from a private to a public firm. Foreign VCs from 
countries with more advanced institutions better understand the importance of 
management skills (e.g. adaption to a working environment with strict monitoring) and 
in turn provide more support to returnee CEOs in management and strategies.  
The match in tacit knowledge between VCs and CEOs could influence how 
strongly VCs support CEOs. The strength of the match presumes that both CEOs and 
VCs are from countries with advanced institutions. They are better matched because of 
their shared tacit knowledge and tend to have a shared vision; such VCs could better 
understand CEOs with experience working in a strict regulatory environment during the 
transition period. The shared knowledge and values also help avoid potential ideological 
conflicts and enhance the leadership of returnee CEOs (Tsui et al., 2006). When they 
share knowledge and values with VCs, returnee CEOs can better manage the transition 




Hypothesis 3: VCs from countries with advanced institutions strengthen the positive 
impact of returnee CEOs on post-IPO performance. 
Hypothesis 4: H3 is more pronounced when both returnee CEOs and foreign VCs have 
experience in countries with advanced legal institutions. 
5.4 Data and Research Method 
5.4.1 Data 
I include all 355 newly public entrepreneurial firms from the ChiNext board 
market from 2009 to 2012. My sample starts in 2009 because this is the year ChiNext 
was launched. To identify returnee CEOs, I reviewed CEOs’ biographies in the section 
introducing board members, executives, and supervisory board members section of all 
IPO prospectuses downloaded from cninfo.com.cn. I also hand-collected information on 
strategic investors (VCs), and their risk factors, firm characteristics, governance 
characteristics, and individual characteristics from all IPO prospectuses. Forty-seven out 
of 355 newly public entrepreneurial firms are managed by returnee CEOs; 221 are 
backed by at least one VC firm. I obtained the post-IPO financial data from the China 
Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. The data for legal 
institutions were obtained from La Porta et al. (1998) and Allen et al. (2005). 
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5.4.2 Dependent Variables 
I measure post-IPO accounting performance using return on assets (ROA) and 
return on sales (ROS).
40
 ROA is estimated as the ratio of net earnings over total assets in 
the financial year following the IPO, which indicates the profitability of firms by using 
its assets. ROS is the ratio of net earnings over sales in the following financial year, 
which indicates the operational efficiency of firms. I use Tobin’s Q to measure post-IPO 
market performance. Estimated as the ratio of the aggregate of market valuation over 
total assets in the financial year following the IPO, Tobin’s Q indicates the market’s 
assessment of future growth opportunities.  
5.4.3 Returnee CEOs, VCs, and Institutions 
Returnee CEO is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO has overseas work 
experience, overseas study experience, overseas permanent residence, or acquired 
foreign citizenship (excluding the Greater China Region), and zero otherwise. I then 
identify the host country of returnee CEOs and match the country with the legal 
enforcement scores in La Porta et al. (1998) and Allen et al. (2005). La Porta et al. 
(1998) classify legal enforcement into four dimensions, including rule of law, level of 
corruption, efficiency of the judicial system, and risk of expropriation, and construct an 
index of 49 countries, not including China. Allen et al. (2005) construct the same index 
for China. I use the various dimensions of legal enforcement to measure CEOs’ tacit 
knowledge of foreign legal institutions.  
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 I do not use regulatory enforcement against fraud and modified audit opinion to infer the effect of CEO 




Rule of law refers to the assessment of the law and order tradition in the country 
produced by the country’s risk rating agency International Country Risk (ICR). 
Corruption refers to ICR’s assessment of the corruption in government. Low scores 
indicate that government officials are more likely to demand special payments and that 
illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of government in the 
form of bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax 
assessment, policy protection, or loans. Efficiency of judicial system refers to the 
assessment of the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, 
particularly foreign firms, produced by the Business International Corp country risk 
rating agency. Risk of expropriation refers to ICR’s assessment of the risk of outright 
confiscation or forced nationalization. 
Allen et al. (2005) do not construct the value of judicial system efficiency and 
risk of expropriation for China due to data availability. I therefore rely on the ranking 
rather than the index value. Table 1A shows that the overseas destinations for returnee 
CEOs only include developed countries, namely the U.S., the U.K., Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand, Singapore, Germany, Japan, and France. Following the discussion of 
Allen et al. (2005), I assume that China ranks lower than France, the foreign country 
with the lowest judicial system efficiency in the sample. According to the report of the 
report of Credendo Group in 2015, China’s expropriation risk is higher than that of the 
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other countries in the sample.
41
 I therefore rank China as the lowest country for these 
two measures in my sample.  
“Insert Table 1A Here” 
To ensure that the impact of returnee CEOs is not driven by the economic effect 
of foreign markets, I also incorporate the natural logarithm of foreign market 
capitalization of CEOs’ host countries, which controls for the development level of 
foreign capital markets.  
 VCs are identified as foreign VCs if they are not from mainland China. I 
construct VC legal institution variables, including VC low corruption, VC rule of law, 
VC efficiency of judicial system rank, and VC low risk of expropriation rank, with the 
same strategy as when constructing the variables for returnee CEOs legal institutions. In 
addition, I use the same method to construct VC origin-market capitalization variable for 
the same purpose. 
5.4.4 Control Variables 
Following the previous IPO literature, I control for firm-level effects, including 
firm size, firm age, venture capital (VC) ownership, high technology industry, and risk. 
Firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets in the financial year prior 
to the IPO. Firm age is measured as the difference in years between the IPO firm’s 
founding date and the date of the IPO (Daily et al., 2003). VC ownership is measured as 
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the percentage of equity held by the VCs in the post-IPO firm. Following Certo et al. 
(2001), the High Tech dummy is equal to one for firms that are operating in high 
technology industry sectors, including computer hardware, computer software, 
semiconductors and printed circuits, biotechnology, telecommunications, and 
pharmaceuticals. High-tech IPOs in China are hand collected by using the China Listed 
Company Industry Classification. Following Certo et al. (2001), I control for 
entrepreneurial firm risk using the number of risk factors reported in the IPO prospectus. 
Industry effect is controlled by coding from CSRC industry classification.  
 To control for corporate governance, I incorporate board size and board 
independence. Previous studies show that board size is positively associated with firm 
performance (Certo et al., 2001). I measure board size as the number of board directors 
prior to the IPO. Board independence is measured by the percentage of independent 
directors on the board prior to the IPO. 
 I also control for founder CEO and CEO ownership. Founder CEO is controlled 
for because CEO founder status has an impact on IPO valuation and is perceived as 
uncertain (Certo et al., 2001). Founder CEO is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
CEO is the founder, and zero otherwise. I also control for CEO ownership, calculated as 
the percentage of equity held by the CEO in post-IPO firms. Descriptive statistics of the 
variables used in my regression models are reported in Table 1B. 




5.5.1 Baseline Regression 
To test H1 on the effect of returnee CEOs’ tacit knowledge on post-IPO 
performance, I regress Returnee CEO on the post-IPO performance (ROA, ROS, and 
Tobin’s Q) of the subsequent year by using OLS regression analysis. The results are 
shown in Table 2, Panel A. The coefficients of Returnee CEO are significantly positive, 
showing that returnee CEOs help to increase ROA (0.0105, t-value=2.04), ROS (0.0452, 
t-value=2.25), and Tobin’s Q (0.2269, t-value=1.81) from the year after IPO. For a 
typical entrepreneurial firm with median-level ROA, ROS, and Tobin’s Q, returnee 
CEOs can increase performance by 17.5%, 30.87%, and 14.85%, respectively. The 
results support H1, suggesting that returnee CEOs’ tacit knowledge of strict legal 
institutions contributes to the person-organization fit during the transition of 
entrepreneurial firms and enhances performance.  
“Insert Table 2 Here” 
5.5.2 Endogeneity Issue 
 Bettis et al. (2014) encourage the rigorous thought in the strategic management 
research, and improve the plausibility of a causal explanation by using various 
identification strategy to address the potential reverse causality issue. In my study, there 
are at least two ways to interpret my results because of the measurement errors and 




First, due to the measurement errors, the tacit knowledge of returnee CEOs might 
be correlated to network resources or innate ability. It is possible that returned CEOs 
with a superior, prestigious education are likely to have superior foreign network 
resources. Or it might be that only individuals with a superior innate ability go abroad. 
This may lead to the confounding effect on firm performance. To address the issue, I 
trace the overseas education of returnee CEOs to classify whether they graduated from 
prestigious universities (defined as those in the top 100 of the Academic Ranking of 
World Universities). The domestic education of returnee CEOs is capture to classify 
whether returnee CEOs graduate from key national universities. Then, I examine the 
effect of returnee CEOs graduating from world top 100 universities on firm performance, 
which helps to address the concern that returnee CEOs are likely to have superior 
foreign network resources. I also examine the effect of returnee CEOs holding 
undergraduate degrees from China’s key universities, which helps rule out the 
alternative interpretation that only individuals with superior innate ability go abroad. 
The untabulated results show that returnee CEOs graduating from world top 100 
universities or national key universities has no impact on firm performance, measured by 
ROA, ROS, and Tobin’s Q, suggesting that the alternative interpretation is not plausible.  
Instrumental variable regression 
Second, the results might be subject to sample selection bias because of the 
endogenous matching of firms and CEOs. One possible alternative explanation for my 
finding is that entrepreneurial firms with good performance tend to appoint returnee 
CEOs before going public because they can afford higher remuneration packages. The 
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China Securities Regulatory Commission’s (CSRC) regulation is not in favor of such 
explanation: According to the Interim Measures on Administration of Initial Public 
Offering and Listing on Growth Enterprise Board, major changes in the senior 
management team are not allowed within two years prior to the IPO. Although this 
interpretation could help us to partially address the concern, I still use instrumental 
variable (IV) approach to address the potential sample selection bias and to rule out this 
possible alternative explanation. 
To address the potential unobservable sample selection bias, I rely on an 
instrumental variable that predicts the likelihood of a firm having a returnee CEO; 
however, this does not directly influence post-IPO performance, except through the 
channel of a returnee CEO. Since the typical age of returnee CEOs in my sample is 45, 
they normally have school-aged children, which is an important factor in their relocation 
decisions. In China, international schools use foreign education curriculums, follow 
foreign education systems, and create a foreign education environment for students. 
Students in international schools prepare for A-level or SAT exams and target foreign 
universities. The traditional education system in China is known for its exam-oriented 
and cramming method of teaching, and fierce competition to get into internationally 
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 See the following site for more information: http://edu.people.com.cn/n/2013/0905/c1053-
22811561.html and http://edu.people.com.cn/n/2013/0905/c1053-22811561.html.  
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 I use the number of international schools in the headquarter city of firms in the year 
prior to the IPO as the instrumental variable. Returnees are more likely to join firms 
headquartered in cities with international schools. By the end of 2012, 116 international 
schools across 31 major cities had been officially approved by the Ministry of Education 
in the People’s Republic of China. The establishment of international schools does not 
correspond to the city’s economic development level. The first international school in 
China was launched in Nanjing, not Beijing, Shanghai, or Shenzhen, in 1996. The 
establishment of international schools brings an exogenous change in the supply of 
returnees who may become CEOs, and firms headquartered in provinces with 
international schools take advantage of this fact to hire returnee CEOs. 
These results are reported in Table 2, Panel B. In the first stage, the international 
school coefficient is significantly positive (0.0076, t-value=2.47). In the second stage, I 
regress the predicted returnee CEOs on various performance measures. In Columns 5 
and 6, the coefficients of instrumental returnee CEOs remain significantly positive for 
ROA and ROS, suggesting that the results are unlikely to be subject to the possibility of 
sample selection bias caused by unobservable characteristics. 
Propensity-Score matching method 
I further address the potential observable sample selection bias with a one-to-one 
nearest neighbor PSM approach (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). I first sort the sample 
randomly and subsequently use a probit regression model with the same set of 
explanatory variables as in Model 1 of Table 2 Panel A to estimate how likely they are 
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to have a returnee CEO. Based on the closest propensity score without replacement, each 
of the 47 firms managed by a returnee CEO is matched with another otherwise identical 
firm managed by a non-returnee CEO. 
Panel A of Table 3 shows that the difference of observable explanatory variables 
between the treatment group (firms with returnee CEOs) and the control group (firms 
with local CEOs) is not significant after the matching procedure. In Panel B, I conduct 
the difference in mean test for post-IPO performance. I find that ROA, ROS, and 
Tobin’s Q for returnee-CEO-managed firms are all significantly higher than for non-
returnee-CEO-managed firms. The results provide evidence to rule out the potential 
observable sample selection bias. 
“Insert Table 3 Here” 
5.5.3 Tacit knowledge of Returnee CEOs 
To test H2, I regress the legal institutions of a CEO’s host country against 
performance measures, based on the PSM matched sample. Table 4 of Panel A shows 
that the coefficients of four measures of the legal institutions of CEO destinations, 
namely low corruption, rule of law, efficiency of the judicial system, and risk of 
expropriation, are significantly positive for the regressions of subsequent ROA, ROS, 
and Tobin’s Q. The results are also economically significant. For example, a one unit 
standard deviation increase of low corruption will lead to an increase of 0.0067, 0.0347, 
and 0.1428 in ROA, ROS, and Tobin’s Q, respectively. For a typical firm with median 
performance, this accounts for 11.06%, 23.63%, and 9.56% for ROA, ROS, and Tobin’s 
Q, respectively. The results support H2, suggesting that CEOs’ tacit knowledge of more 
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advanced institutions leads to higher post-IPO performance. In addition, the positive 
effect might be interpreted by CEOs’ connections in foreign capital markets. To rule out 
the alternative interpretation, I also incorporate the market capitalization of CEOs’ host 
countries to control for their connections in foreign capital markets, and find their 
coefficients do not significantly influence firm performance. Overall, the results in Table 
4 further show that the positive impact of returnee CEOs on post-IPO performance is 
due to their tacit knowledge of strict legal institutions. 
“Insert Table 4 Here” 
The Evaluation of Corporate Governance for Small and Medium Sized Board 
and ChiNext Board in 2013 issued by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
Corporate Governance Research also confirms that newly public firms in ChiNext are 
similar in terms of corporate governance. The evidence also supports the view that 
returnee CEOs influence firm performance through tacit knowledge as well as other 
channels. 
5.5.4 The Match of Tacit Knowledge 
 H4 asserts that the positive impact of returnee CEOs is strengthened by VCs 
from countries with more advanced institutions. Since VCs do not randomly choose 
entrepreneurial firms to invest in, I also need to rely on a PSM approach to construct a 
matched sample to mitigate the selection bias issue. I first randomly rank all the 
observations and obtain the propensity score from the probit regression model with the 
same set of explanatory variables as in Model 1 of Table 2 (excluding VC ownership). 
By using a nearest neighbor matching method, I match each non-VC-backed firm with a 
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VC-backed firm. Finally, I obtain a matched sample of 218 firms. I then compare the 
means of all matching covariates between VC-backed firms and non-VC-backed firms 
and find no significant differences. 
 To test H4, I use regression performance measures on returnee CEOs, legal 
institutions of VC origins, and their interaction term, based on the PSM sample. The 
results are reported in Table 5. Although the coefficients of Returnee CEO and Legal 
institutions of VC origins are not significant, the coefficients of their interaction terms 
are significantly positive. In terms of the size of the effect, for example, a one unit 
standard deviation increase of the interaction term of Returnee CEO*VCC will lead to a 
0.0184, 0.0387, and 0.8908 increase in ROA, ROS, and Tobin’s Q, respectively. For the 
typical firm, this accounts for 30.38%, 26.35%, and 59.64% for ROA, ROS, and Tobin’s 
Q, respectively. The results support H4 and suggest that the VCs from more advanced 
institutions are supportive of the implementation of strategies of returnee CEOs. 
“Insert Table 5 Here”   
 To test H5 on the match of returnee CEOs and VCs in terms of shared tacit 
knowledge of working in an environment with strict monitoring, I regress firm 
performance on the legal institutions of CEO destinations, legal institutions of VC 
origins, and their interaction terms. Table 6 reports the results. The coefficients of the 
legal institutions of CEO destinations and VC origins are not significant. The 
coefficients of their interaction terms are significantly positive in general, especially the 
regressions based on corruption and risk of expropriation as the measures for legal 
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institutions. The results support H6 and confirm the importance of CEOs and VCs being 
well-matched in their tacit knowledge.  
“Insert Table 6 Here” 
5.6 Discussion 
Although the above results show that foreign advanced legal institutions play a 
role in Chinese entrepreneurial firms during the transition period, one may still argue 
that the national culture may influence the tacit knowledge of returnee CEOs. For 
example, Chinese people going to host countries with a highly individualistic culture 
would experience culture shock and be affected by the individualistic culture. However, 
there is no obvious evidence that national culture influences legal enforcement across 
countries. Nevertheless, I still control for the individualism index (Hofstede, 2001) of 
host countries in the regression model when I test the effect of differences in legal 
institutions between home and host countries on firm performance. The untabulated 
results broadly hold, which helps to alleviate the concern. 
This chapter offered theory and evidence contributing to the literature on cross-
border legal institutional differences in financial markets (Estrin et al., 2009; Meyer et 
al., 2009; Moore et al., 2012; Kwok and Tadesse, 2006). I conjectured that returnee 
CEOs experience advanced legal environments that feature a strong rule of law and 
enforcement, and this experience becomes tacit knowledge of advanced legal institutions. 
Their tacit knowledge facilitates adaption to a changed working environment with strict 
monitoring during transition, and enhances firm performance. The results confirm my 
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predictions. Returnee CEOs have a positive effect on the performance of newly public 
entrepreneurial firms, and this positive effect is more pronounced when CEOs return 
from countries with stronger legal institutions. In addition, I find that the match of CEOs 
and VCs in terms of their shared knowledge of the difference in legal institutions 
between host and home countries provides more support for the implementation of 
returnee CEOs’ strategies and further strengthens the positive impact of returnee CEOs 
on firm performance. Encouraged by Bettis et al. (2014), I think critically about 
potential alternative explanations of the quantitative results that stem from the 
endogeneity issue, and I use propensity score matching and instrument variables to 
address these.  
Clearly, returnee CEOs bring a brain gain to their home country. My evidence 
contributes to the literature on cross-border differences of legal institutions. Foreign 
legal institutions play a role through CEOs’ tacit knowledge of strict institutions, which 
helps them adapt to a new working environment and, in turn, create better post-IPO 
performance. I do not find evidence associated with a connection resource transfer 
explanation of the results; for example, there is scant evidence that returning from a 
foreign market with larger market capitalization has any relationship to performance. 
The strategic benefit of tacit knowledge appears to have a much stronger and more 
tangible benefit to executives of newly listed companies and their investors.    
 My findings have implications for policy makers and practitioners. China is 
known for its weak legal institutions (Allen et al., 2005), which could affect the 
development of the economy and the financial market (North, 1990; La Porta et al., 
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1998). I provide original evidence that firms in home countries with weak legal 
institutions could benefit from CEOs who have experienced strong legal institutions in 
host countries during time abroad. This suggests that policy makers should continue to 
encourage attracting overseas Chinese talent and support them to run business and 
implement their tacit knowledge. My findings also suggest policy makers should pay 
attention when matching CEOs and VCs and, in particular, encourage foreign venture 
capital investment in entrepreneurial firms led by returnees, because they improve 
corporate value. 
5.7 Conclusion 
Many studies in the literature show that cross-border legal institution differences 
significantly affect the investment activities of cross-border investors, such as VC and 
MNCs. The impact of significant differences between host countries and home countries 
on firms in home countries is under-researched. In the context of China, I show that 
returnee CEOs obtain experience adapting to legal institutions featuring a strong rule of 
law and enforcement; this tacit knowledge helps them subsequently adapt to a changed 
working environment with strict monitoring during transition. In addition, the positive 
impact of returnee CEOs is more pronounced when foreign VC tacit knowledge about 
social institutions matches the tacit knowledge of returnee CEOs. My insights benefit 






Allen, F., Qian, J., & Qian, M. (2005). Law, finance, and economic growth in 
China. Journal of Financial Economics, 77(1), 57-116. 
Arthurs, J. D., & Busenitz, L. W. (2006). Dynamic capabilities and venture 
performance: The effects of venture capitalists. Journal of Business Venturing, 21(2), 
195-215. 
Athanassiou, N., & Nigh, D. (1999). The impact of US company 
internationalization on top management team advice networks: A tacit knowledge 
perspective. Strategic Management Journal, 20, 83-92. 
Barney, J. B. (1992). Integrating organizational behavior and strategy 
formulation research: A resource based analysis. Advances in Strategic Management, 
8(1), 39-61. 
Bettis, R., Gambardella, A., Helfat, C., & Mitchell, W. (2014). Quantitative 
empirical analysis in strategic management. Strategic Management Journal, 35(7), 949-
953. 
Boeker, W. (1997). Strategic change: The influence of managerial characteristics 
and organizational growth. Academy of Management Journal, 40(1), 152-170. 
Carpenter, M. A., Sanders, W. G., & Gregersen, H. B. (2001). Bundling human 
capital with organizational context: The impact of international assignment experience 
on multinational firm performance and CEO pay. Academy of Management Journal, 
44(3), 493-511.  
Certo, S.T., Covin, J.G., Daily, C.M., & Dalton, D.R. (2001). Wealth and effects 
of founder management among IPO stage new ventures. Strategic Management Journal, 
22, 641-658. 
Chan, C. M., Isobe, T., & Makino, S. (2008). Which country matters? 
Institutional development and foreign affiliate performance. Strategic Management 
Journal, 29(11), 1179-1205. 
169 
 
Cohen, W. M., & Levinthal, D. A. (1990). Absorptive capacity: A new 
perspective on learning and innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(1), 128-
152. 
Crossland, C., & Hambrick, D. C. (2007). How national systems differ in their 
constraints on corporate executives: A study of CEO effects in three countries. Strategic 
Management Journal, 28(8), 767-789. 
Crossland, C., & Hambrick, D. C. (2011). Differences in managerial discretion 
across countries: how nation level institutions affect the degree to which CEOs matter. 
Strategic Management Journal, 32(8), 797-819. 
Daily, C. M., Certo, S. T., & Dalton, D. R. (2000). International experience in 
the executive suite: the path to prosperity?. Strategic Management Journal, 21(4), 515-
523. 
Daily, C.M., Certo, S.T., Dalton, D.R., & Roengpitya, R. (2003). IPO 
underpricing: A met-analysis and research synthesis. Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice, 27, 271-295. 
Deeds, D. L., Mang, P. Y., & Frandsen, M. L. (2004). The influence of firms’ 
and industries’ legitimacy on the flow of capital into high-technology ventures. Strategic 
Organization, 2(1), 9-34. 
Delios, A. and Henisz, W.I., 2000. Japanese firms' investment strategies in 
emerging economies. Academy of Management Journal, 43(3), pp.305-323. 
Dhanaraj, C., Lyles, M. A., Steensma, H. K., & Tihanyi, L. (2004). Managing 
tacit and explicit knowledge transfer in IJVs: the role of relational embeddedness and the 
impact on performance. Journal of International Business Studies, 35, 428-442. 
Estrin, S., Baghdasaryan, D., & Meyer, K. E. (2009). The impact of institutional 
and human resource distance on international entry strategies. Journal of Management 
Studies, 46(7), 1171-1196. 
Filatotchev, I., Liu, X., Buck, T., & Wright, M. (2009). The export orientation 
and export performance of high-technology SMEs in emerging markets: The effects of 




Filatotchev, I., Liu, X., Lu, J., & Wright, M. (2011). Knowledge spillovers 
through human mobility across national borders: Evidence from Zhongguancun Science 
Park in China. Research Policy, 40(3), 453-462. 
Finkle, T. A. (1998). The relationship between boards of directors and initial 
public offerings in the biotechnology industry. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 
22(3), 5-29. 
Fisman, R., & Miguel, E. (2007). Corruption, norms, and legal enforcement: 
Evidence from diplomatic parking tickets. Journal of Political Economy, 115(6), 1020-
1048. 
Ghemawat, P. (2001). Distance still matters. Harvard business review, 79(8), 
137-147. 
Glynn, M. A., & Abzug, R. (2002). Institutionalizing identity: Symbolic 
isomorphism and organizational names. Academy of Management Journal, 45(1), 267-
280. 
Grant, R. M. (1996). Toward a Knowledge‐Based Theory of the firm. Strategic 
Management Journal, 17(S2), 109-122. 
Hambrick DC, Finkelstein S. (1987). Managerial discretion: a bridge between 
polar views of organizational studies. Research in Organizational Behavior, 9, 369–406. 
Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture's consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, 
institutions and organizations across nations. Sage. 
Hybels, R. C. (1995). ‘On legitimacy, legitimation, and organizations: A critical 
review and integrative theoretical model’. In D. P. Moore (ed.), Academy of 
Management Best Papers Proceedings, pp. 241–245. 
Jain, B. A., & Kini, O. (2008). The Impact of Strategic Investment Choices on 
Post‐Issue Operating Performance and Survival of US IPO Firms. Journal of Business 
Finance and Accounting, 35(3-4), 459-490. 
Kenney, M., Breznitz, D., & Murphree, M. (2013). Coming back home after the 




Kogut, B., & Zander, U. (1992). Knowledge of the firm, combinative capabilities, 
and the replication of technology. Organization Science, 3(3), 383-397. 
Kwok, C. C., & Tadesse, S. (2006). The MNC as an agent of change for host-
country institutions: FDI and corruption. Journal of International Business Studies, 37, 
767-785. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000). Investor 
protection and corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1), 3-27. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). Legal 
determinants of external finance. Journal of Finance, 52, 1131-1150. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998). Law 
and Finance. Journal of Political Economy, 106(6), 1113-1155. 
Li, Y. & Zahra, S., (2012). Formal institutions, culture, and venture capital 
activity: A cross-country analysis. Journal of Business Venturing, 27, 95-111. 
Li, Y., Vertinsky, I., & Li. J., 2014. National distances, international experience, 
and venture capital investment performance. Journal of Business Venturing, 29, 471-489. 
Lin, D., Lu, J., Liu, X., & Zhang, X. (2016). International knowledge brokerage 
and returnees’ entrepreneurial decisions. Journal of International Business Studies, 47, 
295-318. 
Liu, X., Lu, J., Filatotchev, I., Buck, T., & Wright, M. (2010). Returnee 
entrepreneurs, knowledge spillovers and innovation in high-tech firms in emerging 
economies. Journal of International Business Studies, 41(7), 1183-1197. 
Lublin , J. (1996). An overseas stint can be a ticket to the top. Wall Street 
Journal, January 29: B1. 
Lungeanu, R., & Zajac, E. J. (2016). Venture Capital Ownership as a Contingent 
Resource: How Owner–Firm Fit Influences IPO Outcomes. Academy of Management 
Journal, 59(3), 930-955. 
Mahoney, J., & Kor, Y. (2015). Advancing the human capital perspective on 
value creation by joining capabilities and governance approaches. Academy of 
Management Perspectives, 29(3), 296-308. 
172 
 
Maruca, R. F. (1994). The right way to go global: An interview with Whirlpool 
CEO David Whitwam. Harvard Business Review, 72(2), 135-146. 
Meyer, K. E., Estrin, S., Bhaumik, S. K., & Peng, M. W. (2009). Institutions, 
resources, and entry strategies in emerging economies. Strategic Management Journal,  
30(1), 61-80. 
Nonaka, I. (1994). A dynamic theory of organizational knowledge creation. 
Organization Science, 5(1), 14-37. 
Nonaka, I., & Takeuchi, H. (1995). The knowledge-creating company: How 
Japanese companies create the dynamics of innovation. Oxford university press. 
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. 
Cambridge university press.  
Penrose, E. T. (1959). The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. New York: John 
Wiley 
Peterson, S. J., Walumbwa, F. O., Byron, K., & Myrowitz, J. (2009). CEO 
positive psychological traits, transformational leadership, and firm performance in high-
technology start-up and established firms. Journal of Management, 35(2), 348-368. 
Rosenbaum, P. R., & Rubin, D. B. (1983). The central role of the propensity score in 
observational studies for causal effects. Biometrika, 70(1), 41-55. 
Roth, K. (1995). Managing international interdependence: CEO characteristics in 
a resource-based framework. Academy of Management Journal, 38(1), 200-231. 
Tsui, A. S., Zhang, Z. X., Wang, H., Xin, K. R., & Wu, J. B. (2006). Unpacking 
the relationship between CEO leadership behavior and organizational culture. 
Leadership Quarterly, 17(2), 113-137. 
Wang, H., & Miao, L. (2013). Annual report on the development of Chinese 
returnees. Social Science and Academic Press. 
Wernerfelt, B. (1984). A resource-based view of the firm. Strategic Management 
Journal, 5(2), 171-180 
173 
 
Wernerfelt, B. (1995). The resource-based view of the firm: Ten years after. 
Strategic Management Journal, 16 (3), 171-174 
Wiersema, M. F., & Bantel, K. A. (1992). Top management team demography 
and corporate strategic change. Academy of Management josurnal, 35(1), 91-121. 
174 
 
Table 5.1A Returnee CEOs’ Host Countries and Legal Institutions 





Country Number of Returnee CEOs Efficiency of Judicial System Rule of Law Corruption Risk of Expropriation 
Australia 4 10.00 10.00 8.52 9.27 
Canada 12 9.25 10.00 10.00 9.67 
France 1 8.00 8.98 9.05 9.65 
Germany 2 9.00 9.23 8.93 9.90 
Japan 2 10.00 8.98 8.52 9.67 
New Zealand 2 10.00 10.00 10.00 9.69 
Singapore 3 10.00 8.57 8.22 9.30 
United Kingdom 2 10.00 8.57 9.10 9.71 
United States 19 10.00 10.00 8.63 9.98 
China 308 N/A 5 2 N/a 
175 
 
Table 5.1B Summary Statistics 
This panel reports the summary statistics of variables in this chapter. All variables are defined in the Appendix. The sample 











Variables Obs Mean SD Median 
Returnee CEO 355 0.1324 0.3394 0 
CEO Ownership 355 0.2004 0.1657 0.1710 
Founder CEO 355 0.5408 0.4990 1 
Total Assets 355 19.4685 0.5708 19.4444 
Board Size 355 8.3803 1.3958 9 
Board Independence 355 0.3705 0.0514 0.3333 
VC Ownership 355 0.0875 0.1045 0.0588 
High Tech 355 0.3634 0.4817 0 
Firm Age 355 8.3103 4.6076 8.4575 
Risk Factor 355 12.8648 4.0837 13 
ROA 355 0.0610 0.0304 0.0600 
ROS 355 0.1724 0.1111 0.1464 
Tobin's Q 355 1.7451 0.5945 1.5279 
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Table 5.2 The Effect of a Returnee CEO on Post-IPO One-year Operating Performance by OLS and Instrument 
Variable 
This table reports the OLS regression analyses between Returnee CEO and post one-year IPO operating performance. All the 
variables are defined in the Appendix. T-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
Variables Panel A: Full Sample 
 
Panel B: Instrument Variable (IV) 
 
1 2 3 
 
4. 1st stage 5. 2nd Stage 6. 2nd Stage 7. 2nd Stage 
 
ROA ROS Tobin's Q 
 
Returnee CEO ROA ROS Tobin's Q 
Returnee CEO 0.0105** 0.0452** 0.2269* 
  
0.0759** 0.3618** 1.0574 
 
(2.04) (2.25) (1.81) 
  
(1.96) (2.12) (1.48) 
International School 
    
0.0076** 
   
     
(2.47) 
   Total Assets -0.0083** -0.0410*** -0.2179*** 
 
-0.0128 -0.0070* -0.0347** -0.2014*** 
 
(-2.48) (-3.30) (-3.74) 
 
(-0.36) (-1.91) (-2.21) (-3.39) 
Board Size -0.0024 0.0023 -0.0279 
 
0.0231 -0.0039** -0.0047 -0.0463 
 
(-1.58) (0.39) (-0.83) 
 
(1.19) (-2.00) (-0.52) (-1.40) 
Board Independence -0.0321 0.0939 -0.5091 
 
-0.1152 -0.0249 0.1288 -0.4175 
 
(-0.73) (0.56) (-0.68) 
 
(-0.28) (-0.53) (0.66) (-0.55) 
VC Ownership -0.0409** -0.0518 0.3389 
 
0.4297* -0.0696** -0.1906 -0.0252 
 
(-2.24) (-0.79) (1.02) 
 
(1.77) (-2.34) (-1.47) (-0.05) 
High Tech 0.0026 0.0092 0.1505** 
 
-0.0609 0.0053 0.0223 0.1847** 
 
(0.67) (0.64) (2.04) 
 
(-1.38) (1.12) (1.13) (2.13) 
Firm Age 0.0005 -0.0002 0.0045 
 
0.0022 0.0003 -0.0013 0.0017 
 
(1.41) (-0.16) (0.70) 
 
(0.50) (0.64) (-0.65) (0.23) 
Risk Factor 0.0000 0.0008 0.0269*** 
 
-0.0015 0.0001 0.0011 0.0277*** 
 
(0.02) (0.44) (2.94) 
 
(-0.27) (0.13) (0.48) (3.02) 
Founder CEO -0.0060 -0.0104 -0.1064 
 
0.0214 -0.0069 -0.0146 -0.1174 
 
(-1.45) (-0.71) (-1.46) 
 
(0.51) (-1.47) (-0.77) (-1.51) 
CEO Ownership -0.0051 0.0170 -0.0726 
 
0.0502 -0.0103 -0.0082 -0.1388 
 
(-0.40) (0.39) (-0.35) 
 
(0.38) (-0.71) (-0.14) (-0.61) 
Constant 0.2289*** 0.8139*** 5.8121*** 
 
0.1019 0.2474*** 0.7790** 5.4704*** 
 
(3.19) (2.93) (5.03) 
 
(0.14) (3.45) (2.50) (4.93) 
Industry Effect YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.176 0.152 0.239 
 
. . . . 
N 355 355 355 
 
355 355 355 355 
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Table 5.3 Returnee CEO and Post-IPO One-year Operating Performance in Propensity-matched Sample by 
OLS 
 
This table reports the mean in difference between returnee CEO and non-returnee CEO by determinants and post-IPO one-year 
operating performance in a propensity- matched sample. All the variables are defined in the Appendix. T-values are in 




Returnee CEOs (R) Predicted Returnee CEOs (P) R-P 
Panel A: Determinants 
 
Mean Mean Mean in Diff P-value 
Total Assets 19.5032 19.5129 -0.0097 0.6545 
Board Size 8.6383 8.6809 -0.0425 0.8815 
Board Independence 0.3628 0.3605 0.0024 0.8024 
VC Ownership 0.1303 0.1434 -0.0131 0.6485 
High Tech 0.3404 0.4255 -0.0851 0.4015 
Firm Age 9.1093 9.3036 -0.1943 0.8427 
Risk Factor 12.8511 12.2340 -0.6170 0.4891 
Founder CEO 0.5532 0.5319 0.0213 0.8381 
CEO Ownership 0.1564 0.1715 -0.0151 0.6678 
#Observations 47 47 
  Panel B: Post-IPO one-year performance 
 
Mean Mean Mean in Diff P-value 
ROA 0.0672 0.0530 0.0142** 0.0128 
ROS 0.2072 0.1374 0.0698*** 0.0027 
Tobin's Q 1.9390 1.6492 0.2898** 0.0484 
#Observations 47 47 




Table 5.4 Returnee CEO Origin, Legal Institution, and National Culture in Propensity-matched Sample 
This table reports the effect of the rule of law and national culture on post one-year IPO operating performance by classifying the 
origin of returnee CEOs in a propensity-match sample. All the variables are defined in the Appendix. T-values are in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
















Country- 0.0019** 0.0096*** 0.0397* 
            Low Corruption (2.40) (3.08) (1.97) 
                
Returnee Host 
Country- 
    
0.0028** 0.0144*** 0.0551* 
        Rule of Law 
    
(2.43) (3.07) (1.86) 





        
0.0034** 0.0177*** 0.0716* 
    Rank 
        
(2.17) (2.91) (1.81) 





            
0.0016* 0.0099*** 0.0331 
Rank 
            
(1.86) (2.75) (1.47) 
    
Returnee Host 




Capitalization (0.76) (1.97) (-0.08)  (0.56) (1.75) (-0.25)  (0.51) (1.71) (-0.29)  (-0.08) (0.91) (-0.84) 
R2 0.065 0.137 0.040 
 
0.064 0.136 0.035 
 
0.058 0.128 0.035 
 
0.043 0.111 0.039 
N 94 94 94 
 
94 94 94 
 
94 94 94 
 
94 94 94 
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Table 5.5 Returnee CEO and VC Origin Match 
This table reports the effect of the Returnee CEO and VC origin match on post one-year IPO operating performance in a 
propensity-score match sample by VC backed. All the variables are defined in the Appendix. T-values are in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Variables Corruption 
 
Rule of Law 
 
Efficiency of Judicial System Rank 
 
Risk of Expropriation Rank 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 
ROA ROS Tobin's Q 
 
ROA ROS Tobin's Q 
 
ROA ROS Tobin's Q 
 
ROA ROS Tobin's Q 
Returnee CEO*VCC 0.0069** 0.0145 0.3341***          
 (2.09) (1.49) (7.30)             




* 0.5727***         
     (3.23) (2.09) (9.25)         
Returnee CEO*VCJR         
0.0407*
* 0.0844 1.9840***     
         (1.97) (1.40) (6.90)     





             (6.80) (3.17) (12.03) 
VC low corruption  -0.0008 -0.0030 -0.0350 
            (VCC) (-0.26) (-0.34) (-0.91) 
            VC rule of law 
(VCL) 
    
-0.0022 -0.0069 -0.0634 
        
     
(-0.59) (-0.67) (-1.55) 
        VC efficiency of 
judicial  
        
-0.0044 -0.0170 -0.2193 
    system rank (VCJR) 
        
(-0.22) (-0.31) (-0.90) 
        
VC risk of 
expropriation 
            
-0.0070 -0.0204 -0.1468*** 
rank (VCR) 
            
(-1.56) (-1.44) (-3.51) 
Returnee CEO -0.0066 -0.0078 0.0338  -0.0066 -0.0078 0.0341  -0.0066 -0.0078 0.0341  -0.0066 -0.0079 0.0338 
 (-0.67) (-0.23) (0.15)  (-0.67) (-0.23) (0.15)  (-0.66) (-0.23) (0.15)  (-0.67) (-0.23) (0.15) 
VC origin-market  -0.0002 0.0004 0.0065  0.0001 0.0014 0.0151*  -0.0001 0.0008 0.0116  -0.0000 0.0009 0.0092*** 
capitalization 
(VCMC) (-0.73) (0.46) (1.58)  (0.18) (0.72) (1.88)  (-0.15) (0.38) (1.27)  (-0.04) (1.20) (2.66) 










 (0.67) (0.10) (-1.24)  (-1.68) (-1.08) (-5.13)  (-0.71) (-0.59) (-3.67)  (-1.39) (-0.83) (-4.14) 
R2 0.034 0.009 0.091 
 
0.035 0.008 0.064 
 
0.035 0.009 0.073 
 
0.040 0.009 0.068 
N 218 218 218 
 
218 218 218 
 
218 218 218 
 
218 218 218 
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Table 5.6 Returnee CEO Origin and VC Origin Match 
This table reports the effect of the returnee CEO origin and VC origin match on post one-year IPO operating performance in a 
propensity-score match sample by VC back. All the variables are defined in the Appendix. T-values are in parentheses. ***, **, 




Rule of Law 
 
Efficiency of Judicial System 
 
Risk of Expropriation 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 













RC*VCC 0.0010*** 0.0017 0.0310***          
 (2.61) (1.26) (2.88)             
RL*VC L     0.0009* 0.0014 0.0136         
     (1.97) (0.71) (0.79)         
RJ*VCJ         0.0062** 0.0093 0.1380     
         (2.37) (0.94) (1.41)     
RR*VCR             0.0040*** 0.0080* 0.0965* 
             (3.14) (1.82) (1.77) 
Returnee origin- 0.0002 0.0010 0.0024 
            low corruption (RC) (0.18) (0.25) (0.08) 
            
Returnee origin- 
    
-0.0007 0.0001 0.0262 
        rule of law (RL) 
    
(-0.37) (0.02) (0.39) 
        
Returnee origin-efficiency  
        
-0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0130 
    of judicial system rank (RJ) 
        
(-0.45) (-0.10) (-0.16) 
    
Returnee origin-low risk  
            
-0.0013 -0.0031 -0.0139 
of expropriation rank (RR) 
            
(-0.98) (-0.71) (-0.33) 
                
VC low corruption (VCC) -0.0030 -0.0059 -0.0718 
            
 
(-0.80) (-0.56) (-1.34) 
            VC rule of law (VCL) 
    
-0.0053 -0.0102 -0.0440 
        
     
(-1.16) (-0.68) (-0.42) 
        VC efficiency of judicial  
        
-0.0019 -0.0072 0.1145 
    system (VCJ) 
        
(-0.11) (-0.15) (0.37) 
    VC low risk of 
expropriation  
            




            
(-1.50) (-1.39) (-1.20) 
Returnee origin-market  0.0080 0.0206 0.1228  0.0063 0.0180 0.1572  0.0062 0.0167 0.0998  0.0057 0.0134 0.0959 
capitalization (RMC) (1.23) (0.98) (1.38)  (0.98) (0.85) (1.32)  (1.03) (0.87) (0.99)  (0.96) (0.74) (1.37) 
VC origin-market  0.0113 0.0272 0.1504  0.0103 0.0266 0.2063  0.0111  0.0265 0.1713  0.0149* 0.0312 0.2945* 
capitalization (VCMC) (1.39) (0.85) (0.78)  (1.21) (0.81) (0.99)  (1.41) (0.84) (0.84)  (1.86) (1.01) (1.67) 
RMC*VCMC -0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0051  -0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0071  -0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0059  -0.0005* -0.0010 -0.0099 
 (-1.41) (-0.84) (-0.76)  (-1.24) (-0.79) (-1.00)  (-1.43) (-0.83) (-0.85)  (-1.87) (-0.98) (-1.64) 
R2 0.035 0.009 0.090 
 
0.033 0.009 0.054 
 
0.037 0.009 0.068 
 
0.036 0.010 0.069 
N 218 218 218 
 
218 218 218 
 
218 218 218 
 







Returnee CEO Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO has overseas work experience, overseas study 





The corruption index value of host countries for returnee CEOs and the value of China for 
local CEOs. Higher value indicates lower corruption. Source: La Porta et al. (1998) and 
Allen et al. (2005).  
Returnee Host 
Country-Rule of law 
The rule of law index value of host countries for returnee CEOs and the value of China for 
local CEOs. Higher value indicates stronger rule of law. Source: La Porta et al. (1998) and 
Allen et al. (2005). 
Returnee Host 
Country-Efficiency 
of judicial system 
rank 
The rank of host countries of returnee CEOs by the efficiency of judicial system index 
from La Porta et al. (1998). Higher rank indicates higher efficiency of the judicial system. 
I use rank rather than value because China is not included in the index. I assume that 
China ranks lower than other developed countries in the sample. 
Returnee Host 
Country-Low risk of 
expropriation rank 
The rank of host countries of returnee CEOs by the risk of expropriation index from La 
Porta et al. (1998). Higher rank indicates lower risk of expropriation. I use rank rather than 
value because China is not included in the index. I assume that China ranks lower than 




The natural logarithm of market capitalization of host countries for returnee CEOs and the 
value of China for local CEOs. Data source: World Bank. 
VC low corruption The corruption index value of overseas destinations for overseas VCs and the value of 
China for domestic VCs. Higher value indicates lower corruption. The variable is equal to 
0 for non-VC-backed companies. Source: La Porta et al. (1998) and Allen et al. (2005). 
VC rule of law The rule of law index value of overseas destinations for overseas VCs and the value of 
China for domestic VCs. Higher value indicates stronger rule of law. The variable is equal 
to 0 for non-VC backed companies. Source: La Porta et al. (1998) and Allen et al. (2005). 
VC efficiency of 
judicial system rank 
The rank of foreign destination of overseas VCs by the efficiency of judicial system index 
from La Porta et al. (1998). Higher rank indicates higher efficiency of the judicial system. 
I use rank rather than value because China is not included in the index. I assume that 
China ranks lower than other developed countries in the sample. The variable is equal to 0 
for non-VC-backed companies.  
VC low risk of 
expropriation rank 
The rank of foreign destination of overseas venture capital by the risk of expropriation 
index from La Porta et al. (1998). A high value indicates a low risk of expropriation. I use 
rank rather than value because China is not included in the index. I assume that China 
ranks lower than other developed countries in the sample. The variable is equal to 0 for 
non-VC-backed companies. 
VC origin market 
capitalization 
The natural logarithm of market capitalization of overseas destinations for overseas VCs  
and the value of China for domestic VCs. The variable is equal to zero for non-VC-backed 
companies. Data source: World Bank. 
CEO ownership The percentage of beneficial ownership in the post-IPO firm held by the CEO. 
Total assets The natural logarithm of total assets in the latest fiscal year before the IPO. 
Board size The number of directors on the board at the time of the IPO. 
Board independence The percentage of independent directors on the board at the time of the IPO. 
VC ownership The percentage of beneficial ownership in the post-IPO firm held by VCs. 
High tech Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is classified as a high-tech firm according to Certo 










Firm age The age of the firm at the time of the IPO. 
Risk factor The total number of risk factors listed in the IPO prospectus. 
Founder CEO Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is the founder at the time of the IPO, and 0 
otherwise. 
ROA Return on assets one year after the IPO. 
ROS Return on sales one year after the IPO. 
Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q one year after the IPO. 
International school The number of international schools in the city of the firm’s headquarters in the year prior 




Chapter 6 Does Overseas Experience of CEOs 





This chapter examines listing location as a managerial decision. Using a sample of IPOs 
of Chinese entrepreneurial firms in mainland China, the US and HK, I show that 
Chinese entrepreneurial firms with returnee CEOs, especially those operating in high-
tech industries, are likely to undertake foreign IPOs. However, the credibility crisis for 
Chinese firms impedes the decision to undertake foreign IPOs of entrepreneurial firms 
with returnee CEOs. The results are consistent on returnee CFOs and other senior 
executives. Overall, my findings emphasize the important role of returnee CEOs in the 






 The human capital of the management team is important to the development of 
entrepreneurial firms (Haber and Reichel, 2007; Zimmerman, 2008), and various 
individual traits, such as leadership, expertise, experience, gender, and personality, are 
found to affect firm outcomes in entrepreneurship studies (Shrader and Siegel, 2007; 
Carter et al., 2007; Engelen et al., 2014; Zona, 2016). Overseas work or study 
experience is receiving increasing attention from practitioners and policymakers. No 
country sends more students overseas than China does every year, growing from 
144,500 in 2007 to 413,900 in 2013.
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 Wilson et al. (2007) and Zhao et al. (2010) 
suggest that background or past experience may affect both personal effectiveness and 
future employment options; hence, international experience may not only be beneficial 
to returnees’ career development but may also contribute to the development of their 
employers’ business. The role of Chinese returnees in science part start-ups has been 
studied by Wright et al. (2008), Filatotchev et al. (2009), Liu et al. (2010a), Liu et al. 
(2010b), Filatotchev et al. (2011), Lin et al. (2016).  However, the impact of returnees on 
the internationalization of entrepreneurial firms in under-researched. In this study, I 
examine the role of returnee CEOs’ international experience in foreign IPOs of 
entrepreneurial firms.  
Going public in a developed foreign capital equity market is an important 
strategic decision for entrepreneurial firms, and foreign IPOs could help entrepreneurial 






firms improve their corporate governance (Bell et al., 2014; Moore et al., 2012) and firm 
valuation (Cumming et al., 2016). Because of institutional differences and information 
asymmetry, entrepreneurial firms, especially those in emerging markets, have to face the 
costs of the liability of foreignness and the liability of newness when undertaking 
foreign IPOs in developed capital markets. Existing literature in entrepreneurship studies 
shows that several factors could help entrepreneurial firms overcome barriers and help 
them to list in foreign capital markets, such as venture capital investment (Hursti and 
Maula, 2007; Cheng and Schwienbacher, 2016; Zhang and Yu, 2016), technology 
orientation (Hursti and Maula, 2007), and top management team foreign experience 
(Hursti and Maula, 2007). However, few researchers have studied the impact of CEOs 
with international experience on undertaking foreign IPOs in entrepreneurial firms. 
This study focuses on CEOs because they play a key role in corporate decision-
making. Returnee CEOs could reduce the information asymmetry, bring networks 
resources, provide knowledge of foreign institutions. More specifically, the overall 
perception of a CEO reduce information asymmetry through the presentations in IPO 
roadshows, which is positively associated with IPO outcome (Blankespoor et al., 2016). 
In addition, returnee CEOs possess the foreign networks resources and the tacit 
knowledge of advanced foreign institution (Cumming et al., 2017) that could facilitate 
the firms to access to foreign markets. I expect that returnee CEOs help overcome 
barriers of foreignness and newness that Chinese entrepreneurial firms face when getting 




 In order to test the impact of returnee CEOs on entrepreneurial firms, I focus on 
IPOs in Growth Enterprise Markets (GEM) because GEM provide financial 
opportunities with flexible listing requirements. Using a hand-collected sample of 355 
IPOs in the ChiNext board market, 33 IPOs in the NASDAQ market, and 23 IPOs in the 
HK Growth Enterprise Market between 2009 and 2012, I find that entrepreneurial firms 
with returnee CEOs tend to list on the US or HK markets rather than on the ChiNext 
market. Furthermore, the possibility of undertaking foreign IPOs for Chinese 
entrepreneurial firms with returnee CEOs is more pronounced when the entrepreneurial 
firms operate in high-tech industries. However, this preference does not survive the 
press reports of financial fraud of US-listed Chinese firms after 2011. I also find that 
entrepreneurial firms with returnee CEOs are negatively associated with IPO 
underpricing until 2011 in the US market. The results imply that firms with returnee 
CEOs is associated with higher IPO pricing, and subsequently have the lower first day 
return. This suggests that returnee CEOs reduce the information asymmetry in foreign 
IPOs until the Muddy Water disclosed the fraud of Chinese firms, which started the 
market level credibility crisis for Chinese firms in the US. The credibility crisis also 
spread to Chinese firms listed in the HK market, where returnee CEOs are not 
significantly associated with IPO underpricing after 2011.
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 I also conduct robustness 
checks to address the reverse causality issue that stems from the appointment of returnee 
CEOs before IPOs for window-dressing purposes. To address this concern, I replicate 
my baseline test in the subsample, which is less likely to be subject to the reverse 
                                                 
44
 There is no Chinese entrepreneurial firm listed on the HK GEM (Growth Enterprise Market) board in 




causality issue. Finally, since the characteristics of the top management team has an 
impact on the IPO decision (Hursti and Mauls, 2007) and their performance 
(Zimmerman, 2008), I also test the impact of other senior executives with international 
experience on foreign IPOs. The results are consistent.  
This chapter makes three main contributions to the entrepreneurship literature. 
First, this is the first study of the role of Chinese returnees in the foreign IPO choice of 
entrepreneurial firms. The literature mainly focuses on the impact of returnee 
entrepreneurs in early-stage entrepreneurial firms (Wright et al., 2008; Filatotchev et al., 
2009; Liu et al., 2010a; Liu et al., 2010b; Filatotchev et al., 2011; Lin et al., 2016). The 
role of returnee CEOs of entrepreneurial firms in undertaking foreign IPOs, however, 
has not been previously examined. Second, this chapter is related to studies on the 
impact of top management team member characteristics on IPOs (Hursti and Mauls, 
2007; Zimmerman, 2008). Hursti and Mauls (2007) argue that the international 
experience of the top management team reduces the home bias of companies in choosing 
IPO markets, but they do not specifically focus on CEOs. Zimmeman (2008) finds that 
top management team heterogeneity, for example in terms of the functional background 
or educational background, is associated with greater capital accumulation. I contribute 
to this strand of the literature by finding that the international experience of the CEO, 
chair, CFO, and other senior executives has an impact on undertaking foreign IPOs. 
Third, this chapter is related to empirical studies exploring the factors that could affect 
the foreign IPOs of entrepreneurial firms (Cheng and Schwienbacher, 2016; Zhang and 




 The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the institutional 
background. Section 3 discusses the theory and hypotheses development. Section 4 
presents the research method. Section 5 reports results. Section 6 discusses the policy 
and practical implications and limitations, and the final section concludes. 
6.2 Institutional Background 
6.2.1 Policies for Returnees 
The Chinese government started paying attention to attracting the graduates to 
come back to China by encouraging large state-owned enterprises (SOEs), banks, 
insurance companies, and securities companies to employ Chinese candidates with 
overseas experience, giving them high positions and salaries. For example, 34 
Academies of Science and 53 Special Economic Zones provided favorable treatment for 
returnee entrepreneurs. More specifically, Shanghai promised that the application 
process for running a business would take just five days. Beijing Zhongguancun, known 
as the Chinese Silicon Valley (Filatotchev et al., 2009), even established an office in the 
U.S. Silicon Valley to recruit talented staff. In the 1990s, the number of Chinese 
returnees increased, most of whom ran their own businesses. 
In the final stage, the Chinese government began to strengthen incentives to 
attract the overseas elite back to China. The ‘Cheung Kong Scholars Program’ was 
implemented in 1998 by the Ministry of Education; it aimed to create 300-500 positions 
for distinguished professors in national key development disciplines within three to five 




Program of Global Experts’, launched by the Organization Department of the 
Communist Party of the China Central Committee in 2008, intended to recruit 
approximately 2,000 experts (including university professors, corporate top executives, 
and other technology- or innovation-oriented talents) with overseas Ph.D. degrees within 
five to ten years. The Chinese government also provided favorable treatment in terms of 
registered residences (hukou), residence permits (for foreigners), premium medical 
service, social security for spouses and children, and even permission to buy real estate 
despite an otherwise restricted policy. Most importantly, the employed experts would 
receive 1,000,000 RMB in a one-off grant from the central and local government. By 
September 2011, 1,510 experts had been accepted onto the ‘Recruitment Program of 
Global Experts’.
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 In addition to the central government’s policy focus on returnees, 
local governments have also issued a variety of policies aimed at attracting and 
supporting returnees.  
6.2.2 ChiNext Board Market 
 Although privately owned companies are the cornerstone of Chinese economic 
growth (Allen et al., 2005), these private entrepreneurial firms often face financial 
constraints (Poncet et al., 2010; Ding et al., 2013). In developed countries, second board 
capital markets are normally in place to facilitate equity financing of entrepreneurial 
firms. For example, growth enterprise markets (GEMs) have been widely established for 
the development of innovative entrepreneurial enterprises, including NASDAQ in the 
US, the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in the UK, and Catalist in Singapore. In 
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October 2009, ChiNext, China’s GEM, was launched in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
to ‘promote the development of innovative enterprises and other growing start-ups,’
46
 
and 355 entrepreneurial firms were listed by the end of 2012. The listing requirements of 
the ChiNext board are substantially more flexible than those of the main board market. 
For example, one of the requirements of the ChiNext board is that accumulated profits 
cannot be less than RMB 10 million (approximate 1.6 million USD) and must represent 
continued growth in the last two years, while the SZSE main board requirement is that 
net profits cannot be lower than RMB 30 million (approximate 4.8 million USD) in 
aggregate in the last three consecutive years.
47
 The ChiNext board provides a new 
platform for the financing of all types of entrepreneurial firms, and offers significant 
opportunities to returnees. For example, more than 30 returnees became billionaires after 
the first round of IPOs on the ChiNext board in October 2009.
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6.2.3 Foreign Listing Requirements 
 Entrepreneurial firms listing on NASDAQ and HK GEM face the flexible 
financial requirements. Although the financial requirement of listing on the ChiNext 
board is more flexible than that of the main board in China, the requirements of listing 
on foreign GEM are still flexible than the ChiNext. More specifically, the main 
differences in financial requirement could be classified into two veins: profit or income, 
and firm size. First, the ChiNext board requires entrepreneurial firm have to 
accumulative profit no less than 10 million RMB (approximate 1.6 million USD) for two 
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consecutive years. However, both NASDAQ and HK GEM have no requirements on 
profit for issuers. Nevertheless, the HK GEM requires issuers to have at least 20 million 
HK dollar (approximate 2.7 million USD). Second, the ChiNext board requires the 
market capitalization after IPO should be more than 30 million RMB (approximate 4.8 
million USD), and the HK GEM requires the market capitalization at the time of IPO 
should be higher than 100 million HK dollar (approximate 14 million USD). The 
NASDAQ does not have requirements on market capitalization, but requires the 
stockholders’ equity is higher than 4 million USD. 
6.3 Theory and Hypotheses Development 
6.3.1 IPO Markets Selection 
Private firms, especially start-ups, often face financial constraints in China 
(Poncet et al., 2010; Ding et al., 2013). In developed countries, growth enterprise 
markets (GEMs) are normally in place to facilitate equity financing of entrepreneurial 
firms. In 2009, China launched the ChiNext board, the so-called Chinese NASDAQ, in 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The aim of the ChiNext board is to ‘promote the 
development of innovative enterprises and other growing start-ups’. Along with the 
launch of the ChiNext board in 2009, Chinese firms have opportunities to choose to 
access the GEMs in China and GEMs in other countries. Although GEMs in both China 
and overseas countries provide good opportunities to access external capital, firms 
seeking IPOs in the foreign capital market are motivated to improve the corporate 
governance (Moore et al., 2012; Bell et al., 2012; Bell et al., 2014) or a better 




relatively low investor protection enjoy long-term growth by conducting IPOs in foreign 
countries with strong investor protection (Doidge et al., 2004). However, entrepreneurial 
firms from emerging markets face challenges to access and raise funds from the foreign 
developed equity capital market. In addition to language, culture, and distance obstacles, 
issuer companies from emerging markets primarily suffer from the cost of the liability of 
foreignness (Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997). Apart from the cost of the liability of 
foreignness, the cost of the liability of newness (Certo, 2003) is an additional barrier for 
entrepreneurial firms aiming to raise funds from the foreign equity capital market, 
because firms often have a short operating history and little publicly available 
information. The compounded cost of both the liability of foreignness and newness are 
very challenging for entrepreneurs from emerging economies trying to access developed 
equity capital markets.  
There might be two reasons for the costs. First, the pricing of the entrepreneurial 
firm is undervalued by the strong information asymmetry between the issuer from the 
emerging economy and the prospective investors from the developed countries. For 
instance, prospective investors in foreign developed countries may be concerned about 
the institutional development and legitimacy of emerging economies (Bell et al., 2015), 
because they often lack important institutional mechanisms to effectively govern 
business activities (Peng et al., 2008). Foreign investors may fail to fully recognize the 
success of privately owned firms from emerging countries. Due to the differences in 
institutional context, the outcome of foreign IPOs could be influenced by a lack of 




legal, market, and regulatory systems. Therefore, the pricing of the entrepreneurial firm 
from emerging economies may suffer lower valuation in the equity capital market of 
development countries. 
 Second, entrepreneurial firm issuers lack both the foreign network resources and 
the foreign institutional expertise in the IPO market of foreign developed countries. The 
IPO process relies on several financial service institutions, such as underwriters, lawyers, 
and auditors. Without a connection to foreign financial service institutions, such as 
underwriters, auditors, venture capitalists alliance partners, which shape IPO outcomes 
(Pollock et al., 2004), entrepreneurial firms are less likely to successfully identify and 
choose appropriate financial service institutions to conduct IPOs in foreign markets.  
 I argue that the international experience of returnee CEOs could help Chinese 
entrepreneurial firms effectively reduce the cost of both the liability of foreignness and 
newness when listing on foreign equity capital markets by reducing information 
asymmetry and providing social network resources and expertise. First, perceptions of a 
CEO, as observed in during IPO roadshow presentations, are positively related to IPO 
pricing (Blankespoor et al., 2016), which implies that CEOs could help reduce 
information asymmetry. According to signal theory (Certo, 2003; Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 
2001a), returnee CEOs are a good signal that entrepreneurial firms can alleviate the 
legitimacy issue, because returnees could apply their expertise in entrepreneurial 
companies, such as foreign companies’ management. The signal could help to alleviate 
informational asymmetry. Second, Chinese returnees obtain social network resources 




life experience. Returnee CEOs also have the ability to help entrepreneurial firm issuers 
effectively communicate with financial institutions. I therefore expect that Chinese 
entrepreneurial firms with returnee CEOs are more likely to go public in developed 
foreign capital markets compared with those without returnee CEOs. 
Hypothesis 1: Chinese entrepreneurial firms with returnee CEOs are more likely 
to undertake IPOs in developed foreign markets. 
6.3.2 Moderating Effects for High-tech Industries 
Entrepreneurial firms with a technological orientation may be a proxy for 
investors’ perceptions of riskiness (Daily, Certo, & Dalton, 2005), and entrepreneurial 
firms operating in high-tech industries could reflect this risk. Due to the difficulty of 
analyzing information about high-tech companies, entrepreneurial firms largely benefit 
from the lowering cost of information. Hursti and Maula (2007) argue that high-tech 
firms seek overseas investors because they are more likely to understand the associated 
risks. Accordingly, Pagano et al. (2002) and Hursti and Maula (2007) find that R&D 
intensive firms and high-tech firms are more likely to seek foreign IPOs. In addition, 
since foreign VC industries are more developed than China, the market would have 
better perception about the riskiness of technological oriented firms.  Thus, I 
hypothesize that entrepreneurial firms with returnee CEOs are more likely to undertake 
foreign IPOs if the firm operates in a high-tech industry. 
Hypothesis 2: The marginal benefit of a foreign IPO to a high-tech 
entrepreneurial firm is greater when the firm has a returnee CEO, due to the 




6.3.3 Moderating Effects for the Credibility Crisis 
Muddy Waters (MW) LLC is an investment research firm that not only conducts 
business research for the public but also undertakes short selling. Its research relates to 
business fraud, accounting fraud, and other fundamental business problems. MW’s 
business model is to combine equity research and short selling, which conducts short 
selling before issuing the equity research that discloses the detected fraud. MW came to 
fame by successfully revealing several fraudulent Chinese companies listed on US 
markets. The stock price of these companies reduced sharply after the disclosure of the 
fraud. For example, MW reported in the Orient Paper
49
, a U.S.-listed Chinese firm, 
greatly overstated their revenues on 28 June 2010, and the stock price of the company 
reduced by about 55.9% in the following 220 trading days. 
A series of disclosures of fraudulent Chinese companies by MW subsequently 
triggered a number of fraud investigations of Chinese firms listed on the US market, and 
further create the credibility crisis in the market level.
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 Darrough et al. (2012) and 
Jindra et al. (2012) document that Chinese firms listed on the US market are becoming 
increasingly subject to investigations and securities class actions since 2010; this has led 
to a decrease in firm value. Consequently, US-listed Chinese firms tend to face an 
adverse environment, which has discouraged IPO activities by Chinese firms in the US 
market. Consequently, the number of IPOs of Chinese firms in the NASDAQ market has 
dropped substantially since 2011. Because of their overseas network resources and 
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institutional expertise in foreign markets, returnee CEOs could better perceive this 
adverse environment, and then make correct decisions that avoid conducting IPOs in the 
US market. Although returnee CEOs are viewed as the signal of trust and transparency 
of entrepreneurial firms, they still cannot reverse the credibility crisis in the market level. 
Thus, I expect returnee CEOs to avoid the US market after 2011. 
Hypothesis 3: Chinese entrepreneurial firms with returnee CEOs are more likely 
to avoid undertaking IPOs in the US market after 2011. 
6.4 Research Method 
6.4.1 Sample and Data Collection Procedure 
 To test my hypotheses, I identify 355 IPOs of entrepreneurial firms from the 
Shenzhen ChiNext board market, 33 IPOs of entrepreneurial firms from the NASDAQ 
market, and 23 IPOs of entrepreneurial firms from the Hong Kong second board market 
from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database.
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 I mainly 
rely on CSMAR and cross check with media coverage to obtain IPOs in the NASDAQ 
market. IPOs in the NASDAQ market include issuing common shares and issuing 
American Depositary Receipts (ADR) shares. In addition, my sample excludes IPOs that 
transfer from the OTC board to NASDAQ, as the information on these entrepreneurial 
firms is made available to public investors before listing on the NASDAQ market. In my 
research, I only focus on the first time the entrepreneurial firm transitions from a 
privately owned firm to a publicly owned firm. 
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 The prospectuses are downloaded from cninfo.com.cn (Shenzhen ChiNext board 
market), hkexnews.hk (Hong Kong second board market), and EDGAR (NASDAQ 
market). I hand-collect information on returnee CEOs by reviewing the short 
biographies in the IPO prospectuses. In addition, firm characteristics, governance 
characteristics, and personal characteristics prior to the IPO are manually collected from 
the IPO prospectuses.  
6.4.2 Dependent Variables 
Choice of Market. In order to explore whether an entrepreneurial firm with a 
returnee CEO or chair chooses a domestic or foreign market, I use three variables 
measuring the choice of market when entrepreneurial firms go public. China vs US&HK 
is a dummy variable equal to one if the entrepreneurial firm chooses to list on the 
domestic market (Shenzhen ChiNext board market), and equal to zero if the 
entrepreneurial firm chooses to list on a foreign market (Hong Kong second board 
market or NASDAQ market). China vs US is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
entrepreneurial firm chooses to list on the domestic market (Shenzhen ChiNext board 
market), and equal to zero if the entrepreneurial firm chooses to list on the US market 
(NASDAQ market).  
IPO Underpricing. I use IPO first day return to measure the IPO underpricing. 
IPO first day return is measured as the percentage difference between the offer price and 




6.4.3 Independent Variables 
Returnee CEO. CEOs are identified as returnees if they have had overseas work 
experience, overseas study experience, overseas permanent residence rights, or foreign 
nationality. CEOs are not identified as returnees if they worked, studied, or lived in 
Hong Kong, Macau, or Taiwan. 
Returnee Chair. Board chairs are identified as returnees if they have had 
overseas work experience, overseas study experience, overseas permanent residence, or 
foreign nationality. Board chairs are not identified as returnees if they work, study, or 
live in Hong Kong, Macau, or Taiwan. 
Returnee CFO. CFOs are identified as returnees if they have had overseas work 
experience, overseas study experience, overseas permanent residence, or foreign 
nationality. CFOs are not identified as returnees if they work, study, or live in Hong 
Kong, Macau, or Taiwan. 
Other Returnee Senior Executives. Other senior executives, including vice-
presidents, executive directors, vice-chair, and board secretaries, are identified as 
returnees if they have had overseas work experience, overseas study experience, 
overseas permanent residence, or foreign nationality. They are not identified as returnees 
if they work, study, or live in Hong Kong, Macau, or Taiwan. 
6.4.4 Control Variables 
 Following the previous IPO literature (e.g., Ritter, 2015), I control for firm-level 




industry. Firm size is measured by the natural logarithms of total sales in the financial 
year prior to the IPO. Firm age is measured as the difference in years between the IPO 
firm’s founding date and the date of the IPO (Daily et al., 2003). VC back is a dummy 
variable if the IPO is backed by venture capitals, and 0 otherwise. Following Certo et al. 
(2001b), the high-tech dummy is equal to one if firms operate in the high-technology 
industry sectors (two-digit SIC codes) including computer hardware (SIC 35), computer 
software (SIC 73), semiconductors and printed circuits (SIC 36), biotechnology (SIC 28), 
telecommunications (SIC 48), and pharmaceuticals (SIC 28). China Listed Company 
Industry Classification Guidelines and Global Industry Classification Standard keep 
track of manage IPOs for high-tech companies, respectively.  
 To reflect differences in corporate governance I control for board size and board 
independence. Previous studies show that board size is positively associated with firm 
performance (Certo et al., 2001b; Dalton et al., 1999) and related to environmental 
resources (Certo et al., 2001a). I measure board size as the number of board directors 
prior to the IPO. Daily et al. (2005) argue that a board of predominantly independent 
directors is a signal that effective monitoring and control systems are in place. Board 
independence is measured by the percentage of independent directors on the board prior 
to the IPO. 
 I also control for founder CEO, CEO duality, and CEO age. Founder CEO is 
controlled for as the CEO founder status has an impact on IPO valuation (Certo et al., 
2001b). Founder CEO is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is the founder, and 




measured by the CEO’s age prior to the IPO. Descriptive statistics and the correlations 
between all variables used in my regression models are reported in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. 
 Year effects and industry effects are included in all regressions. The year ranges 
from 2009 to 2012. Industry effect variables are constructed by the first two digits of the 
Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS). Some year and industry effect variables 
may be automatically omitted in different regressions. 
[Insert Table 6.1] 
6.5 Results 
6.5.1 Market Selection  
 To test H1 regarding the impact of returnee CEOs on market selection, I regress 
Returnee CEO on China vs US&HK, China vs US using probit regression models. The 
results are shown in Table 6.2. All coefficients reported are the average marginal effects. 
In column 1, the coefficient of returnee CEO (0.0924, z=4.01) shows that 
entrepreneurial firms led by returnee CEOs are 9.24% more likely to choose to list on 
the US and HK markets over the mainland China market, at the 1% level, which implies 
that the results are not only statistically but also economically significant. To show that 
my results are not driven by any specific developed equity capital market, I partition the 
sample of firms listed in HK and US markets to conduct the test separately. In column 2, 
the coefficient of returnee CEOs (0.0517, z=3.48) indicates that entrepreneurial firms led 
by returnee CEOs are 5.17 % more likely to choose to list on the US market rather than 




statistically but also economically significant. In column 3, the coefficient of returnee 
CEOs (0.1030, z=2.6) indicates that entrepreneurial firms led by returnee CEOs are 
10.30 % more likely to choose to list on the HK market rather than the mainland China 
market, at the 1% level, which implies that the results are not only statistically but also 
economically significant. The results support Hypothesis 1, that entrepreneurial firms 
led by returnee CEOs prefer listing on more developed overseas markets.  
[Insert Table 6.2] 
6.5.2 Moderating Effects for High-tech Industry and Muddy Water Research 
 To test Hypothesis 2, I further incorporate the interaction term between Returnee 
CEO and high-tech in column 1 of Table 6.2. All coefficients reported are the average 
marginal effects. I regress the interaction term of Returnee CEO and high-tech on China 
vs US by using probit regression analysis, and show the results in Panel A of Table 6.3. 
The coefficient (0.0870, z=1.70) of the interaction term indicates that entrepreneurial 
firms with returnee CEOs are more likely to undertake IPOs in the US and HK markets 
when they operate in high-tech industries. The results support my Hypothesis 2. 
 To test Hypothesis 3, I incorporate Post2011 (dummy variable defined in 
Appendix) and the interaction term between Returnee CEO and Post2011 in column 2 of 
Table 6.2. All coefficients reported are the average marginal effects. I regress the 
interaction term of Returnee CEO and Post2011 on China vs US by using probit 




0.0554, z=-2.13) of the interaction term (Returnee CEO*Post2011) indicates that 
entrepreneurial firms led by returnee CEOs are less likely to be listed in the US 
NASDAQ market than the ChiNext board market after 2011, which supports my 
prediction.  
[Insert Table 6.3] 
6.5.3 IPO Underpricing 
 According to signaling theory (Certo, 2003; Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2001a) and 
the study of Blankespoor et al. (2016), if CEOs reduce information asymmetry, then 
firms could be able to get higher IPO pricing. To further explore complementary 
evidence to explain why returnee CEOs are associated with a higher likelihood of listing 
on US and HK markets, I test whether entrepreneurial firms with returnee CEOs are 
negatively related to IPO pricing in foreign IPOs. IPO underpricing, which is measured 
by the IPO first day return, is an indicator of information asymmetry. If returnee CEOs 
could facilitate foreign IPOs by reducing information asymmetry, firms with returnee 
CEOs should have higher IPO pricing, and then the first day return would be lower. 
Furthermore, the Muddy Water effect could also affect IPO pricing in the US market. 
Therefore, I predict that entrepreneurial firms with returnee CEOs are negatively 
associated with IPO underpricing in the US market before 2011, and the negative 
relation disappears after the credibility crisis. Entrepreneurial firms with returnee CEOs 
are negatively associated with IPO underpricing in the HK market after 2011, because 




Returnee CEO, US Market, and the interaction term of Returnee CEO and US Market on 
IPO first day return. The results are shown in Panel A of Table 6.4. Firm characteristics, 
CEO characteristics, year effects, and industry effect are included in the regression. In 
column 1 of Table 6.4, Panel A, the coefficient (-0.3882 , t=-2.07) of Returnee CEO*US 
Market indicates that entrepreneurial firms with returnee CEOs are negatively related to 
IPO underpricing in US markets before 2011, at the 5% significance level. In column 2 
of Table 6.4, Panel A, the coefficient (0.2199, t=1.39) of Returnee CEO*US Market 
indicates that entrepreneurial firms with returnee CEOs are not related to IPO 
underpricing in US markets after 2011, due to the credibility crisis in the market level. In 
addition, I also test whether the credibility crisis influences the valuation of returnee 
CEOs in the HK market. The results are shown in Panel B of Table 6.4. The coefficient 
(-0.1440, t=-1.34) of Returnee CEO* HK Market indicates that entrepreneurial firms 
with returnee CEOs are not significantly associated with lower IPO underpricing in the 
HK market after 2011. The results provide complementary evidence that returnee CEOs 
send a good signal and could reduce information asymmetry, which is in line with 
Blankespoor et al. (2016).  
[Insert Table 6.4] 
6.5.4 Endogeneity Issue: Reverse Causality 
The major concern of endogeneity in this study is reverse causality. An 
alternative interpretation of my results could be that an entrepreneurial firm may appoint 




concern, I replicate my baseline test in the subsample, which is less likely to be subject 
to reverse causality. 
I address the reverse causality by using three subsamples. First, I examine the 
subsample in which CEOs are also founders. Since founders are in charge of the firm 
daily operation from the establishment of the firm persistently, they less likely to be 
appointed as CEOs before IPOs for window dressing. I split my sample into two groups 
by founder CEOs, and examine whether entrepreneurial firms with returnee CEOs is 
positively related to foreign IPOs in the subgroup of founder CEOs. Second, I examine 
the subsample in which CEOs are also board chairs. In entrepreneurial firms, CEOs that 
serve as chairs are often ultimate controllers, and manage firms for a long time prior to 
IPO proposal. I split the sample by whether CEOs also serve as chair, and test the role of 
returnee CEOs in foreign IPOs in the subsample of chairman CEOs. Third, I examine 
the subsample in which CEOs are also both board chairs and founder. I show the 
replicate results of base line results among the founder CEO subsample, chairman CEO 
subsample, and both founder and chairman CEO subsample in Table 6.5. All columns 
replicate the regression analysis of column1 of Table 6.2, and all coefficients reported 
are the average marginal effects. In column 1, the coefficient of Returnee CEO (0.1040, 
z=2.86) indicates that the results hold for founder CEO subsample. In column 2, the 
coefficient of Returnee CEO (0.1017, z=3.48) indicates that the results hold for 
chairman CEO sample. In column 3, the coefficient of Returnee CEO (0.1612, z=3.49) 
indicates that the results hold for both founder and chairman CEO subsample. Thus, my 




[Insert Table 6.5]  
6.5.5 Other Top Management Team Members  
  Since the literature shows that the top management team has an impact on IPO 
decisions (Hursti and Mauls, 2007) and the performance of IPOs (Zimmeman, 2008), I 
also test the impact of other top management team members with international 
experience on IPO market selection. To conduct the test, I identify the returnee identity 
of board chairmen, CFOs, and other senior executives (e.g. vice-president, executive 
directors, vice-chairman, and board secretaries) by reading their short biographies. Then, 
I test whether other top management team members with international experience affect 
foreign IPOs, and report the probit regression results in Table 6.6. All coefficients 
reported are the average marginal effects. In column 1, the coefficient of Returnee 
Chairman (0.0605, z=2.69) shows that entrepreneurial firms led by returnee chairmen 
are 6.05% more likely to choose to listed on the UK and HK markets than the mainland 
China market at 1% level. In column 2, the coefficient of returnee CFOs (0.1811, 
z=5.75) shows that entrepreneurial firms led by returnee CFOs are 18.11% more likely 
to choose to list on the US and HK markets than the mainland China market, at the 1% 
level. In column 3, the coefficient of other returnee senior executives (0.1071, z=4.64) 
shows that entrepreneurial firms led by other returnee senior executives are 10.71% 
more likely to choose to list on the US and HK markets than the mainland China market, 
at the 1% level. 





 The primary goal of this study is to explore the role of returnee CEOs in IPO 
market selection. My research finds that entrepreneurial firms with returnee CEOs prefer 
to list on US or Hong Kong capital markets rather than in mainland China, especially 
entrepreneurial firms operating in high-tech industries. However, they are less likely to 
choose the US market after the credibility crisis of 2011. I also find further evidence to 
support that returnee CEOs represent good signals that entrepreneurial firms with 
returnee CEOs are associated with lower IPO underpricing by listing on foreign markets.  
6.6.1 Contribution to Chinese returnee studies 
 Returning overseas graduates have contributed greatly to the social and 
economic development of modern China, but the effect of returnees on the 
internationalization of entrepreneurial firms deserves more attention in entrepreneurship 
studies. Previous research has studied the role of returnee entrepreneurs in the growth 
and innovation of early-stage entrepreneurial firms (Wright et al., 2008; Filatotchev et 
al., 2009; Liu et al., 2010a; Liu et al., 2010b; Filatotchev et al., 2011; Lin et al., 2016). 
More specifically, Wright et al. (2008) analyze high-tech Small- and Medium-sized 
Enterprises (SMEs) and find that returnee entrepreneurs have a positive effect on 
employment growth in SMEs located in certain types of science parks. Returnee 
entrepreneurs are positively associated with entrepreneurial decision (Lin et al., 2016), 
firm innovation (Filatotchev et al., 2011), innovative performance, and multinational 
enterprises’ employee mobility (Liu et al., 2010a, 2010b). In terms of 




and finds that returnee entrepreneurs have a positive impact on export orientation and 
performance because of their foreign social networks. Because I consider foreign social 
networks and foreign institutional experience to be advantages, I use IPOs of Chinese 
firms to study the relationship between entrepreneurial firms with returnee CEOs and 
foreign IPOs. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that identifies returnees 
as a determinant of foreign IPOs in the internationalization of entrepreneurial firms. 
6.6.2 Contribution to TMT characteristics and IPOs 
 This study contributes to the literature on the impact of top management team 
member characteristics on IPO decisions (Hursti and Mauls, 2007) and IPO performance 
(Zimmerman, 2008). Hursti and Mauls (2007) argue that international experience of the 
top management team reduces the home bias of companies in choosing IPO markets, but 
they do not specifically focus on CEOs. Zimmerman (2008) finds that top management 
team heterogeneity, in terms of functional background or educational background, is 
associated with greater capital accumulation. However, the literature focuses on the 
impact of the TMT but does not look at each member of the TMT individually. I 
contribute to the literature by mainly looking at the impact of CEO international 
experience on IPO market selection, and the impact of CEO international experience on 
IPO underpricing. In addition, I also test the impact of other TMT members with 
international experience on IPO market selection separately to provide additional 




6.6.3 Contribution to IPO Market Selection Studies  
I contribute to empirical studies exploring the determinants of foreign IPOs of 
entrepreneurial firms (Hursti and Mauls, 2007), especially for emerging markets (Cheng 
and Schwienbacher, 2016; Zhang and Yu, 2016). Previous studies provide evidence that 
the likelihood of foreign IPOs is influenced by top management team international 
experience in European markets (Hursti and Mauls, 2007). I provide comparable robust 
evidence from emerging markets by studying Chinese returnee CEOs. The evidence also 
extends studies on the determinants of foreign IPOs of Chinese firms from a VC 
perspective (Cheng and Schwienbacher, 2016; Zhang and Yu, 2016) to a CEO 
perspective. 
6.6.4 Policy and Practical Implications 
 My findings have implications for policymakers and practitioners. The Chinese 
government has made great efforts to attract overseas Chinese professionals to return 
and contribute to the development of the Chinese economy. In addition to previous 
studies which confirm the positive effect of returnees on early stage and listed firms 
(Wright et al., 2008; Filatotchev et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2010a; Liu et al., 2010b; 
Filatotchev et al., 2011; Lin et al., 2016), I add new evidence to support the positive role 
of returnee CEOs on the process of firm internationalization. This suggests that 
policymakers should continue to encourage firms listed on the ChiNext market to 
appoint returnees. The novel findings of my study suggest the important role of returnee 




suggests that practitioners should pay attention to international experience when 
appointing CEOs. 
6.6.5 Limitations and Future Studies 
 Although this chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of the effect of returnee 
CEOs on entrepreneurial firms and finds robust and reliable results, the study has 
limitations that open avenues for future research. First, I do not have the data to identify 
what connections returnee CEOs do have, and what the quality of these connections is. 
Second, prospectuses do not disclose detailed information of any venture capital 
background, and I were unable to identify the nationality of venture capital investors. 
Future studies could, therefore, usefully explore the impact of returnees’ connection 
types and quality on foreign IPOs and IPO performance, and investigate the impact of 
local versus foreign venture capital. In addition, generalized evidence from other 
emerging economies could be explored by future studies.  
6.7 Conclusion 
Many studies have investigated whether returnees are better than locals in 
contributing to the value of entrepreneurial firms (Wright et al., 2008; Filatotchev et al., 
2009; Liu et al., 2010a; Liu et al., 2010b; Filatotchev et al., 2011; Lin et al., 2016). My 
study extends this analysis by examining whether returnee CEOs affect IPO market 
selection and IPO underpricing. I find that entrepreneurial firms led by returnee CEOs 
tend to choose to list on foreign capital markets, especially those operating in high-tech 




the US NASDAQ market after 2011, due to the credibility crisis. The credibility crisis 
did not spread to the Hong Kong market, and entrepreneurial firms with returnee CEOs 
are negatively associated with IPO underpricing. To sum up, this chapter extends the 
current research into the effect of returnees on IPO market selection and contributes to 
the literature on foreign IPOs. My insights benefit from the foreign network resources 
and the institutional expertise perspectives for analyzing the role of returnees. Although 
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Table 6.1 Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics of variables in this chapter. All variables are defined in Appendix. The sample includes IPOs of 
Chinese firms listed in the ChiNext market, NASDAQ market, and HKEX market from 2009 to 2012. 
Variables China Mainland US HK China — US China — HK US — HK 
 
Obs Mean SD Median Obs Mean SD Median Obs Mean SD Median Mean in Diff Mean in Diff Mean in Diff 
Returnee CEO 355 0.13 0.34 0 33 0.30 0.47 0 23 0.43 0.51 0 -0.17** -0.3024*** -0.1317 
CEO Age 355 45.16 5.62 45 33 44.39 6.66 43 23 47.91 9.98 43 0.77 -2.7525 -3.5191 
Founder CEO 355 0.54 0.50 1 33 0.76 0.44 1 23 0.52 0.51 1 -0.22*** 0.0191 0.2358* 
CEO Duality 355 0.53 0.50 1 33 0.61 0.50 1 23 0.39 0.50 1 -0.08 0.1383 0.2148 
Firm Size 355 19.31 0.63 19.25 33 19.61 1.07 19.66 23 18.32 0.87 18.28 -0.30** 0.9929*** 1.2935*** 
Board Size 355 8.38 1.40 9 33 6.21 1.69 6 23 6.57 1.47 6 2.17*** 1.8151*** -0.3531 
Board Independence 355 0.37 0.05 0.33 33 0.48 0.15 0.5 23 0.50 0.13 0.5 -0.11*** -0.1307*** -0.0168 
VC Back 355 0.09 0.10 0.06 33 0.68 0.47 1 23 0.26 0.45 0 -0.08 0. 4180*** 0.1343*** 
High-Tech 355 0.36 0.48 0 33 0.64 0.49 1 23 0.13 0.34 1 -0.27*** 0.2329*** 0.5059*** 
Firm Age 355 8.31 4.61 8.46 33 8.61 2.860 9 23 11.96 6.55 9 -0.30 -3.6462** -3.3505** 
IPO Underpricing 355 0.34 0.36 0.25 33 0.10 0.36 -0.01 23 0.18 0.28 0.08 0.24*** 0.1562** -0.0853 
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Table 6.2 Returnee CEOs and Foreign IPOs (China Mainland, US or HK) 
This table reports the probit regression analyses between Returnee CEO and listed market 
selection. All the variables are defined in Appendix. The coefficients reported are average 
marginal effects. T-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Variables China vs US&HK China vs US China vs HK 
Returnee CEO 0.0924*** 0.0517*** 0.1030*** 
 (4.01) (3.48) (2.60) 
Firm Size 0.0178 0.0298*** -0.0553*** 
 (1.19) (3.19) (-4.23) 
Board Size -0.0406*** -0. 0240*** 0.0141** 
 (-4.71) (-4.29) (2.03) 
Board Independence 0.6533*** 0.3262*** 1.0499*** 
 (4.75) (3.53) (4.02) 
VC Back 0.0245 0.0411*** -0.04122* 
 (1.13) (2.90) (-1.79) 
High Tech 0.08974*** 0.0643*** -0.0028 
 (3.14) (3.33) (-0.10) 
Frim Age 0.0076*** 0.0051** 0.0023* 
 (3.28) (2.23) (1.80) 
Founder CEO 0.0314 0.0427*** -0.0116 
 (1.33) (2.75) (-0.45) 
CEO Duality -0.0690** -0.0461** -0.1371*** 
 (-2.42) (-2.53) (-3.41) 
CEO Age -0.0027* -0.0016 0.0002 
 (-1.66) (-1.32) (0.09) 
CEO Ownership 0.1449** 0.1017** 0.2395** 
 (2.00) (2.14) (2.26) 
MBA 0.0189 0.0052 0.0755*** 
 (0.69) (0.24) (2.65) 
Year effects YES YES YES 
Industry effects YES YES YES 
Pseudo R
2
 0.5984 0.7112 0.7538 




Table 6.3 Returnee CEOs and Foreign IPOs: Moderating Effects by High-
tech Industry and Muddy Water Research 
 
This table reports the probit regression analyses between Returnee CEO and listed market 
selection, by moderating effects of high-tech industries and Muddy Water research. All the 
variables are defined in Appendix. The coefficients reported are average marginal effects. T-
values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 




China vs US&HK 
 
China vs US&HK 52 


















  Post2011 
  
-0.0623** 
   
(-2.10) 
Returnee CEO*Post 2011 
  
-0.0554** 
   
(-2.13) 
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 I exclude observations that list on Hong Kong second board market because there is no IPOs of Chinese 



















Table 6.4 Returnee CEOs and Foreign IPO Underpricing 
This table reports the OLS regression analyses between Foreign IPOs with returnee CEOs and 
IPO underpricing, by split sample. All the variables are defined in Appendix. T-values are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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 I do not test the IPO underpricing in Hong Kong second board market before 2011 because there is no 
IPOs of Chinese firm in 2009 and 2010 naturally. 
 




























  HK Market 
   
-0.1529 
    
(-1.48) 
Returnee CEO*HK Market 
   
-0.1440 
    
(-1.34) 















































































Constant 1.3197 2.5387*** 2.8393*** 
 (1.45) (3.59)  (4.24) 
Year effects YES YES 
 
YES 
Industry effects YES YES 
 
YES 
R2 0.455 0.158 
 
0.164 





Table 6.5 Returnee CEOs and Foreign IPOs: Subsample tests by Founder 
CEOs, Chairman CEOs, and both Founder and Chairman CEOs. 
This table reports the probit regression analyses between Returnee CEO and listed market 
selection by subsamples. All the variables are defined in Appendix. The coefficients reported are 
average marginal effects. T-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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CEO Duality -0.6099 
    
 
(-1.18) 




   
(2.17) 



























Table 6.6 Chairman, CFO, Other Senior Executives and Foreign IPOs 
 
This table reports the probit regression analyses between Returnee Chairman, Returnee CFO, 
and Other Returnee Senior Executives and listed market selection. All the variables are defined 
in Appendix 6.1. The coefficients reported are average marginal effects. T-values are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Variables China vs US&HK China vs US&HK China vs US&HK 












Other Returnee Senior Executives 
  
0.1071*** 
   
(4.64) 
Firm Size 0.0223 0.0139 0.0188 
 
(1.31) (1.26) (1.17) 
Board Size -0.0381*** -0.0233*** -0.0385*** 
 
(-3.82) (-3.06) (-4.59) 
Board Independence 0.6823*** 0.7786*** 0.7459*** 
 
(4.24) (5.72) (5.41) 
VC Back 0.0350** 0.0217 0.0218 
 
(2.52) (1.04) (1.00) 
High-Tech 0.0912*** 0.0768*** 0.0949*** 
 
(3.46) (3.15) (3.30) 
Firm Age 0.0085*** 0.0054*** 0.0077*** 
 
(3.83) (2.76) (3.98) 
Founder CEO 0.0451* 0.0268 0.0345 
 
(1.75) (1.36) (1.53) 
CEO Duality -0.0552** -0.0323 -0.0505** 
 
(-2.13) (-1.64) (-2.17) 
Year effects YES YES YES 
Industry effects YES YES YES 
Pseudo R
2
 0.5648 0.7174 0.6127 









Returnee CEO Dummy variable equal to one if the CEO has overseas work experience, overseas 
study experience, overseas permanent residence, or holds a foreign nationality, 
and zero otherwise. 
CEO Age The age of the CEO at the time of the IPO. 
Firm Size The natural logarithm of total sales in the latest fiscal year before the time of the 
IPO. 
Board Size The number of directors on the board at the time of the IPO. 
Board Independence The percentage of independent directors on the board at the time of the IPO. 
VC Back Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is backed by VC at the time of the IPO, 
and zero otherwise. 
High-Tech Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is classified as a high-tech firm, and zero 
otherwise. 
Firm Age The age of the firm at the time of the IPO. 
Founder CEO Dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is the founder at the time of the IPO, and 
zero otherwise. 
CEO Duality Dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is the chairman at the time of the IPO, 
and zero otherwise. 
IPO Underpricing The percentage difference between the offer price and the closing price on the first 
trading day. 
China vs US&HK Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is listed on the NASDAQ or HKEX 
markets, and zero otherwise. 
China vs US Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is listed on the NASDAQ market, and 
zero if the firm is listed on the ChiNext market. 
Post2011 Dummy variable equal to one if the IPO year is 2011 or 2012, and zero otherwise. 
US Market Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is listed on the NASDAQ market, and 
zero if the firm is listed on the ChiNext market. 
HK Market Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is listed on the HKEX market, and zero if 
the firm is listed on the ChiNext market. 
Year effects The year ranges from 2009 to 2012. Some year effect variables may be 
automatically omitted in different regressions. 
Industry effects Constructed by the first two digits of the Global Industry Classification Standard 
(GICS). Some industry effect variables may be automatically omitted in different 
regressions. 
Returnee Chairman Dummy variable equal to one if the board chairman has overseas work experience, 
overseas study experience, overseas permanent residence, or foreign nationality, 
and zero otherwise. 
Returnee CFO Dummy variable equal to one if the CFO has overseas work experience, overseas 




Dummy variable equal to one if the other senior executives have overseas work 
experience, overseas study experience, overseas permanent residence, or hold 
foreign nationality, and zero otherwise. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
 This thesis examines the role of Chinese returnee CEOs in Chinese capital 
markets. First, by exploiting  2847 returnee CEO hire event in A-share main board 
markets, I find that Chinese returnee CEOs are associated with inferior performance, 
lower market reactions to appointment announcements and an adverse regulatory 
environment. The negative effect disappears when social capital is acquired, regional 
legal institutions are strong or returnees’ international expertise is in demand. The 
evidence supports the argument that the CEOs’ international expertise is acquired at 
the opportunity cost of local social capital, which is more important than expertise in 
countries with weak legal institutions. The results hold after controlling the 
endogeneity issue.  
Second, I study the impact of returnee CEOs on the newly public 
entrepreneurial firms that are in transition period. With the help of the tacit 
knowledge of foreign advanced legal institutions, returnee CEOs could overcome the 
formalization challenge in newly public entrepreneurial firms. I find that returnee 
CEOs are positively associated with post-IPO performance that is proxied by ROA, 
ROS and Tobin’s Q, especially those returned from host countries with stronger legal 
institutions. In addition, the positive impact is more pronounced when foreign VCs 
back firms, especially when both VCs and CEOs are from countries with advanced 
institutions.  
Finally, I study the impact of returnee CEOs on the listing decision of GEMs. 
By using the IPOs on ChiNext Board, NASDAQ, and HK GEM, I find that 
entrepreneurial firms with returnee CEOs are more likely to get listed on NASDAQ 
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and HK GEM rather than ChiNext Board, especially for firms in high-tech industry. 
However, the credibility crisis of US-listed Chinese firms that was triggered by 
Muddy Water Research in 2011 impedes the firms with returnee CEOs to list in 
NASDAQ and HK GEM. 
 The findings of this thesis have implications for policymakers and 
practitioners. First, the evidence shows that mature firms need take external 
resources into consideration in the appointment of CEOs, besides their expertise, and 
firms listed on the ChiNext market need to appoint returnees. Second, policy makers 
need create a more suitable environment in which returnee CEOs can exercise their 
expertise. Third, the evidence suggests that policy makers should continue to 
encourage attracting overseas Chinese talents and support them to run business and 
implement their tacit knowledge. My findings also suggest policy makers should pay 
attention when matching CEOs and VCs and, in particular, encourage foreign 
venture capital investment in entrepreneurial firms led by returnees, because they 
enchance corporate value. 
 This thesis remains a fruitful area for the future research since the data on 
CEOs with international experience is only focus on Chinese market, and the data 
cannot reflect the length of the international experience. Future research could rely 
on detailed data to examine the quality of returnee CEOs on firm policies, capital 
structure or even international mergers and acquisitions. In addition, future research 
can also study the effect of CEOs with international experience through cross-
country evidence. My thesis studies the role of CEOs with international evidence in 
the country with weak legal institutions. It would be interest to look at the role of 
CEOs with international experience across countries with different legal origins. 
